From: Jeff Hugo <jeff.hugo@oss.qualcomm.com>
To: Manivannan Sadhasivam <mani@kernel.org>
Cc: Youssef Samir <quic_yabdulra@quicinc.com>,
manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org, quic_carlv@quicinc.com,
quic_thanson@quicinc.com, mhi@lists.linux.dev,
linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] bus: mhi: host: Detect events pointing to unexpected TREs
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2025 08:32:11 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <58baef06-8066-428d-ad72-7bb4cb537085@oss.qualcomm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4atrwojcbhzzegixeyzulldmhp655rcqn4pccbchlrp3gvyzvh@mhcgkjkgfkzb>
On 7/9/2025 5:08 AM, Manivannan Sadhasivam wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 08, 2025 at 11:18:10AM GMT, Jeff Hugo wrote:
>> On 7/8/2025 7:26 AM, Manivannan Sadhasivam wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jul 02, 2025 at 04:06:55PM GMT, Youssef Samir wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 6/17/2025 11:24 AM, Manivannan Sadhasivam wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, May 21, 2025 at 06:31:10PM +0200, Youssef Samir wrote:
>>>>>> When a remote device sends a completion event to the host, it contains a
>>>>>> pointer to the consumed TRE. The host uses this pointer to process all of
>>>>>> the TREs between it and the host's local copy of the ring's read pointer.
>>>>>> This works when processing completion for chained transactions, but can
>>>>>> lead to nasty results if the device sends an event for a single-element
>>>>>> transaction with a read pointer that is multiple elements ahead of the
>>>>>> host's read pointer.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> How can this happen? I cannot relate this with the scenario mentioned below.
>>>>>
>>>>>> For instance, if the host accesses an event ring while the device is
>>>>>> updating it, the pointer inside of the event might still point to an old
>>>>>> TRE.
>>>>>
>>>>> I cannot interpret this, sorry. The host is supposed to access the ring elements
>>>>> till the RP. Even if the device updates the RP while host is processing the TREs,
>>>>> it should not cause any issues for the host which only sees the used ring
>>>>> elements.
>>>>>
>>>>> Maybe I'm missing something?
>>>>
>>>> Hi Mani,
>>>>
>>>> This is related to the behavior that 'commit 6f18d174b73d ("bus: mhi: ep: Update read pointer only after buffer is written")'
>>>> aimed to fix from the endpoint. The scenario I observed with a device using drivers/bus/mhi/ep/
>>>> involved the device sending an MSI to host for an event that hasn't had its data
>>>> completely updated. the event could be pointing to a TRE that is not local_rp + 1.
>>>> As you mentioned, the host will process all the TREs until the event's rp,
>>>> which allows it to access data that were freed or hasn't been written to yet.
>>>>
>>>
>>> So you are saying that mhi_ep_ring_add_element() didn't update the ring pointer
>>> before triggering MSI? If that's the case, we should add a barrier to make sure
>>> that the RP is updated before raising MSI. Though, I thought that the implicit
>>> barrier offered by the mutex_unlock() would be enough to make sure that the RP
>>> is updated before triggering MSI.
>>
>> No, we are saying that an ep without 'commit 6f18d174b73d ("bus: mhi: ep:
>> Update read pointer only after buffer is written")' can cause the host to
>> crash because the host is trusting the ep, when it shouldn't be. This patch
>> hardens the host by removing that trust and checking that the ep didn't do
>> something invalid (to the extend that we can detect invalid behavior).
>>
>> The ep updated the ring pointer before it updated the ring contents.
>> Therefore there is a window where the host can see the updated ring pointer,
>> but the ring contents won't be updated therefore the host sees stale data.
>> This is identical to the scenario where the ep updates the ring contents
>> with invalid data (maybe a FW bug), and then updates the ring pointer. This
>> proposed patch catches both issues and avoids the host consuming the invalid
>> data.
>>
>
> Ok, makes sense now. This information (with reference to 6f18d174b73d) should be
> present in the commit message to make it self explanatory.
Youssef please send a v2 with this suggestion.
-Jeff
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-09 14:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-21 16:31 [PATCH] bus: mhi: host: Detect events pointing to unexpected TREs Youssef Samir
2025-05-21 16:39 ` Jeff Hugo
2025-06-17 10:24 ` Manivannan Sadhasivam
2025-07-02 15:06 ` Youssef Samir
2025-07-08 13:26 ` Manivannan Sadhasivam
2025-07-08 17:18 ` Jeff Hugo
2025-07-09 11:08 ` Manivannan Sadhasivam
2025-07-09 14:32 ` Jeff Hugo [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=58baef06-8066-428d-ad72-7bb4cb537085@oss.qualcomm.com \
--to=jeff.hugo@oss.qualcomm.com \
--cc=linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mani@kernel.org \
--cc=manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org \
--cc=mhi@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=quic_carlv@quicinc.com \
--cc=quic_thanson@quicinc.com \
--cc=quic_yabdulra@quicinc.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox