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From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <Catalin.Marinas@arm.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [DISCUSSION] kstack offset randomization: bugs and performance
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2025 19:08:57 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aSStSQsHqjb620gI@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <B696956E-579E-412E-B774-AAADCFA4B31C@kernel.org>

On Mon, Nov 24, 2025 at 09:11:23AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On November 24, 2025 6:36:25 AM PST, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> wrote:
> >On Mon, Nov 17, 2025 at 11:31:22AM +0000, Ryan Roberts wrote:
> >> On 17/11/2025 11:30, Ryan Roberts wrote:
> >> > Could this give us a middle ground between strong-crng and
> >> > weak-timestamp-counter? Perhaps the main issue is that we need to store the
> >> > secret key for a long period?
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > Anyway, I plan to work up a series with the bugfixes and performance
> >> > improvements. I'll add the siphash approach as an experimental addition and get
> >> > some more detailed numbers for all the options. But wanted to raise it all here
> >> > first to get any early feedback.
> >
> >FWIW, I share Mark's concerns about using a counter for this. Given that
> >the feature currently appears to be both slow _and_ broken I'd vote for
> >either removing it or switching over to per-thread offsets as a first
> >step.
> 
> That it has potential weaknesses doesn't mean it should be entirely
> removed.

Well, we can always bring it back when it does something useful :)

> > We already have a per-task stack canary with
> >CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK so I don't understand the reluctance to
> >do something similar here.
> 
> That's not a reasonable comparison: the stack canary cannot change
> arbitrarily for a task or it would immediately crash on a function return.
> :)

Fair enough, but I was thinking more about concerns relating to the
size of task struct. I don't think that's a huge concern in this case
and we already have tonnes of junk in thread_struct if you want to put
it there instead. Certainly, persevering with per-cpu data just feels
like the wrong approach to me based on Ryan's report.

> >Speeding up the crypto feels like something that could happen separately.
> 
> Sure. But let's see what Ryan's patches look like. The suggested changes
> sound good to me.

I guess we'll have to wait and see but some of the ideas in this thread
(e.g. using the counter and interrupt timing) seem pretty flawed to me
so I was trying to avoid Ryan wasting his time.

Will


      parent reply	other threads:[~2025-11-24 19:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <66c4e2a0-c7fb-46c2-acce-8a040a71cd8e@arm.com>
2025-11-17 11:31 ` [DISCUSSION] kstack offset randomization: bugs and performance Ryan Roberts
2025-11-17 16:47   ` Arnd Bergmann
2025-11-17 17:23     ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-17 17:46     ` Mark Rutland
2025-11-17 23:04       ` Arnd Bergmann
2025-11-18 17:15     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2025-11-18 17:21       ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-18 17:28         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2025-11-17 20:27   ` Kees Cook
2025-11-18 10:28     ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-18 11:25       ` Mark Rutland
2025-11-18 12:16         ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-18 11:05     ` Mark Rutland
2025-11-17 20:56   ` Jeremy Linton
2025-11-18 11:05     ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-24 14:36   ` Will Deacon
2025-11-24 17:11     ` Kees Cook
2025-11-24 17:50       ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-24 20:51         ` Kees Cook
2025-11-25 11:14           ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-26 22:58             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-27  8:00               ` Kees Cook
2025-11-27 11:50                 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-27 12:19                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-27 14:09                     ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-27 19:17                       ` Kees Cook
2025-11-24 19:08       ` Will Deacon [this message]

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