From: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
To: Sebastian Ene <sebastianene@google.com>
Cc: maz@kernel.org, oliver.upton@linux.dev, will@kernel.org,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, joey.gouly@arm.com,
ayrton@google.com, yuzenghui@huawei.com, qperret@google.com,
kernel-team@android.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Check the untrusted offset in FF-A memory share
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2025 16:21:41 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aPj2hTXbGUseUqhE@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251017075710.2605118-1-sebastianene@google.com>
On Fri, Oct 17, 2025 at 07:57:10AM +0000, Sebastian Ene wrote:
> Verify the offset to prevent OOB access in the hypervisor
I believe that would be just a read, so probably it would be difficult to use
this to compromise anything, except crashing the system?
> FF-A buffer in case an untrusted large enough value
> [U32_MAX - sizeof(struct ffa_composite_mem_region) + 1, U32_MAX]
> is set from the host kernel.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ene <sebastianene@google.com>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c | 9 +++++++--
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c
> index 4e16f9b96f63..58b7d0c477d7 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c
> @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ static void __do_ffa_mem_xfer(const u64 func_id,
> struct ffa_mem_region_attributes *ep_mem_access;
> struct ffa_composite_mem_region *reg;
> struct ffa_mem_region *buf;
> - u32 offset, nr_ranges;
> + u32 offset, nr_ranges, checked_offset;
> int ret = 0;
>
> if (addr_mbz || npages_mbz || fraglen > len ||
> @@ -516,7 +516,12 @@ static void __do_ffa_mem_xfer(const u64 func_id,
> goto out_unlock;
> }
>
> - if (fraglen < offset + sizeof(struct ffa_composite_mem_region)) {
> + if (check_add_overflow(offset, sizeof(struct ffa_composite_mem_region), &checked_offset)) {
> + ret = FFA_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
> + goto out_unlock;
> + }
> +
> + if (fraglen < checked_offset) {
> ret = FFA_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
> goto out_unlock;
>
Perhaps this could be easier to reason about by moving this check with the nr_ranges?
reg = (void *)buf + offset;
if ((void *)reg->constituents > (void *)buf + fraglen) {
ret = FFA_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
goto out_unlock;
}
nr_ranges = ((void *)buf + fraglen) - (void *)reg->constituents;
if (nr_ranges % sizeof(reg->constituents[0])) {
ret = FFA_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
}
> --
> 2.51.0.858.gf9c4a03a3a-goog
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-10-22 15:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-17 7:57 [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Check the untrusted offset in FF-A memory share Sebastian Ene
2025-10-22 15:21 ` Vincent Donnefort [this message]
2025-10-29 10:27 ` Sebastian Ene
2025-10-29 16:23 ` Will Deacon
2025-10-30 16:23 ` Marc Zyngier
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