From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
Date: Wed, 28 May 2014 23:09:58 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1401332999-15167-1-git-send-email-eparis@redhat.com> (raw)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit
rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow...
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 254ce20..842f58a 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -728,6 +728,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
+static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
+{
+ int word, bit;
+
+ if (val > 0xffffffff)
+ return false;
+
+ word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
+ if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
+ return false;
+
+ bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
+
+ return rule->mask[word] & bit;
+}
+
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
@@ -745,11 +761,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
rcu_read_lock();
if (!list_empty(list)) {
- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
&state, false)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -769,20 +782,16 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_names *n,
struct audit_context *ctx) {
- int word, bit;
int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
struct audit_entry *e;
enum audit_state state;
- word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
if (list_empty(list))
return 0;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
ctx->current_state = state;
return 1;
--
1.9.0
next reply other threads:[~2014-05-29 3:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-05-29 3:09 Eric Paris [this message]
2014-05-29 3:09 ` [PATCH 2/2] audit: do not select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL on x32 Eric Paris
2014-06-09 22:30 ` [PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking Greg KH
2014-06-09 22:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-09 22:46 ` Greg KH
2014-06-09 22:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-10 0:32 ` Greg KH
2014-06-10 0:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-10 0:37 ` Greg KH
2014-06-09 23:35 ` Josh Boyer
2014-06-10 0:31 ` Greg KH
2014-06-09 22:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-06-09 22:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-09 23:36 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-06-10 12:50 ` Eric Paris
2014-06-10 15:42 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-06-10 15:48 ` Linus Torvalds
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