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From: nico@fluxnic.net (Nicolas Pitre)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH] ARM: SECCOMP support
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 2010 12:31:07 -0400 (EDT)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.00.1009251220420.13233@xanadu.home> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20100925113413.GA3044@n2100.arm.linux.org.uk>

On Sat, 25 Sep 2010, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 23, 2010 at 05:11:36PM -0400, Nicolas Pitre wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
> > index f05a35a..cdd0a88 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
> > +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
> > @@ -314,6 +314,16 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi)
> >  	tst	ip, #_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE		@ are we tracing syscalls?
> >  	bne	__sys_trace
> >  
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
> > +	tst	ip, #_TIF_SECCOMP
> > +	beq	1f
> > +	mov	r0, scno
> > +	bl	__secure_computing	
> > +	add	r0, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
> > +	ldmia	r0, {r0 - r3}			@ have to reload r0 - r3
> > +1:
> > +#endif
> 
> Why not do this before the test for TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE?  You're doing
> the same check in both paths, and x86 checks for secure computing
> before any syscall tracing stuff.

Well, for one thing, the syscall tracing has the ability to change the 
actual syscall number.  So this looked like a possible hole that could 
somehow be exploited to escape the seccomp control.  So I went with the 
safest way.


Nicolas

  reply	other threads:[~2010-09-25 16:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-09-23 21:11 [PATCH] ARM: SECCOMP support Nicolas Pitre
2010-09-25 11:34 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2010-09-25 16:31   ` Nicolas Pitre [this message]
2010-09-25 18:58     ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2010-09-25 19:46       ` Nicolas Pitre

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