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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <Catalin.Marinas@arm.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [DISCUSSION] kstack offset randomization: bugs and performance
Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2025 18:15:17 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aRyppb8PCxFKVphr@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <dd5b4423-0954-44d5-99a5-0052b62c55af@app.fastmail.com>

On Mon, Nov 17, 2025 at 05:47:05PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 17, 2025, at 12:31, Ryan Roberts wrote:
> > On 17/11/2025 11:30, Ryan Roberts wrote:
> >> Hi All,
> >> 
> >> Over the last few years we had a few complaints that syscall performance on
> >> arm64 is slower than x86. Most recently, it was observed that a certain Java
> >> benchmark that does a lot of fstat and lseek is spending ~10% of it's time in
> >> get_random_u16(). Cue a bit of digging, which led me to [1] and also to some new
> >> ideas about how performance could be improved.
> 
> 
> >> I believe this helps the mean latency significantly without sacrificing any
> >> strength. But it doesn't reduce the tail latency because we still have to call
> >> into the crng eventually.
> >> 
> >> So here's another idea: Could we use siphash to generate some random bits? We
> >> would generate the secret key at boot using the crng. Then generate a 64 bit
> >> siphash of (cntvct_el0 ^ tweak) (where tweak increments every time we generate a
> >> new hash). As long as the key remains secret, the hash is unpredictable.
> >> (perhaps we don't even need the timer value). For every hash we get 64 bits, so
> >> that would last for 10 syscalls at 6 bits per call. So we would still have to
> >> call siphash every 10 syscalls, so there would still be a tail, but from my
> >> experiements, it's much less than the crng:
> 
> IIRC, Jason argued against creating another type of prng inside of the
> kernel for a special purpose. 

Yes indeed... I'm really not a fan of adding bespoke crypto willynilly
like that. Let's make get_random_u*() faster. If you're finding that the
issue with it is the locking, and that you're calling this from irq
context anyway, then your proposal (if I read this discussion correctly)
to add a raw_get_random_u*() seems like it could be sensible. Those
functions are generated via macro anyway, so it wouldn't be too much to
add the raw overloads. Feel free to send a patch to my random.git tree
if you'd like to give that a try.

Jason


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-11-18 17:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <66c4e2a0-c7fb-46c2-acce-8a040a71cd8e@arm.com>
2025-11-17 11:31 ` [DISCUSSION] kstack offset randomization: bugs and performance Ryan Roberts
2025-11-17 16:47   ` Arnd Bergmann
2025-11-17 17:23     ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-17 17:46     ` Mark Rutland
2025-11-17 23:04       ` Arnd Bergmann
2025-11-18 17:15     ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2025-11-18 17:21       ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-18 17:28         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2025-11-17 20:27   ` Kees Cook
2025-11-18 10:28     ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-18 11:25       ` Mark Rutland
2025-11-18 12:16         ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-18 11:05     ` Mark Rutland
2025-11-17 20:56   ` Jeremy Linton
2025-11-18 11:05     ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-24 14:36   ` Will Deacon
2025-11-24 17:11     ` Kees Cook
2025-11-24 17:50       ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-24 20:51         ` Kees Cook
2025-11-25 11:14           ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-26 22:58             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-27  8:00               ` Kees Cook
2025-11-27 11:50                 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-27 12:19                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-27 14:09                     ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-27 19:17                       ` Kees Cook
2025-11-24 19:08       ` Will Deacon

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