* Re: [LTP] [PATCH] lib: tst_fd: Add kernel version check to memfd_secret [not found] ` <OS3PR01MB639110A9BC48CA10A9D97FEC92CF2@OS3PR01MB6391.jpnprd01.prod.outlook.com> @ 2024-06-19 17:33 ` Petr Vorel 2024-06-20 1:22 ` nobuhiro1.iwamatsu 0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread From: Petr Vorel @ 2024-06-19 17:33 UTC (permalink / raw) To: nobuhiro1.iwamatsu; +Cc: chrubis, ltp, linux-arm-kernel > Hi, > Thanks for your review. > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Cyril Hrubis <chrubis@suse.cz> > > Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2024 7:16 PM > > To: iwamatsu nobuhiro(岩松 信洋 ○ＤＩＴＣ□ＤＩＴ○ＯＳＴ) > > <nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp> > > Cc: ltp@lists.linux.it > > Subject: Re: [PATCH] lib: tst_fd: Add kernel version check to memfd_secret > > Hi! > > > memfd_secret is a syscall added since 5.14. On earlier kernels, tests > > > such as accept03, readahead01 and splice07 that use memfd_secret fail. > > > This adds a kernel version check to the tst_fd library when running > > > tests using memfd_secret. > > > Test log on linux-5.10.162/arm32 with version 20240524: > > > ``` > > > $ ./testcases/kernel/syscalls/accept/accept03 > > > tst_test.c:1733: TINFO: LTP version: 20240524 > > > tst_test.c:1617: TINFO: Timeout per run is 0h 00m 30s > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on file : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on O_PATH file : EBADF (9) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on directory : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on /dev/zero : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on /proc/self/maps : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on pipe read end : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on pipe write end : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on epoll : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on eventfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on signalfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on timerfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on pidfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > tst_fd.c:151: TCONF: Skipping fanotify: ENOSYS (38) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on inotify : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > tst_fd.c:170: TCONF: Skipping userfaultfd: ENOSYS (38) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on perf event : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on io uring : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on bpf map : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on fsopen : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on fspick : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on open_tree : EBADF (9) > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on memfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > tst_test.c:1677: TBROK: Test killed by SIGILL! > > This looks like a bug either in kernel or libc. > This is caused by __NR_memfd_secure being defined as -1 (0xffffffff)and "Illegal instruction" > occurs when syscall() is executed. And this problem does not occur on x86_64. > I cannot decide if this is a bug or not. I can't decide if this is a bug or not, because this behavior has > existed for a long time. Interesting. But it'd be good to discuss it, right? In case there is something to improve. Cc linux-arm-kernel ML. > > > Summary: > > > passed 20 > > > failed 0 > > > broken 1 > > > skipped 2 > > > warnings 0 > > > ``` > > > Closed: #1145 > > > Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp> > > > --- > > > lib/tst_fd.c | 8 ++++++++ > > > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > > diff --git a/lib/tst_fd.c b/lib/tst_fd.c index 6538a098c..53f583fa0 > > > 100644 > > > --- a/lib/tst_fd.c > > > +++ b/lib/tst_fd.c > > > @@ -255,8 +255,16 @@ static void open_memfd(struct tst_fd *fd) > > > static void open_memfd_secret(struct tst_fd *fd) { > > > + if ((tst_kvercmp(5, 14, 0)) < 0) { > > > + tst_res(TINFO, "accept() on %s: Linux kernel version is before > > than v5.14", tst_fd_desc(fd)); > > > + errno = ENOSYS; > > > + goto skip; > > > + } > > > + > > > fd->fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0); > > > + > > > if (fd->fd < 0) { > > > +skip: > > > tst_res(TCONF | TERRNO, > > > "Skipping %s", tst_fd_desc(fd)); > > > } > > And this looks like you are working around the bug. > Your point is correct... > I would suggest using tst_syscall() to check for syscall undefined instead Well, I guess we don't want to use tst_syscall() otherwise it would call tst_brk(). I proposed similar patch some time ago [1], I suppose you told me privately exactly this. [1] https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/ltp/patch/20240124142108.303782-1-pvorel@suse.cz/ > of this modification. How about this modification? > ``` > --- a/lib/tst_fd.c > +++ b/lib/tst_fd.c > @@ -255,7 +255,8 @@ static void open_memfd(struct tst_fd *fd) > static void open_memfd_secret(struct tst_fd *fd) > { > - fd->fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0); > + fd->fd = tst_syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0); > if (fd->fd < 0) { > tst_res(TCONF | TERRNO, > "Skipping %s", tst_fd_desc(fd)); Therefore how about this? if ((tst_kvercmp(5, 14, 0)) < 0) { tst_res(TCONF, "accept() on %s: skipping due old kernel", tst_fd_desc(fd)); return; } Kind regards, Petr > Best regards, > Nobuhiro ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* RE: [LTP] [PATCH] lib: tst_fd: Add kernel version check to memfd_secret 2024-06-19 17:33 ` [LTP] [PATCH] lib: tst_fd: Add kernel version check to memfd_secret Petr Vorel @ 2024-06-20 1:22 ` nobuhiro1.iwamatsu 2024-06-20 13:25 ` Petr Vorel 0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread From: nobuhiro1.iwamatsu @ 2024-06-20 1:22 UTC (permalink / raw) To: pvorel; +Cc: chrubis, ltp, linux-arm-kernel Hi! Thanks for your comment. > > > > $ ./testcases/kernel/syscalls/accept/accept03 > > > > tst_test.c:1733: TINFO: LTP version: 20240524 > > > > tst_test.c:1617: TINFO: Timeout per run is 0h 00m 30s > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on file : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on O_PATH file : EBADF (9) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on directory : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on /dev/zero : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on /proc/self/maps : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on pipe read end : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on pipe write end : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on epoll : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on eventfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on signalfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on timerfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on pidfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > tst_fd.c:151: TCONF: Skipping fanotify: ENOSYS (38) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on inotify : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > tst_fd.c:170: TCONF: Skipping userfaultfd: ENOSYS (38) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on perf event : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on io uring : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on bpf map : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on fsopen : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on fspick : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on open_tree : EBADF (9) > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on memfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > tst_test.c:1677: TBROK: Test killed by SIGILL! > > > > This looks like a bug either in kernel or libc. > > > This is caused by __NR_memfd_secure being defined as -1 (0xffffffff)and > "Illegal instruction" > > occurs when syscall() is executed. And this problem does not occur on > x86_64. > > I cannot decide if this is a bug or not. I can't decide if this is a > > bug or not, because this behavior has existed for a long time. > > Interesting. But it'd be good to discuss it, right? In case there is something to > improve. Cc linux-arm-kernel ML. Indeed, Thank you. > > > > > Summary: > > > > passed 20 > > > > failed 0 > > > > broken 1 > > > > skipped 2 > > > > warnings 0 > > > > ``` > > > > > Closed: #1145 > > > > Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu > > > > <nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp> > > > > --- > > > > lib/tst_fd.c | 8 ++++++++ > > > > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > > > > diff --git a/lib/tst_fd.c b/lib/tst_fd.c index > > > > 6538a098c..53f583fa0 > > > > 100644 > > > > --- a/lib/tst_fd.c > > > > +++ b/lib/tst_fd.c > > > > @@ -255,8 +255,16 @@ static void open_memfd(struct tst_fd *fd) > > > > > static void open_memfd_secret(struct tst_fd *fd) { > > > > + if ((tst_kvercmp(5, 14, 0)) < 0) { > > > > + tst_res(TINFO, "accept() on %s: Linux kernel version > is before > > > than v5.14", tst_fd_desc(fd)); > > > > > > + errno = ENOSYS; > > > > + goto skip; > > > > + } > > > > + > > > > fd->fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0); > > > > + > > > > if (fd->fd < 0) { > > > > +skip: > > > > tst_res(TCONF | TERRNO, > > > > "Skipping %s", tst_fd_desc(fd)); > > > > } > > > > And this looks like you are working around the bug. > > > Your point is correct... > > I would suggest using tst_syscall() to check for syscall undefined > > instead > > Well, I guess we don't want to use tst_syscall() otherwise it would call tst_brk(). > I proposed similar patch some time ago [1], I suppose you told me privately > exactly this. > > [1] > https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/ltp/patch/20240124142108.303782-1-p > vorel@suse.cz/] I see, I understand. > > > of this modification. How about this modification? > > > ``` > > --- a/lib/tst_fd.c > > +++ b/lib/tst_fd.c > > @@ -255,7 +255,8 @@ static void open_memfd(struct tst_fd *fd) > > > static void open_memfd_secret(struct tst_fd *fd) { > > - fd->fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0); > > + fd->fd = tst_syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0); > > if (fd->fd < 0) { > > tst_res(TCONF | TERRNO, > > "Skipping %s", tst_fd_desc(fd)); > > > Therefore how about this? > > if ((tst_kvercmp(5, 14, 0)) < 0) { > tst_res(TCONF, "accept() on %s: skipping due old kernel", > tst_fd_desc(fd)); > return; > } > I did not explain well enough. The memfd_secret syscall itself is supported in 5.14, but is implemented on i386, x86_64, s390, and s390x with latest kernel. Other architectures are not supported. The above patch causes the same problem with the latest kernel. So, I create with the following patch based on your comments. How about this? --- a/lib/tst_fd.c +++ b/lib/tst_fd.c @@ -255,11 +255,20 @@ static void open_memfd(struct tst_fd *fd) static void open_memfd_secret(struct tst_fd *fd) { +#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) + if ((tst_kvercmp(5, 14, 0)) < 0) { + tst_res(TCONF, "%s: skipping due old kernel", tst_fd_desc(fd)); + return; + } + fd->fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0); if (fd->fd < 0) { tst_res(TCONF | TERRNO, "Skipping %s", tst_fd_desc(fd)); } +#else + tst_res(TCONF, "%s not supported on this architecture", tst_fd_desc(fd)); +#endif } static struct tst_fd_desc fd_desc[] = { @@ -287,7 +296,7 @@ static struct tst_fd_desc fd_desc[] = { [TST_FD_FSPICK] = {.open_fd = open_fspick, .desc = "fspick"}, [TST_FD_OPEN_TREE] = {.open_fd = open_open_tree, .desc = "open_tree"}, [TST_FD_MEMFD] = {.open_fd = open_memfd, .desc = "memfd"}, - [TST_FD_MEMFD_SECRET] = {.open_fd = open_memfd_secret, .desc = "memfd secret"}, + [TST_FD_MEMFD_SECRET] = {.open_fd = open_memfd_secret, .desc = "memfd_secret"}, Best regards, Nobuhiro ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [LTP] [PATCH] lib: tst_fd: Add kernel version check to memfd_secret 2024-06-20 1:22 ` nobuhiro1.iwamatsu @ 2024-06-20 13:25 ` Petr Vorel 2024-06-21 9:07 ` Cyril Hrubis 0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread From: Petr Vorel @ 2024-06-20 13:25 UTC (permalink / raw) To: nobuhiro1.iwamatsu; +Cc: chrubis, ltp, linux-arm-kernel > Hi! > Thanks for your comment. > > > > > $ ./testcases/kernel/syscalls/accept/accept03 > > > > > tst_test.c:1733: TINFO: LTP version: 20240524 > > > > > tst_test.c:1617: TINFO: Timeout per run is 0h 00m 30s > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on file : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on O_PATH file : EBADF (9) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on directory : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on /dev/zero : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on /proc/self/maps : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on pipe read end : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on pipe write end : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on epoll : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on eventfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on signalfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on timerfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on pidfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > tst_fd.c:151: TCONF: Skipping fanotify: ENOSYS (38) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on inotify : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > tst_fd.c:170: TCONF: Skipping userfaultfd: ENOSYS (38) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on perf event : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on io uring : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on bpf map : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on fsopen : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on fspick : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on open_tree : EBADF (9) > > > > > accept03.c:58: TPASS: accept() on memfd : ENOTSOCK (88) > > > > > tst_test.c:1677: TBROK: Test killed by SIGILL! > > > > This looks like a bug either in kernel or libc. > > > This is caused by __NR_memfd_secure being defined as -1 (0xffffffff)and > > "Illegal instruction" > > > occurs when syscall() is executed. And this problem does not occur on > > x86_64. > > > I cannot decide if this is a bug or not. I can't decide if this is a > > > bug or not, because this behavior has existed for a long time. > > Interesting. But it'd be good to discuss it, right? In case there is something to > > improve. Cc linux-arm-kernel ML. > Indeed, Thank you. > > > > > Summary: > > > > > passed 20 > > > > > failed 0 > > > > > broken 1 > > > > > skipped 2 > > > > > warnings 0 > > > > > ``` > > > > > Closed: #1145 > > > > > Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu > > > > > <nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp> > > > > > --- > > > > > lib/tst_fd.c | 8 ++++++++ > > > > > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > > > > diff --git a/lib/tst_fd.c b/lib/tst_fd.c index > > > > > 6538a098c..53f583fa0 > > > > > 100644 > > > > > --- a/lib/tst_fd.c > > > > > +++ b/lib/tst_fd.c > > > > > @@ -255,8 +255,16 @@ static void open_memfd(struct tst_fd *fd) > > > > > static void open_memfd_secret(struct tst_fd *fd) { > > > > > + if ((tst_kvercmp(5, 14, 0)) < 0) { > > > > > + tst_res(TINFO, "accept() on %s: Linux kernel version > > is before > > > > than v5.14", tst_fd_desc(fd)); > > > > > + errno = ENOSYS; > > > > > + goto skip; > > > > > + } > > > > > + > > > > > fd->fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0); > > > > > + > > > > > if (fd->fd < 0) { > > > > > +skip: > > > > > tst_res(TCONF | TERRNO, > > > > > "Skipping %s", tst_fd_desc(fd)); > > > > > } > > > > And this looks like you are working around the bug. > > > Your point is correct... > > > I would suggest using tst_syscall() to check for syscall undefined > > > instead > > Well, I guess we don't want to use tst_syscall() otherwise it would call tst_brk(). > > I proposed similar patch some time ago [1], I suppose you told me privately > > exactly this. > > [1] > > https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/ltp/patch/20240124142108.303782-1-p > > vorel@suse.cz/] > I see, I understand. > > > of this modification. How about this modification? > > > ``` > > > --- a/lib/tst_fd.c > > > +++ b/lib/tst_fd.c > > > @@ -255,7 +255,8 @@ static void open_memfd(struct tst_fd *fd) > > > static void open_memfd_secret(struct tst_fd *fd) { > > > - fd->fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0); > > > + fd->fd = tst_syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0); > > > if (fd->fd < 0) { > > > tst_res(TCONF | TERRNO, > > > "Skipping %s", tst_fd_desc(fd)); > > Therefore how about this? > > if ((tst_kvercmp(5, 14, 0)) < 0) { > > tst_res(TCONF, "accept() on %s: skipping due old kernel", > > tst_fd_desc(fd)); > > return; > > } > I did not explain well enough. > The memfd_secret syscall itself is supported in 5.14, but is implemented on i386, x86_64, s390, and s390x with latest kernel. > Other architectures are not supported. The above patch causes the same problem with the latest kernel. > So, I create with the following patch based on your comments. How about this? > --- a/lib/tst_fd.c > +++ b/lib/tst_fd.c > @@ -255,11 +255,20 @@ static void open_memfd(struct tst_fd *fd) > static void open_memfd_secret(struct tst_fd *fd) > { > +#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) Well, I would prefer to detect syscall support via ENOSYS (or whichever errno it uses on the archs which does not implement it), otherwise it will always TCONF regardless some arch may get support in the future. E.g. use the same approach as tst_syscall(), but just use tst_res() instead of tst_brk() (first run the syscall and then do the check - expect that errno != ENOSYS on these 4 archs on kernel >= 5.14. FYI We have usually this approach: we try to explicitly check whether certain functionality works if arch or filesystem dependent (e.g. some arch supports something), but sure still keep in mind that particular support can be extended (to other archs or filesystems). Also according to 1507f51255c9f ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas") [1] it's a configurable option (hidden via CONFIG_EXPERT, but it can be disabled). Therefore the functionality can be detected via check for CONFIG_SECRETMEM: tst_kconfig_get("CONFIG_SECRETMEM") == 'y'; Therefore something like this? static void open_memfd_secret(struct tst_fd *fd) { fd->fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0); if (errno == ENOSYS) { if (tst_kconfig_get("CONFIG_SECRETMEM") == 'y') { tst_brk(TBROK | TERRNO, "Broken memfd_secret() functionality"); } else { tst_res(TCONF | TERRNO, "Skipping %s due missing memfd_secret()", tst_fd_desc(fd)); return; } } if (fd->fd < 0) tst_res(TCONF | TERRNO, "Skipping %s", tst_fd_desc(fd)); } [1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=1507f51255c9ff07d75909a84e7c0d7f3c4b2f49 Therefore the original approach looked better to me. Kind regards, Petr > + if ((tst_kvercmp(5, 14, 0)) < 0) { > + tst_res(TCONF, "%s: skipping due old kernel", tst_fd_desc(fd)); > + return; > + } > + > fd->fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0); > if (fd->fd < 0) { > tst_res(TCONF | TERRNO, > "Skipping %s", tst_fd_desc(fd)); > } > +#else > + tst_res(TCONF, "%s not supported on this architecture", tst_fd_desc(fd)); > +#endif > } > static struct tst_fd_desc fd_desc[] = { > @@ -287,7 +296,7 @@ static struct tst_fd_desc fd_desc[] = { > [TST_FD_FSPICK] = {.open_fd = open_fspick, .desc = "fspick"}, > [TST_FD_OPEN_TREE] = {.open_fd = open_open_tree, .desc = "open_tree"}, > [TST_FD_MEMFD] = {.open_fd = open_memfd, .desc = "memfd"}, > - [TST_FD_MEMFD_SECRET] = {.open_fd = open_memfd_secret, .desc = "memfd secret"}, > + [TST_FD_MEMFD_SECRET] = {.open_fd = open_memfd_secret, .desc = "memfd_secret"}, > Best regards, > Nobuhiro ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [LTP] [PATCH] lib: tst_fd: Add kernel version check to memfd_secret 2024-06-20 13:25 ` Petr Vorel @ 2024-06-21 9:07 ` Cyril Hrubis 0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread From: Cyril Hrubis @ 2024-06-21 9:07 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Petr Vorel; +Cc: nobuhiro1.iwamatsu, ltp, linux-arm-kernel Hi! Can we first try the simple solution by adding fallback definitions before we add such complexity there? -- Cyril Hrubis chrubis@suse.cz ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
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2024-06-19 17:33 ` [LTP] [PATCH] lib: tst_fd: Add kernel version check to memfd_secret Petr Vorel
2024-06-20 1:22 ` nobuhiro1.iwamatsu
2024-06-20 13:25 ` Petr Vorel
2024-06-21 9:07 ` Cyril Hrubis
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