From: Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>,
coresight@lists.linaro.org, Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>,
Denis Nikitin <denik@chromium.org>,
Mattias Nissler <mnissler@chromium.org>,
Al Grant <al.grant@arm.com>,
linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, jannh@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode instruction tracing
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 13:08:05 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b5cbc2607e3f847887e94bfad18534d8@codeaurora.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6903bc0588a5c8e41892503a204015ee@codeaurora.org>
Hi Peter,
On 2021-02-02 11:41, Sai Prakash Ranjan wrote:
> Hi Peter,
>
> On 2021-02-01 19:11, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>> On Mon, Feb 01, 2021 at 01:11:04PM +0530, Sai Prakash Ranjan wrote:
>>
>>> Ok I suppose you mean CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM? But I don't see
>>> how this new config has to depend on that? This can work
>>> independently
>>> whether complete lockdown is enforced or not since it applies to only
>>> hardware instruction tracing. Ideally this depends on several
>>> hardware
>>> tracing configs such as ETMs and others but we don't need them
>>> because
>>> we are already exposing PERF_PMU_CAP_ITRACE check in the events core.
>>
>> If you don't have lockdown, root pretty much owns the kernel, or am I
>> missing something?
>>
>
> You are right in saying that without lockdown root would own kernel but
> this config(EXCLUDE_KERNEL) will independently make sure that kernel
> level pmu tracing is not allowed(we return -EACCES) even if LOCKDOWN
> config is disabled. So I'm saying that we don't need to depend on
> LOCKDOWN config, its good to have LOCKDOWN config enabled but perf
> subsystem doesn't have to care about that.
>
>>> be used for some speculative execution based attacks. Which other
>>> kernel level PMUs can be used to get a full branch trace that is not
>>> locked down? If there is one, then this should probably be applied to
>>> it as well.
>>
>> Just the regular counters. The information isn't as accurate, but
>> given
>> enough goes you can infer plenty.
>>
>> Just like all the SMT size-channel attacks.
>>
>> Sure, PT and friends make it even easier, but I don't see a
>> fundamental
>> distinction.
>
> Right, we should then exclude all kernel level pmu tracing, is it fine?
>
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXCLUDE_KERNEL_HW_ITRACE) &&
> !attr.exclude_kernel))
> return -EACCES;
>
Sorry for being pushy, but does the above make sense?
Thanks,
Sai
--
QUALCOMM INDIA, on behalf of Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a
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of Code Aurora Forum, hosted by The Linux Foundation
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-10 7:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-29 19:05 [PATCH 0/4] Add support to exclude kernel mode hardware assisted instruction tracing Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-01-29 19:05 ` [PATCH 1/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode " Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-01-29 19:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-02-01 7:41 ` Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-02-01 13:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-02-02 6:11 ` Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-02-10 7:38 ` Sai Prakash Ranjan [this message]
2021-01-29 19:05 ` [PATCH 2/4] perf evsel: Print warning for excluding " Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-01-29 19:05 ` [PATCH 3/4] coresight: etm4x: Add support to exclude kernel mode tracing Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-02-22 20:14 ` Doug Anderson
2021-02-24 14:51 ` Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-01-29 19:05 ` [PATCH 4/4] coresight: etm3x: " Sai Prakash Ranjan
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