From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.2 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_2 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 403CBC433E0 for ; Thu, 4 Feb 2021 09:32:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E1CA464F48 for ; Thu, 4 Feb 2021 09:32:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235205AbhBDJcp convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Feb 2021 04:32:45 -0500 Received: from relay8-d.mail.gandi.net ([217.70.183.201]:43487 "EHLO relay8-d.mail.gandi.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233628AbhBDJcm (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Feb 2021 04:32:42 -0500 X-Originating-IP: 86.210.203.150 Received: from xps13 (lfbn-tou-1-972-150.w86-210.abo.wanadoo.fr [86.210.203.150]) (Authenticated sender: miquel.raynal@bootlin.com) by relay8-d.mail.gandi.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 16E051BF212; Thu, 4 Feb 2021 09:31:52 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 10:31:52 +0100 From: Miquel Raynal To: Boris Brezillon Cc: Manivannan Sadhasivam , richard@nod.at, vigneshr@ti.com, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org, bjorn.andersson@linaro.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] mtd: rawnand: Do not check for bad block if bbt is unavailable Message-ID: <20210204103152.5d086525@xps13> In-Reply-To: <20210204102738.3ea8393e@collabora.com> References: <20210202041614.GA840@work> <20210202091459.0c41a769@xps13> <20210203110522.12f2b326@xps13> <20210203111914.1c2f68f6@collabora.com> <8A2468D5-B435-4923-BA4F-7BF7CC0FF207@linaro.org> <20210203122422.6963b0ed@collabora.com> <20210204091336.1406ca3b@xps13> <20210204085221.GB8235@thinkpad> <20210204095945.51ef0c33@collabora.com> <20210204100408.6eb053d8@xps13> <20210204102738.3ea8393e@collabora.com> Organization: Bootlin X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.17.4 (GTK+ 2.24.32; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org Hi Boris, Boris Brezillon wrote on Thu, 4 Feb 2021 10:27:38 +0100: > On Thu, 4 Feb 2021 10:04:08 +0100 > Miquel Raynal wrote: > > > Hi Boris, > > > > Boris Brezillon wrote on Thu, 4 Feb > > 2021 09:59:45 +0100: > > > > > On Thu, 4 Feb 2021 14:22:21 +0530 > > > Manivannan Sadhasivam wrote: > > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 04, 2021 at 09:13:36AM +0100, Miquel Raynal wrote: > > > > > Hi Manivannan, > > > > > > > > > > Manivannan Sadhasivam wrote on Wed, > > > > > 03 Feb 2021 17:11:31 +0530: > > > > > > > > > > > On 3 February 2021 4:54:22 PM IST, Boris Brezillon wrote: > > > > > > >On Wed, 03 Feb 2021 16:22:42 +0530 > > > > > > >Manivannan Sadhasivam wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> On 3 February 2021 3:49:14 PM IST, Boris Brezillon > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >> >On Wed, 03 Feb 2021 15:42:02 +0530 > > > > > > >> >Manivannan Sadhasivam wrote: > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> >> >> > > > > > > >> >> >> I got more information from the vendor, Telit. The access to > > > > > > >the > > > > > > >> >3rd > > > > > > >> >> >partition is protected by Trustzone and any access in non > > > > > > >privileged > > > > > > >> >> >mode (where Linux kernel runs) causes kernel panic and the device > > > > > > >> >> >reboots. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> >Out of curiosity, is it a per-CS-line thing or is this section > > > > > > >> >protected on all CS? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Sorry, I didn't get your question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > >The qcom controller can handle several chips, each connected through a > > > > > > >different CS (chip-select) line, right? I'm wondering if the firmware > > > > > > >running in secure mode has the ability to block access for a specific > > > > > > >CS line or if all CS lines have the same constraint. That will impact > > > > > > >the way you describe it in your DT (in one case the secure-region > > > > > > >property should be under the controller node, in the other case it > > > > > > >should be under the NAND chip node). > > > > > > > > > > > > Right. I believe the implementation is common to all NAND chips so the property should be in the controller node. > > > > > > > > > > Looks weird: do you mean that each of the chips will have a secure area? > > > > > > > > I way I said is, the "secure-region" property will be present in the controller > > > > node and not in the NAND chip node since this is not related to the device > > > > functionality. > > > > > > > > But for referencing the NAND device, the property can have the phandle as below: > > > > > > > > secure-region = <&nand0 0xffff>; > > > > > > My question was really what happens from a functional PoV. If you have > > > per-chip protection at the FW level, this property should be under the > > > NAND node. OTH, if the FW doesn't look at the selected chip before > > > blocking the access, it should be at the controller level. So, you > > > really have to understand what the secure FW does. > > > > I'm not so sure actually, that's why I like the phandle to nand0 -> in > > any case it's not a property of the NAND chip itself, it's kind of a > > host constraint, so I don't get why the property should be at the > > NAND node level? > > I would argue that we already have plenty of NAND properties that > encode things controlled by the host (ECC, partitions, HW randomizer, > boot device, and all kind of controller specific stuff) :P. Having > the props under the NAND node makes it clear what those things are > applied to, and it's also easier to parse for the driver (you already > have to parse each node to get the reg property anyway). Fair points. > > Also, we should probably support several secure regions (which could be > > a way to express the fact that the FW does not look at the CS)? > > Sure, the secure-region should probably be renamed secure-regions, even > if it's defined at the NAND chip level. Absolutely. Thanks, Miquèl