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From: Oliver Upton To: Mostafa Saleh Cc: maz@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tabba@google.com, kaleshsingh@google.com, will@kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com, yuzenghui@huawei.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, james.morse@arm.com Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Use different pointer authentication keys for pKVM Message-ID: References: <20230516141531.791492-1-smostafa@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20230516141531.791492-1-smostafa@google.com> X-Migadu-Flow: FLOW_OUT X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20230526_134802_232917_898A89FC X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 31.10 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 02:15:31PM +0000, Mostafa Saleh wrote: > When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL, it > uses Armv8.3-Pauth for return address protection for the kernel code > including nvhe code in EL2. > > Same keys are used in both kernel(EL1) and nvhe code(EL2), this is > fine for nvhe but not when running in protected mode(pKVM) as the host > can't be trusted. But we trust it enough to hand pKVM a fresh set of keys before firing off? I understand there is some degree of initialization required to get pKVM off the ground, but I question in this case if key handoff is strictly necessary. There are potentially other sources of random directly available at EL2, such as the SMCCC TRNG ABI or FEAT_RNG. Should pKVM prefer one of these random implementations and only fall back to host-provided keys if absolutely necessary? > The keys for the hypervisor are generated from the kernel before it > de-privileges, each cpu has different keys, this relies on nvhe code > not being migratable while running. > > This patch adds host/hyp save/restore for the keys. > For guest/hyp, they are already handled in common kvm code in > __guest_enter, where they are saved/restored if they are not > trapped. Try to avoid "this patch" or any self-referential language in the changelog. Just directly state what the patch does: Similar to guest entry/exit, start context switching the pointer authentication keys on host/entry exit if the feature is in use. > Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh > --- > arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c > index 14391826241c..dd03b52f035d 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c > @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ DECLARE_KVM_HYP_PER_CPU(unsigned long, kvm_hyp_vector); > DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, kvm_arm_hyp_stack_page); > DECLARE_KVM_NVHE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_nvhe_init_params, kvm_init_params); > > +DECLARE_KVM_NVHE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_cpu_context, kvm_hyp_ctxt); > + > static bool vgic_present; > > static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned char, kvm_arm_hardware_enabled); > @@ -2067,6 +2069,26 @@ static int __init kvm_hyp_init_protection(u32 hyp_va_bits) > return 0; > } > > +static void pkvm_hyp_init_ptrauth(void) > +{ > + struct kvm_cpu_context *hyp_ctxt; > + int cpu; > + > + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { > + hyp_ctxt = per_cpu_ptr_nvhe_sym(kvm_hyp_ctxt, cpu); > + hyp_ctxt->sys_regs[APIAKEYLO_EL1] = get_random_long(); > + hyp_ctxt->sys_regs[APIAKEYHI_EL1] = get_random_long(); > + hyp_ctxt->sys_regs[APIBKEYLO_EL1] = get_random_long(); > + hyp_ctxt->sys_regs[APIBKEYHI_EL1] = get_random_long(); > + hyp_ctxt->sys_regs[APDAKEYLO_EL1] = get_random_long(); > + hyp_ctxt->sys_regs[APDAKEYHI_EL1] = get_random_long(); > + hyp_ctxt->sys_regs[APDBKEYLO_EL1] = get_random_long(); > + hyp_ctxt->sys_regs[APDBKEYHI_EL1] = get_random_long(); > + hyp_ctxt->sys_regs[APGAKEYLO_EL1] = get_random_long(); > + hyp_ctxt->sys_regs[APGAKEYHI_EL1] = get_random_long(); > + } > +} > + > /* Inits Hyp-mode on all online CPUs */ > static int __init init_hyp_mode(void) > { > @@ -2228,6 +2250,10 @@ static int __init init_hyp_mode(void) > kvm_hyp_init_symbols(); > > if (is_protected_kvm_enabled()) { > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL) && > + cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH)) > + pkvm_hyp_init_ptrauth(); > + > init_cpu_logical_map(); > > if (!init_psci_relay()) { > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S > index b6c0188c4b35..255ba4af911b 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S > @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > .text > > @@ -37,10 +38,42 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__host_exit) > > /* Save the host context pointer in x29 across the function call */ > mov x29, x0 > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL > +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH > +b __skip_pauth_save > +alternative_else_nop_endif > + > +alternative_if ARM64_KVM_PROTECTED_MODE > + /* Save kernel ptrauth keys. */ > + add x18, x29, #CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1 > + ptrauth_save_state x18, x19, x20 > + > + /* Use hyp keys. */ > + adr_this_cpu x18, kvm_hyp_ctxt, x19 > + add x18, x18, #CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1 > + ptrauth_restore_state x18, x19, x20 > +alternative_else_nop_endif > +__skip_pauth_save: > +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL */ > + > bl handle_trap > > - /* Restore host regs x0-x17 */ > __host_enter_restore_full: > + /* Restore kernel keys. */ > +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL > +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH > +b __skip_pauth_restore > +alternative_else_nop_endif > + > +alternative_if ARM64_KVM_PROTECTED_MODE > + add x18, x29, #CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1 > + ptrauth_restore_state x18, x19, x20 > +alternative_else_nop_endif > +__skip_pauth_restore: > +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL */ > + > + /* Restore host regs x0-x17 */ > ldp x0, x1, [x29, #CPU_XREG_OFFSET(0)] > ldp x2, x3, [x29, #CPU_XREG_OFFSET(2)] > ldp x4, x5, [x29, #CPU_XREG_OFFSET(4)] > -- > 2.40.1.606.ga4b1b128d6-goog > -- Thanks, Oliver _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel