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From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@arm.com>,
	Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
	Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Drop mte_allowed check during memslot creation
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2025 15:58:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Z786ODqxlYNpj40l@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <yq5a8qptauyl.fsf@kernel.org>

On Wed, Feb 26, 2025 at 03:28:26PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
> Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> writes:
> > On Mon, 24 Feb 2025 16:44:06 +0000,
> > Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> wrote:
> >> >> On Mon, Feb 24, 2025 at 12:24:14PM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> >> >> > > On Mon, Feb 24, 2025 at 03:09:38PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) wrote:
> >> >> > > > This change is needed because, without it, users are not able to use MTE
> >> >> > > > with VFIO passthrough (currently the mapping is either Device or
> >> >> > > > NonCacheable for which tag access check is not applied.), as shown
> >> >> > > > below (kvmtool VMM).
[...]
> >> >> > My other concern is that this gives pretty poor consistency to the
> >> >> > guest, which cannot know what can be tagged and what cannot, and
> >> >> > breaks a guarantee that the guest should be able to rely on.
[...]
> >> What if we trigger a memory fault exit with the TAGACCESS flag, allowing
> >> the VMM to use the GPA to retrieve additional details and print extra
> >> information to aid in analysis? BTW, we will do this on the first fault
> >> in cacheable, non-tagged memory even if there is no tagaccess in that
> >> region. This can be further improved using the NoTagAccess series I
> >> posted earlier, which ensures the memory fault exit occurs only on
> >> actual tag access
> >> 
> >> Something like below?
> >
> > Something like that, only with:
> >
> > - a capability informing userspace of this behaviour
> >
> > - a per-VM (or per-VMA) flag as a buy-in for that behaviour
> 
> If we’re looking for a capability based control, could we tie that up to
> FEAT_MTE_PERM? That’s what I did here:
> 
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250110110023.2963795-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org
> 
> That patch set also addresses the issue mentioned here. Let me know if
> you think this is a better approach

From the patch linked above:

| @@ -2152,7 +2162,8 @@ int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
|  		if (!vma)
|  			break;
| 
| -		if (kvm_has_mte(kvm) && !kvm_vma_mte_allowed(vma)) {
| +		if (kvm_has_mte(kvm) &&
| +		    !kvm_has_mte_perm(kvm) && !kvm_vma_mte_allowed(vma)) {
|  			ret = -EINVAL;
|  			break;
|  		}

we also have the same ABI change every time FEAT_MTE_PERM is present.
TBH, I'd rather have it from the start as per the patch in this thread,
irrespective of FEAT_MTE_PERM. I'm fine, however, with better exit to
VMM information though.

If we don't want to confuse the VMMs, we could skip the
kvm_vma_mte_allowed() check only for VM_ALLOW_ANY_UNCACHED and
VM_PFNMAP vmas, maybe the latter only with FEAT_MTE_PERM. I don't think
the VMM would get it wrong here since a VFIO mmap() would not support
MTE anyway.

-- 
Catalin


  reply	other threads:[~2025-02-26 16:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-02-24  9:39 [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Drop mte_allowed check during memslot creation Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2025-02-24 10:32 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2025-02-24 11:05 ` Catalin Marinas
2025-02-24 12:24   ` Marc Zyngier
2025-02-24 14:39     ` Catalin Marinas
2025-02-24 15:02       ` Marc Zyngier
2025-02-24 16:44         ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-02-24 17:23           ` Marc Zyngier
2025-02-26  8:02             ` Oliver Upton
2025-02-26  9:58             ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-02-26 15:58               ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2025-02-26 16:48                 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-02-26 18:02                   ` Catalin Marinas
2025-02-24 18:00         ` Catalin Marinas

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