From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AAB06606A325 for ; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 05:01:39 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=bombadil.20210309 header.b=GMcouQoO; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=RNbMjuDh DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender:List-Subscribe:List-Help :List-Post:List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:Content-Type: MIME-Version:References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Unsubscribe-Post:List-Owner; bh=/3gTc3OhQhIgQt6McVDsUOMeCjJgyS505Y5yzx9cgOs=; b=GMcouQoOyrSErXnM1svMGJiWkN XTcyZ4rQ7y8irjjbaGr7whgEPwVp1YbRiA/Bpc+jD8CLksyDQD7WEksasuJC1WdO27ho2itoJqkzL eO6JwFQTbSre18XRErczPIdI8lBC3ja2awNdBTxTFqRG+m8R6HWZAet8xMnHAFWSHPDYQXlL5lzj+ RTXeOl5+5Jl0gJdhWuTQYK9QKiARbCUqrZ77c+JeYrcdqcstS0uJoRdy8Z/xDXLHtsQjoPpGqExKw KTYadOElRctiGl8SREVhvw7bzfnTEeZmdvG8THT1IEQl0uAKkkq9XeFy6i8SCs/m4q6njaJsIhqh9 V2ybLevA==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.100.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1xTuGz-0000000AqzP-2Ghv; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 05:01:25 +0000 Received: from sea.source.kernel.org ([172.234.252.31]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.100.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1xTuGy-0000000AqzI-1sA4 for linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 05:01:24 +0000 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) by sea.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTP id 9123646747; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 05:01:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPSA id E97521F000C5; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 05:01:22 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795064483; bh=/3gTc3OhQhIgQt6McVDsUOMeCjJgyS505Y5yzx9cgOs=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=RNbMjuDhiUDcZyHgp73D5m6ri7m8MwOWTKphR8qId5y/koRUl/2OZN2Idl4zlzkIl dOdKI+XMl7YQs9/bk56L+9i4m6IWT8HLT3iF42eJHckjuMzfvc5rRZrWsHnwuM/ZHQ YGbhJIDGZzqGlYZLisa2Ay9LO2FaNcUaL4BAX85XM1GxxqJsjGK4pFCETfjadu7E1x dAkJnY5r5ucSljqiEj5wXHjD+WfEV9UhBw+ZTLRV3/DfEvMceLdVv/oc1zlA4dj1M5 y05y/wrthET2C0OByrOMJGoZFsx2wXuVRkQvWzAqvsik8xOg/dLOF3wagjWs8GbpU2 jyibVMmksmzEQ== Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 07:01:20 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Demi Marie Obenour Cc: Rodolfo Giometti , David Howells , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Jens Wiklander , Sumit Garg , op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org, Horia =?utf-8?Q?Geant=C4=83?= , Pankaj Gupta , Sahil Malhotra , Ahmad Fatoum , Richard Weinberger , "Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" , Eric Biggers , Arnd Bergmann , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Randy Dunlap , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Message-ID: References: <20261118140421.584086-1-giometti@enneenne.com> <650f89ef-9745-4f75-b254-80fa5ac4773d@gmail.com> <61ca7c37-7b42-48a3-be2e-95deb4d999a2@gmail.com> <01692969-8e92-4a08-bde9-aad86674504f@gmail.com> X-Archived-By: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <01692969-8e92-4a08-bde9-aad86674504f@gmail.com> X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.9 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=4.0.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.1 (2024-03-26) on aws-us-west-2-korg-listserv-alma10-1 On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 11:35:40PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: > On 11/18/26 7:43 PM, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: > > On 11/18/26 7:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > >> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:42:15PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: > >>> On 11/18/26 9:04 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote: > >>>> This RFC proposes a key type, "keycrypt", whose material user space can > >>>> use for symmetric operations but never read: AES-256-CBC, HMAC-SHA256 > >>>> and an authenticated AES-256-GCM stream, through a file descriptor that > >>>> KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN returns for one key and one operation. > >>> > >>> I haven't looked at the API, but from a cryptographic perspective, > >>> this encourages very poor practices. AES-GCM even allows userspace > >>> to extract the secret authentication key. > >>> > >>> AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined > >>> with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC. Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday > >>> bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless > >>> the key is ephemeral. > >>> > >>> AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either. If you allow encrypting > >>> with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API > >>> to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce. Nonce reuse leaks the > >>> authentication key and allows forgeries. Using random nonces isn't > >>> good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case, > >>> and the API can't enforce that limit. > >>> > >>> For long-term keys, all of the following are much safer choices. > >>> They have 192-bit nonces, which means that one can generate them > >>> at random for each encryption without any problems. > >>> > >>> - XAES-256-GCM > >>> - XChaCha20-Poly1305 > >>> - AEGIS-256 > >>> > >>> AES-GCM-SIV is also okay, provided that you are fine with occasionally > >>> leaking if two plaintexts are equal. This happens whenever there is > >>> a nonce collision, so with probability 2^-32 after 2^32 encryptions. > >> > >> The exitential problem here is that KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN creates a circular > >> relationship between the keyrings API and a specific key type. > >> > >> At hardware level I did not see any support for TPM, which narrows down > >> the potential user base. > >> > >> The remaining potential user base is further reduced by those that use > >> trusted keys; leaving out those who need to solve the assumed problem > >> that only this patch set can presumebly sort out. > >> > >> And we don't really know at this point that cut. This is pretty much > >> the break down of what is wrong here. > >> > >> If there is/was a problem to sort out, it should be so constrained that > >> it should be as quick to describe as stepping over a nail really. > >> > >> These are the main topics what I would focus on. > > > > This whole patchset looks like a solution looking for a problem. > > > > The usual solution to something like this is a userspace service > > like ssh-agent. Then you can do whatever key management you want. > > That doesn't protect against root, but if someone can get root you > > have bigger problems. > > Also, if you need keys stored in hardware for some reason (compliance, > time-limited exfiltration), you can use a userspace library or > daemon that abstracts over whatever the hardware-specific API is. Pro-bab-ly but I'm not a huge fan of generalization ;-) But when looking only at HSMs that is at least 99,999% true as they appear as PKCS#11 providing smart cards with a possible prorietary API. Other than generic smart card driver they ought not to require any special kernel support. > -- > Sincerely, > Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers) Br, Jarkko