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From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	luto@kernel.org, will@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 05/13] stackleak: clarify variable names
Date: Sun, 8 May 2022 23:49:46 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e1cf0177-40a0-ffca-6be4-57fd97860c4a@linux.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220427173128.2603085-6-mark.rutland@arm.com>

On 27.04.2022 20:31, Mark Rutland wrote:
> The logic within __stackleak_erase() can be a little hard to follow, as
> `boundary` switches from being the low bound to the high bound mid way
> through the function, and `kstack_ptr` is used to represent the start of
> the region to erase while `boundary` represents the end of the region to
> erase.
> 
> Make this a little clearer by consistently using clearer variable names.
> The `boundary` variable is removed, the bounds of the region to erase
> are described by `erase_low` and `erase_high`, and bounds of the task
> stack are described by `task_stack_low` and `task_stck_high`.

A typo here in `task_stck_high`.

> As the same time, remove the comment above the variables, since it is
> unclear whether it's intended as rationale, a complaint, or a TODO, and
> is more confusing than helpful.

Yes, this comment is a bit confusing :) I can elaborate.

In the original grsecurity patch, the stackleak erasing was written in asm.
When I adopted it and proposed for the upstream, Linus strongly opposed this.
So I developed stackleak erasing in C.

And I wrote this comment to remember that having 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' 
variables on the stack (which we are clearing) would not be good.

That was also the main reason why I reused the 'boundary' variable: I wanted the 
compiler to allocate it in the register and I avoided creating many local variables.

Mark, did your refactoring make the compiler allocate local variables on the 
stack instead of the registers?

> There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
>   kernel/stackleak.c | 30 ++++++++++++++----------------
>   1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/stackleak.c
> index 24b7cf01b2972..d5f684dc0a2d9 100644
> --- a/kernel/stackleak.c
> +++ b/kernel/stackleak.c
> @@ -73,40 +73,38 @@ late_initcall(stackleak_sysctls_init);
>   static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(void)
>   {
>   	const unsigned long task_stack_low = stackleak_task_low_bound(current);
> -
> -	/* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
> -	unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack;
> -	unsigned long boundary = task_stack_low;
> +	unsigned long erase_low = current->lowest_stack;
> +	unsigned long erase_high;
>   	unsigned int poison_count = 0;
>   	const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
>   
>   	/* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */
> -	while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) {
> -		if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON)
> +	while (erase_low > task_stack_low && poison_count <= depth) {
> +		if (*(unsigned long *)erase_low == STACKLEAK_POISON)
>   			poison_count++;
>   		else
>   			poison_count = 0;
>   
> -		kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long);
> +		erase_low -= sizeof(unsigned long);
>   	}
>   
>   #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
> -	current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr;
> +	current->prev_lowest_stack = erase_low;
>   #endif
>   
>   	/*
> -	 * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from
> -	 * 'kstack_ptr' and move up till the new 'boundary'. We assume that
> -	 * the stack pointer doesn't change when we write poison.
> +	 * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack between 'erase_low'
> +	 * and 'erase_high'. We assume that the stack pointer doesn't change
> +	 * when we write poison.
>   	 */
>   	if (on_thread_stack())
> -		boundary = current_stack_pointer;
> +		erase_high = current_stack_pointer;
>   	else
> -		boundary = current_top_of_stack();
> +		erase_high = current_top_of_stack();
>   
> -	while (kstack_ptr < boundary) {
> -		*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr = STACKLEAK_POISON;
> -		kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
> +	while (erase_low < erase_high) {
> +		*(unsigned long *)erase_low = STACKLEAK_POISON;
> +		erase_low += sizeof(unsigned long);
>   	}
>   
>   	/* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */


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  reply	other threads:[~2022-05-08 20:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-27 17:31 [PATCH v2 00/13] stackleak: fixes and rework Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] arm64: stackleak: fix current_top_of_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 16:41   ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 19:01     ` Kees Cook
2022-05-04 19:55       ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-05  8:25         ` Will Deacon
2022-05-08 17:24   ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:36     ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] stackleak: move skip_erasing() check earlier Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 17:44   ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:40     ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] stackleak: remove redundant check Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 18:17   ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:46     ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11  3:00       ` Kees Cook
2022-05-11  8:02         ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11 14:44           ` Kees Cook
2022-05-12  9:14             ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 16:17               ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-24 10:03                 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-26 22:09                   ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] stackleak: rework stack low bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] stackleak: clarify variable names Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 20:49   ` Alexander Popov [this message]
2022-05-10 13:01     ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11  3:05       ` Kees Cook
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] stackleak: rework stack high bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 21:27   ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:22     ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 16:32       ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] stackleak: rework poison scanning Mark Rutland
2022-05-09 13:51   ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 13:13     ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 17:33       ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-24 13:31         ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-26 23:25           ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-31 18:13             ` Kees Cook
2022-06-03 16:55               ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] lkdtm/stackleak: avoid spurious failure Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] lkdtm/stackleak: rework boundary management Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 19:07   ` Kees Cook
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] lkdtm/stackleak: prevent unexpected stack usage Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] lkdtm/stackleak: check stack boundaries Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] stackleak: add on/off stack variants Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] arm64: entry: use stackleak_erase_on_task_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 16:42   ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 19:16 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] stackleak: fixes and rework Kees Cook

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