From: "Madhavan T. Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: broonie@kernel.org, jpoimboe@redhat.com, ardb@kernel.org,
nobuta.keiya@fujitsu.com, sjitindarsingh@gmail.com,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org,
jamorris@linux.microsoft.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
live-patching@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 4/6] arm64: Introduce stack trace reliability checks in the unwinder
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 00:01:55 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c7df4f17-a788-a037-887f-368cc5dc3fac@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YrgZkz7BA1U09gUC@FVFF77S0Q05N>
On 6/26/22 03:32, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 17, 2022 at 04:07:15PM -0500, madvenka@linux.microsoft.com wrote:
>> From: "Madhavan T. Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
>>
>> There are some kernel features and conditions that make a stack trace
>> unreliable. Callers may require the unwinder to detect these cases.
>> E.g., livepatch.
>>
>> Introduce a new function called unwind_check_reliability() that will
>> detect these cases and set a flag in the stack frame. Call
>> unwind_check_reliability() for every frame in unwind().
>>
>> Introduce the first reliability check in unwind_check_reliability() - If
>> a return PC is not a valid kernel text address, consider the stack
>> trace unreliable. It could be some generated code. Other reliability checks
>> will be added in the future.
>>
>> Let unwind() return a boolean to indicate if the stack trace is
>> reliable.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
>> ---
>> arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>> 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c
>> index c749129aba5a..5ef2ce217324 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c
>> @@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
>> * @final_fp: Pointer to the final frame.
>> *
>> * @failed: Unwind failed.
>> + *
>> + * @reliable: Stack trace is reliable.
>> */
>
> I would strongly prefer if we could have something like an
> unwind_state_is_reliable() helper, and just use that directly, rather than
> storing that into the state.
>
> That way, we can opt-into any expensive checks in the reliable unwinder (e.g.
> __kernel_text_address), and can use them elsewhere for informative purposes
> (e.g. when dumping a stacktrace out to the console).
>
>> struct unwind_state {
>> unsigned long fp;
>> @@ -57,6 +59,7 @@ struct unwind_state {
>> struct task_struct *task;
>> unsigned long final_fp;
>> bool failed;
>> + bool reliable;
>> };
>>
>> static void unwind_init_common(struct unwind_state *state,
>> @@ -80,6 +83,7 @@ static void unwind_init_common(struct unwind_state *state,
>> state->prev_fp = 0;
>> state->prev_type = STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
>> state->failed = false;
>> + state->reliable = true;
>>
>> /* Stack trace terminates here. */
>> state->final_fp = (unsigned long)task_pt_regs(task)->stackframe;
>> @@ -242,11 +246,34 @@ static void notrace unwind_next(struct unwind_state *state)
>> }
>> NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(unwind_next);
>>
>> -static void notrace unwind(struct unwind_state *state,
>> +/*
>> + * Check the stack frame for conditions that make further unwinding unreliable.
>> + */
>> +static void unwind_check_reliability(struct unwind_state *state)
>> +{
>> + if (state->fp == state->final_fp) {
>> + /* Final frame; no more unwind, no need to check reliability */
>> + return;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * If the PC is not a known kernel text address, then we cannot
>> + * be sure that a subsequent unwind will be reliable, as we
>> + * don't know that the code follows our unwind requirements.
>> + */
>> + if (!__kernel_text_address(state->pc))
>> + state->reliable = false;
>> +}
>
> I'd strongly prefer that we split this into two helpers, e.g.
>
> static inline bool unwind_state_is_final(struct unwind_state *state)
> {
> return state->fp == state->final_fp;
> }
>
> static inline bool unwind_state_is_reliable(struct unwind_state *state)
> {
> return __kernel_text_address(state->pc);
> }
>
>> +
>> +static bool notrace unwind(struct unwind_state *state,
>> stack_trace_consume_fn consume_entry, void *cookie)
>> {
>> - while (unwind_continue(state, consume_entry, cookie))
>> + unwind_check_reliability(state);
>> + while (unwind_continue(state, consume_entry, cookie)) {
>> unwind_next(state);
>> + unwind_check_reliability(state);
>
> This is going to slow down regular unwinds even when the reliablity value is
> not consumed (e.g. for KASAN traces on alloc and free), so I don't think this
> should live here, and should be intreoduced with arch_stack_walk_reliable().
>
So, I have been thinking about this whole reliability check thing. Instead of
checking many different things for reliability, I believe that a single frame
pointer validation check is sufficient. I am attempting to do that in my
other frame pointer validation patch series. Hopefully, in that patch series,
I can prove that that one check is sufficient. We will continue this discussion
there.
So, for now, I am dropping the reliability checks patches from the series.
I will just send the unwind loop reorg in v16 and focus on getting that
upstreamed.
Thanks.
Madhavan
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-27 5:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <ff68fb850d42e1adaa6a0a6c9c258acabb898b24>
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 0/6] arm64: Reorganize the unwinder and implement stack trace reliability checks madvenka
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 1/6] arm64: Split unwind_init() madvenka
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 2/6] arm64: Copy the task argument to unwind_state madvenka
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 3/6] arm64: Make the unwind loop in unwind() similar to other architectures madvenka
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 4/6] arm64: Introduce stack trace reliability checks in the unwinder madvenka
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 5/6] arm64: Create a list of SYM_CODE functions, check return PC against list madvenka
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 6/6] arm64: Introduce arch_stack_walk_reliable() madvenka
2022-06-17 20:50 ` [RFC PATCH v15 0/6] arm64: Reorganize the unwinder and implement stack trace reliability checks Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-27 13:00 ` Will Deacon
2022-06-27 17:06 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-17 21:07 ` [PATCH " madvenka
2022-06-17 21:07 ` [PATCH v15 1/6] arm64: Split unwind_init() madvenka
2022-06-26 7:39 ` Mark Rutland
2022-06-17 21:07 ` [PATCH v15 2/6] arm64: Copy the task argument to unwind_state madvenka
2022-06-26 7:39 ` Mark Rutland
2022-06-17 21:07 ` [PATCH v15 3/6] arm64: Make the unwind loop in unwind() similar to other architectures madvenka
2022-06-26 8:21 ` Mark Rutland
2022-06-27 4:51 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-17 21:07 ` [PATCH v15 4/6] arm64: Introduce stack trace reliability checks in the unwinder madvenka
2022-06-26 8:32 ` Mark Rutland
2022-06-27 5:01 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman [this message]
2022-06-17 21:07 ` [PATCH v15 5/6] arm64: Create a list of SYM_CODE functions, check return PC against list madvenka
2022-06-26 8:46 ` Mark Rutland
2022-06-27 5:06 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-17 21:07 ` [PATCH v15 6/6] arm64: Introduce arch_stack_walk_reliable() madvenka
2022-06-26 8:57 ` Mark Rutland
2022-06-27 5:53 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-23 17:32 ` [PATCH v15 0/6] arm64: Reorganize the unwinder and implement stack trace reliability checks Will Deacon
2022-06-24 5:19 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-24 5:27 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-26 9:18 ` Mark Rutland
2022-06-27 4:33 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-27 16:32 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-06-27 17:04 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-27 4:48 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-27 9:42 ` Will Deacon
2022-06-24 11:42 ` Mark Brown
2022-06-24 22:15 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
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