From: fweimer@redhat.com (Florian Weimer)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation
Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2018 12:07:48 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fef98ede-efe4-eaf2-f314-07b623e9800e@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180802132133.23999-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
On 08/02/2018 03:21 PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> The idea is that we can significantly limit the kernel's attack surface
> for ROP based attacks by clearing the stack pointer's sign bit before
> returning from a function, and setting it again right after proceeding
> from the [expected] return address. This should make it much more difficult
> to return to arbitrary gadgets, given that they rely on being chained to
> the next via a return address popped off the stack, and this is difficult
> when the stack pointer is invalid.
Doesn't this break stack unwinding?
Thanks,
Florian
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-06 10:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-02 13:21 [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` [RFC/PoC PATCH 1/3] arm64: use wrapper macro for bl/blx instructions from asm code Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` [RFC/PoC PATCH 2/3] gcc: plugins: add ROP shield plugin for arm64 Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` [RFC/PoC PATCH 3/3] arm64: enable ROP protection by clearing SP bit #55 across function returns Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 10:07 ` Florian Weimer [this message]
2018-08-06 10:31 ` [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 13:55 ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 14:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 15:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 15:38 ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 15:50 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 16:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 17:45 ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 18:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-06 19:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 19:50 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-06 19:54 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <CAN+XpFQCO1nr5tQ4oyPPaSfvnQSvwx-=JCtba2xJXrEN+6=LZg@mail.gmail.com>
2018-08-07 9:21 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-08 16:09 ` Mark Brand
2018-08-08 22:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-18 1:27 ` Laura Abbott
2018-08-20 6:30 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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