From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: "liuyuntao (F)" <liuyuntao12@huawei.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>,
Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] randomize_kstack: Remove non-functional per-arch entropy filtering
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 12:08:42 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZnVfOnIuFl2kNWkT@J2N7QTR9R3> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202406201127.17CE526F0@keescook>
On Thu, Jun 20, 2024 at 11:34:22AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 20, 2024 at 11:47:58AM +0800, liuyuntao (F) wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 2024/6/20 5:47, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > An unintended consequence of commit 9c573cd31343 ("randomize_kstack:
> > > Improve entropy diffusion") was that the per-architecture entropy size
> > > filtering reduced how many bits were being added to the mix, rather than
> > > how many bits were being used during the offsetting. All architectures
> > > fell back to the existing default of 0x3FF (10 bits), which will consume
> > > at most 1KiB of stack space. It seems that this is working just fine,
> > > so let's avoid the confusion and update everything to use the default.
> > >
> >
> > My original intent was indeed to do this, but I regret that not being more
> > explicit in the commit log..
> >
> > Additionally, I've tested the stack entropy by applying the following patch,
> > the result was `Bits of stack entropy: 7` on arm64, too. It does not seem to
> > affect the entropy value, maybe removing it is OK, or there may be some
> > nuances of your intentions that I've overlooked.
> >
> > --- a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> > @@ -79,9 +79,7 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
> > #define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do { \
> > if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \
> > &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \
> > - u32 offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \
> > - offset = ror32(offset, 5) ^ (rand); \
> > - raw_cpu_write(kstack_offset, offset); \
> > + raw_cpu_write(kstack_offset, rand); \
> > } \
> > } while (0)
> > #else /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */
>
> I blame the multiple applications of the word "entropy" in this feature. :)
>
> So, there's both:
>
> - "how many bits CAN be randomized?" (i.e. within what range can all
> possible stack offsets be?)
>
> and
>
> - "is the randomization predictable?" (i.e. is the distribution of
> selected positions with the above range evenly distributed?)
>
> Commit 9c573cd31343 ("randomize_kstack: Improve entropy diffusion") was
> trying to improve the latter, but accidentally also grew the former.
> This patch is just trying to clean all this up now.
>
> Thanks for testing! And I'm curious as to why arm64's stack offset
> entropy is 7 for you when we're expecting it to be 6. Anyway, that's not
> a problem I don't think. Just a greater offset range than expected.
Hmm....
I think this is due to the way the compiler aligns the stack in alloca(); it
rounds up the value of KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(offset) and ends up spilling over an
additional bit (e.g. 0x3f1 to 0x3ff round up to 0x400).
Looking at v6.10-rc4 defconfig + CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_STACKOFFSET=y, the
disassembly for arm64's invoke_syscall() looks like:
// offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset)
mov x4, sp
adrp x0, kstack_offset
mrs x5, tpidr_el1
add x0, x0, #:lo12:kstack_offset
ldr w0, [x0, x5]
// offset = KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(offset)
and x0, x0, #0x3ff
// alloca(offset)
add x0, x0, #0xf
and x0, x0, #0x7f0
sub sp, x4, x0
... which in C would be:
offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset)
offset &= 0x3ff; // [0x0, 0x3ff]
offset += 0xf; // [0xf, 0x40e]
offset &= 0x7f0; // [0x0,
... so when *all* bits [3:0] are 0, they'll have no impact, and when *any* of
bits [3:0] are 1 they'll trigger a carry into bit 4, which could ripple all the
way up and spill into bit 10.
I have no idea whether that's important. Kees, does that introduce a bias, and
if so do we need to care?
If I change the mask to discard the low bits:
#define KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(x) ((x) & 0x3F0)
... then the assembly avoids the rounding:
mov x4, sp
adrp x0, 0 <kstack_offset>
mrs x5, tpidr_el1
add x0, x0, #:lo12:kstack_offset
ldr w0, [x0, x5]
and x0, x0, #0x3f0
sub sp, x4, x0
Mark.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-21 11:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-19 21:47 [PATCH] randomize_kstack: Remove non-functional per-arch entropy filtering Kees Cook
2024-06-20 3:47 ` liuyuntao (F)
2024-06-20 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2024-06-21 11:08 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2024-06-26 22:10 ` Kees Cook
2024-06-20 9:34 ` Heiko Carstens
2024-06-20 10:01 ` Mark Rutland
2024-06-20 10:28 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-07-04 13:10 ` patchwork-bot+linux-riscv
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=ZnVfOnIuFl2kNWkT@J2N7QTR9R3 \
--to=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=agordeev@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=aou@eecs.berkeley.edu \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=borntraeger@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=gor@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=gustavoars@kernel.org \
--cc=hca@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=imbrenda@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=leobras@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-s390@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=liuyuntao12@huawei.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=palmer@dabbelt.com \
--cc=paul.walmsley@sifive.com \
--cc=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
--cc=svens@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox