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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: shechenglong <shechenglong@xfusion.com>,
	will@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stone.xulei@xfusion.com,
	chenjialong@xfusion.com, yuxiating@xfusion.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] cpu: fix hard lockup triggered during stress-ng stress testing.
Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2025 17:08:33 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aNF0gb1iZndz0-be@J2N7QTR9R3> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aMvsxd8nHb5roC0o@arm.com>

On Thu, Sep 18, 2025 at 12:28:05PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 18, 2025 at 02:49:07PM +0800, shechenglong wrote:
> > Context of the Issue:
> > In an ARM64 environment, the following steps were performed:
> > 
> > 1. Repeatedly ran stress-ng to stress the CPU, memory, and I/O.
> > 2. Cyclically executed test case pty06 from the LTP test suite.
> > 3. Added mitigations=off to the GRUB parameters.
> > 
> > After 1–2 hours of stress testing, a hardlockup occurred,
> > causing a system crash.
> > 
> > Root Cause of the Hardlockup:
> > Each time stress-ng starts, it invokes the /sys/kernel/debug/clear_warn_once
> > interface, which clears the values in the memory section from __start_once
> > to __end_once. This caused functions like pr_info_once() — originally
> > designed to print only once — to print again every time stress-ng was called.
> > If the pty06 test case happened to be using the serial module at that same
> > moment, it would sleep in waiter.list within the __down_common function.
> > 
> > After pr_info_once() completed its output using the serial module,
> > it invoked the semaphore up() function to wake up the process waiting
> > in waiter.list. This sequence triggered an A-A deadlock, ultimately
> > leading to a hardlockup and system crash.
> > 
> > To prevent this, a local variable should be used to control and ensure
> > the print operation occurs only once.
> > 
> > Hard lockup call stack:
> > 
> > _raw_spin_lock_nested+168
> > ttwu_queue+180 (rq_lock(rq, &rf); 2nd acquiring the rq->__lock)
> > try_to_wake_up+548
> > wake_up_process+32
> > __up+88
> > up+100
> > __up_console_sem+96
> > console_unlock+696
> > vprintk_emit+428
> > vprintk_default+64
> > vprintk_func+220
> > printk+104
> > spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation+344
> > __switch_to+100
> > __schedule+1028 (rq_lock(rq, &rf); 1st acquiring the rq->__lock)
> > schedule_idle+48
> > do_idle+388
> > cpu_startup_entry+44
> > secondary_start_kernel+352
> 
> Is the problem actually that we call the spectre v4 stuff on the
> switch_to() path (we can't change this) under the rq_lock() and it
> subsequently calls printk() which takes the console semaphore? I think
> the "once" aspect makes it less likely but does not address the actual
> problem.

Agreed; I think what we do here is structurally wrong, even if (in the
asbence of writes to the 'clear_warn_once' file) this happens to largely
do what we want today.

We really shouldn't print in accessors for kernel state.

> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
> > index edf1783ffc81..f8663157e041 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
> > @@ -424,8 +424,10 @@ static bool spectre_v4_mitigations_off(void)
> >  	bool ret = cpu_mitigations_off() ||
> >  		   __spectre_v4_policy == SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DISABLED;
> >  
> > -	if (ret)
> > -		pr_info_once("spectre-v4 mitigation disabled by command-line option\n");
> > +	static atomic_t __printk_once = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
> > +
> > +	if (ret && !atomic_cmpxchg(&__printk_once, 0, 1))
> > +		pr_info("spectre-v4 mitigation disabled by command-line option\n");
> >  
> >  	return ret;
> >  }
> 
> I think we should just avoid the printk() on the
> spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation() path. Well, I'd remove it altogether
> from the spectre_v4_mitigations_off() as it's called on kernel entry as
> well. Just add a different way to print the status during kernel boot if
> there isn't one already, maybe an initcall.

I agree; I think we want to rip that out of spectre_v2_mitigations_off()
too.

We print a bunch of things under setup_system_capabilities(), so hanging
something off that feels like the right thing to do.

Mark.


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-09-22 16:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-18  6:49 [PATCH] cpu: fix hard lockup triggered during stress-ng stress testing shechenglong
2025-09-18 11:28 ` Catalin Marinas
2025-09-19 12:05   ` 答复: " shechenglong
2025-09-22 16:54     ` Catalin Marinas
2025-09-22 16:08   ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2025-09-24 12:32 ` [PATCH] cpu: fix hard lockup triggered by printk calls within scheduling context shechenglong
2025-09-25 13:48   ` Catalin Marinas
2025-10-03 14:23   ` Will Deacon
2025-10-20 14:51 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] arm64: spectre: Fix hard lockup and cleanup mitigation messages shechenglong
2025-10-20 14:51   ` [PATCH v2 1/2] cpu:Remove the print when the CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY Kconfig option is disabled shechenglong
2025-10-20 14:51   ` [PATCH v2 2/2] cpu: fix hard lockup triggered by printk calls within scheduling context shechenglong
2025-10-29  3:45 ` [RESEND v2 0/2] arm64: spectre: Fix hard lockup and cleanup mitigation messages shechenglong
2025-10-29  3:45   ` [PATCH v2 1/2] cpu:Remove the print when the CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY Kconfig option is disabled shechenglong
2025-10-30 14:48     ` Will Deacon
2025-10-29  3:45   ` [PATCH v2 2/2] cpu: fix hard lockup triggered by printk calls within scheduling context shechenglong
2025-10-30 14:50     ` Will Deacon
2025-10-31  9:15 ` [PATCH v3 0/2] arm64: spectre: Fix hard lockup and cleanup mitigation messages shechenglong
2025-10-31  9:15   ` [PATCH v3 1/2] cpu:Remove the print when the CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY Kconfig option is disabled shechenglong
2025-10-31  9:15   ` [PATCH v3 2/2] cpu: fix hard lockup triggered by printk calls within scheduling context shechenglong
2025-11-07 15:53   ` [PATCH v3 0/2] arm64: spectre: Fix hard lockup and cleanup mitigation messages Will Deacon

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