From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
Catalin Marinas <Catalin.Marinas@arm.com>,
"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/2] randomize_kstack: Unify random source across arches
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2025 10:02:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aS65LFUfdgRPKv1l@J2N7QTR9R3> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMj1kXG=HDVso1xc6TGgSrBpV3Sq2YQLdPKg2dw5z9qdrbdWBw@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Dec 02, 2025 at 10:47:04AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Tue, 2 Dec 2025 at 10:35, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 02, 2025 at 10:15:22AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > > On Mon, 1 Dec 2025 at 19:20, Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> wrote:
> > > > I've got bot warnings because this is being called from noinstr code. I guess
> > > > the best option is to just move add_random_kstack_offset() to after
> > > > instrumentation is enabled for the affected arches.
> > >
> > > Just put instrumentation_begin()/instrumentation_end() around the call
> > > to prandom_u32_state() - that seems to be the common approach for
> > > punching holes into the 'noinstr' validation.
> >
> > That silences the warning, but isn't necessarily safe, so please DO NOT
> > do that blindly.
>
> Oops - sorry about that.
No problem! I just wanted to make sure we didn't start to gain broken
usage that'd need an audit and cleanup.
[...]
> Given that prandom_u32_state() does a fairly straight-forward mangle
> of 4 32-bit words, might it be better to make that __always_inline
> itself?
Possibly! I don't know whether it's better to have prandom_u32_state()
inline or out-of-line.
So long as prandom_u32_state() doesn't call out to instrumented code,
making it an __always_inline function will be safe.
Mark.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-12-02 10:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-11-27 10:59 [RFC PATCH v1 0/2] Fix bugs and performance of kstack offset randomisation Ryan Roberts
2025-11-27 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/2] randomize_kstack: Maintain kstack_offset per task Ryan Roberts
2025-11-27 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/2] randomize_kstack: Unify random source across arches Ryan Roberts
2025-11-28 11:01 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-12-01 18:20 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-12-02 9:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-12-02 9:34 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-12-02 9:35 ` Mark Rutland
2025-12-02 9:39 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-12-02 9:53 ` Mark Rutland
2025-12-02 11:04 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-12-02 9:47 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-12-02 10:02 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2025-12-02 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/2] Fix bugs and performance of kstack offset randomisation Kees Cook
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