From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Ben Horgan <ben.horgan@arm.com>, Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>,
Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>,
Yuan Yao <yaoyuan@linux.alibaba.com>,
Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: arm64: Trap guest MPAM accesses whenever MPAM is implemented
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2026 11:40:51 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aqKJM3CF-i3VyJk2@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260908145651.2828597-1-fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
On Tue, Sep 08, 2026 at 03:56:51PM +0100, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> finalise_el2_state() clears the EL2 MPAM traps whenever the ID
> registers advertise MPAM, while KVM sets them only under ARM64_MPAM,
> which also requires MPAMEN. Without EL3 nothing sets that enable, so a
> guest reaches the MPAM registers while ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.MPAM reads 0
> for it.
>
> Gate the traps on the ID registers alone: MPAMEN isn't a term in any
> MPAM accessor, so they take effect without it. The cap tests the
> sanitised ID fields, which never exceed a CPU's own, so it's set only
> where finalise_el2_state already wrote MPAM2_EL2. MPAM3_EL3.TRAPLOWER
> is clear there, and arm64.nompam turns the cap off too.
>
> Fixes: 23b33d1e168c ("arm64: head.S: Initialise MPAM EL2 registers and disable traps")
> Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yaoyuan@linux.alibaba.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
> ---
>
> Notes:
> Changes since v1:
> - Commit message only. The code is unchanged, so Yuan Yao's
> Reviewed-by is carried.
> - Fixes: names the commit that cleared the traps, rather than the
> one that added KVM's trapping.
> - Says why the sanitised ID fields are the safe gate: the cap is set
> only where finalise_el2_state already wrote MPAM2_EL2.
>
> Not covered, and answered on the v1 thread: a machine whose CPUs
> differ on MPAM, raised by Ben and by sashiko.
>
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260903160819.831518-1-fuad.tabba@linux.dev/
>
> arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 5 +++++
> arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 4 ++--
> arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> index 7404a6e83a930..8863ae99596bc 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> @@ -873,6 +873,11 @@ static __always_inline bool system_supports_mpam_hcr(void)
> return alternative_has_cap_unlikely(ARM64_MPAM_HCR);
> }
>
> +static __always_inline bool system_supports_mpam_sysregs(void)
> +{
> + return alternative_has_cap_unlikely(ARM64_MPAM_SYSREGS);
> +}
> +
> static inline bool system_supports_pmuv3(void)
> {
> return cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_PMUV3);
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> index 17b83a2518a8f..36a27692e5cf7 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> @@ -2501,6 +2501,13 @@ test_has_mpam(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
> return (read_sysreg_s(SYS_MPAM1_EL1) & MPAM1_EL1_MPAMEN);
> }
>
> +static bool
> +test_has_mpam_sysregs(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int __unused)
> +{
> + /* The registers exist whether or not firmware enabled MPAM. */
> + return detect_ftr_has_mpam();
> +}
> +
> static void
> cpu_enable_mpam(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
> {
> @@ -3116,6 +3123,12 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
> .matches = test_has_mpam,
> .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_mpam,
> },
> + {
> + .desc = "Memory Partitioning And Monitoring system registers",
> + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
> + .capability = ARM64_MPAM_SYSREGS,
> + .matches = test_has_mpam_sysregs,
> + },
We already have two system capabilities for MPAM so I'm not overly keen
to add a third, especially as the MPAM code is largely confined to the
resctrl driver. In fact, this feels a bit similar to things like TRBE
and SPE in the sense that (a) we have to probe it per-cpu (b) it can
be disabled by a higher EL and (c) most of the code is in a driver, but
KVM needs to know how to switch it.
Neither TRBE nor SPE need entries in arm64_features[] at all, so something
isn't right here...
Will
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-10 10:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-08 14:56 [PATCH v2] KVM: arm64: Trap guest MPAM accesses whenever MPAM is implemented Fuad Tabba
2026-09-10 10:40 ` Will Deacon [this message]
2026-09-11 7:01 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-10 11:08 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-11 10:43 ` Fuad Tabba
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