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From: "Wentai Deng" <wtdeng24@m.fudan.edu.cn>
To: linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: davem <davem@davemloft.net>, edumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	kuba <kuba@kernel.org>, pabeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	杜雪盈 <21210240012@m.fudan.edu.cn>
Subject: [BUG] Possible Use-After-Free Vulnerability in ether3 Driver Due to Race Condition
Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2024 19:42:55 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <tencent_48E7914150CBB05A03CD68C4@qq.com> (raw)

Our team recently developed a vulnerability detection tool, and we have employed it to scan the Linux Kernel (version 6.9.6). After manual review, we found some potentially vulnerable code snippets which may have use-after-free bugs due to race conditions. Therefore, we would appreciate your expert insight to confirm whether these vulnerabilities could indeed pose a risk to the system.

Vulnerability Description:

File: /drivers/net/ethernet/seeq/ether3.c

In the ether3_probe function, a timer is initialized with a callback function ether3_ledoff, bound to &prev(dev)->timer. Once the timer is started, there is a risk of a race condition if the module or device is removed, triggering the ether3_remove function to perform cleanup. The sequence of operations that may lead to a UAF bug is as follows:

CPU0                            CPU1

                            |   ether3_ledoff
ether3_remove               |
    free_netdev(dev);       |
    put_device              |
    kfree(dev);             |
                            |       ether3_outw(priv(dev)->regs.config2 |= CFG2_CTRLO, REG_CONFIG2);
                            |       // use dev

Proposed Fix:

The issue can be resolved by ensuring that the timer is canceled before proceeding with the cleanup in ether3_remove or ether3_close. This will prevent any pending or active timer functions from accessing memory that has already been freed.

Relevant CVE and Reference:

This issue is similar to the vulnerability documented in CVE-2023-3141, and a related fix was implemented as shown in the following commit:

memstick: r592: Fix UAF bug in r592_remove due to race condition (https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=63264422785021704c39b38f65a78ab9e4a186d7)

Request for Review:

We would appreciate your expert insight to confirm whether this vulnerability indeed poses a risk to the system and if the proposed fix is appropriate.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Best regards,
Wentai Deng
wtdeng24@m.fudan.edu.cn

             reply	other threads:[~2024-09-02 11:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-09-02 11:42 Wentai Deng [this message]
2024-09-02 15:56 ` [BUG] Possible Use-After-Free Vulnerability in ether3 Driver Due to Race Condition Andrew Lunn
2024-09-04  6:31   ` Wentai Deng
     [not found] <tencent_4212C4F240B0666B49355184@qq.com>
2024-09-02  9:23 ` Russell King (Oracle)
2024-09-02 11:37   ` Wentai Deng
2024-09-02 15:54     ` Andrew Lunn

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