Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] seccomp: Add sysctl to display available actions

Kees Cook
2017-02-16T01:00:51Z

On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 7:45 PM, Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> wrote:
> This patch creates a read-only sysctl containing an ordered list of
> seccomp actions that the kernel supports. The ordering, from left to
> right, is the lowest action value (kill) to the highest action value
> (allow). Currently, a read of the sysctl file would return "kill trap
> errno trace allow". The contents of this sysctl file can be useful for
> userspace code as well as the system administrator.
>
> The path to the sysctl is:
>
> /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_avail
>
> libseccomp and other userspace code can easily determine which actions
> the current kernel supports. The set of actions supported by the current
> kernel may be different than the set of action macros found in kernel
> headers that were installed where the userspace code was built.
>
> In addition, this sysctl will allow system administrators to know which
> actions are supported by the kernel and make it easier to configure
> exactly what seccomp logs through the audit subsystem. Support for this
> level of logging configuration will come in a future patch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
> ---
> Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt | 16 ++++++++++
> Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 1 +
> kernel/seccomp.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 72 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
> index 1e469ef..a5554ff 100644
> --- a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
> @@ -166,7 +166,23 @@ The samples/seccomp/ directory contains both an x86-specific example
> and a more generic example of a higher level macro interface for BPF
> program generation.
>
> +Sysctls
> +-------
> +
> +Seccomp's sysctl files can be found in the /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/
> +directory. Here's a description of each file in that directory:
> +
> +actions_avail:
> + A read-only ordered list of seccomp return values (refer to the
> + SECCOMP_RET_* macros above) in string form. The ordering, from
> + left-to-right, is the least permissive return value to the most
> + permissive return value.
>
> + The list represents the set of seccomp return values supported
> + by the kernel. A userspace program may use this list to
> + determine if the actions found in the seccomp.h, when the
> + program was built, differs from the set of actions actually
> + supported in the current running kernel.
>
> Adding architecture support
> -----------------------
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> index a32b4b7..56f9b29 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
> - reboot-cmd [ SPARC only ]
> - rtsig-max
> - rtsig-nr
> +- seccomp/ ==> Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
> - sem
> - sem_next_id [ sysv ipc ]
> - sg-big-buff [ generic SCSI device (sg) ]
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index f7ce79a..e36dfe9 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -16,10 +16,12 @@
> #include <linux/atomic.h>
> #include <linux/audit.h>
> #include <linux/compat.h>
> +#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/seccomp.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <linux/syscalls.h>
> +#include <linux/sysctl.h>
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
> #include <asm/syscall.h>
> @@ -905,3 +907,56 @@ long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long filter_off,
> return ret;
> }
> #endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
> +
> +/* Human readable action names for friendly sysctl interaction */
> +#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_NAME "kill"
> +#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME "trap"
> +#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME "errno"
> +#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME "trace"
> +#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME "allow"
> +
> +static char seccomp_actions_avail[] = SECCOMP_RET_KILL_NAME " "
> + SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME " "
> + SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME " "
> + SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME " "
> + SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME;
> +
> +static struct ctl_path seccomp_sysctl_path[] = {
> + { .procname = "kernel", },
> + { .procname = "seccomp", },
> + { }
> +};
> +
> +static struct ctl_table seccomp_sysctl_table[] = {
> + {
> + .procname = "actions_avail",
> + .data = &seccomp_actions_avail,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail),
> + .mode = 0444,
> + .proc_handler = proc_dostring,
> + },
> + { }
> +};
> +
> +static int __init seccomp_sysctl_init(void)
> +{
> + struct ctl_table_header *hdr;
> +
> + hdr = register_sysctl_paths(seccomp_sysctl_path, seccomp_sysctl_table);
> + if (!hdr)
> + pr_warn("seccomp: sysctl registration failed\n");
> + else
> + kmemleak_not_leak(hdr);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +#else /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
> +
> +static __init int seccomp_sysctl_init(void) { return 0; }
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
> +
> +device_initcall(seccomp_sysctl_init)

Can the device_initcall() just live in the CONFIG_SYSCTL #ifdef to
avoid the #else and stub?

-Kees

--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security