linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Yuntao Liu <liuyuntao12@huawei.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	gor@linux.ibm.com, Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
	Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>,
	Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	imbrenda@linux.ibm.com, pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] remove AND operation in choose_random_kstack_offset()
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 11:45:22 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZnFlQgVSTtf0t2cU@J2N7QTR9R3> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d0959336-4430-4062-b909-54d553238468@app.fastmail.com>

Hi Arnd,

On Mon, Jun 17, 2024 at 10:33:08PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 17, 2024, at 20:22, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 17, 2024 at 04:52:15PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> >> On Mon, Jun 17, 2024 at 01:37:21PM +0000, Yuntao Liu wrote:
> >> > Since the offset would be bitwise ANDed with 0x3FF in
> >> > add_random_kstack_offset(), so just remove AND operation here.
> >> > 
> >> > Signed-off-by: Yuntao Liu <liuyuntao12@huawei.com>
> >> 
> >> The comments in arm64 and x86 say that they're deliberately capping the
> >> offset at fewer bits than the result of KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX() masking the
> >> value with 0x3FF.
> >> 
> >> Maybe it's ok to expand that, but if that's the case the commit message
> >> needs to explain why it's safe add extra bits (2 on arm64, 3 on s39 and
> >> x86), and those comments need to be updated accordingly.
> >> 
> >> As-is, I do not think this patch is ok.
> >
> > Yeah, I agree: the truncation is intentional and tuned to the
> > architecture.
> 
> It may be intentional, but it's clearly nonsense: there is nothing
> inherent to the architecture that means we have can go only 256
> bytes instead of 512 bytes into the 16KB available stack space.
> 
> As far as I can tell, any code just gets bloated to the point
> where it fills up the available memory, regardless of how
> much you give it. I'm sure one can find code paths today that
> exceed the 16KB, so there is no point pretending that 15.75KB
> is somehow safe to use while 15.00KB is not.
> 
> I'm definitely in favor of making this less architecture
> specific, we just need to pick a good value, and we may well
> end up deciding to use less than the default 1KB. We can also
> go the opposite way and make the limit 4KB but then increase
> the default stack size to 20KB for kernels that enable
> randomization.

Sorry, to be clear, I'm happy for this to change, so long as:

* The commit message explains why that's safe.

  IIUC this goes from 511 to 1023 bytes on arm64, which is ~3% of the
  stack, so maybe that is ok. It'd be nice to see any rationale/analysis
  beyond "the offset would be bitwise ANDed with 0x3FF".

* The comments in architecture code referring to the masking get
  removed/updated along with the masking.

My complaint was that the patch didn't do those things.

Mark.


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-06-18 10:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-06-17 13:37 [PATCH] remove AND operation in choose_random_kstack_offset() Yuntao Liu
2024-06-17 15:52 ` Mark Rutland
2024-06-17 18:22   ` Kees Cook
2024-06-17 20:33     ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-06-17 23:31       ` Kees Cook
2024-06-18  6:46         ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-06-18 10:45       ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2024-06-18 11:14         ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-06-18 11:51           ` Mark Rutland
2024-06-20  4:04         ` liuyuntao (F)

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=ZnFlQgVSTtf0t2cU@J2N7QTR9R3 \
    --to=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=agordeev@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=borntraeger@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=broonie@kernel.org \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=gor@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=gustavoars@kernel.org \
    --cc=hca@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=imbrenda@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=leobras@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-s390@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=liuyuntao12@huawei.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=svens@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).