Re: [PATCH ghak90 V6 02/10] audit: add container id

Tycho Andersen
2019-05-29T15:34:27Z

On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 11:29:05AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 10:57 AM Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Apr 08, 2019 at 11:39:09PM -0400, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > It is not permitted to unset the audit container identifier.
> > > A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier.
> >
> > ...
> >
> > > /**
> > > + * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit contid
> > > + * @contid: contid value
> > > + *
> > > + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure.
> > > + *
> > > + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write().
> > > + */
> > > +int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)
> > > +{
> > > + u64 oldcontid;
> > > + int rc = 0;
> > > + struct audit_buffer *ab;
> > > + uid_t uid;
> > > + struct tty_struct *tty;
> > > + char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
> > > +
> > > + task_lock(task);
> > > + /* Can't set if audit disabled */
> > > + if (!task->audit) {
> > > + task_unlock(task);
> > > + return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> > > + }
> > > + oldcontid = audit_get_contid(task);
> > > + read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
> > > + /* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */
> > > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid))
> > > + rc = -EINVAL;
> > > + /* if we don't have caps, reject */
> > > + else if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
> > > + rc = -EPERM;
> > > + /* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */
> > > + else if (!list_empty(&task->children))
> > > + rc = -EBUSY;
> > > + else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task)))
> > > + rc = -EALREADY;
> > > + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
> > > + if (!rc)
> > > + task->audit->contid = contid;
> > > + task_unlock(task);
> > > +
> > > + if (!audit_enabled)
> > > + return rc;
> >
> > ...but it is allowed to change it (assuming
> > capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL), of course)? Seems like this might be more
> > immediately useful since we still live in the world of majority
> > privileged containers if we didn't allow changing it, in addition to
> > un-setting it.
>
> The idea is that only container orchestrators should be able to
> set/modify the audit container ID, and since setting the audit
> container ID can have a significant effect on the records captured
> (and their routing to multiple daemons when we get there) modifying
> the audit container ID is akin to modifying the audit configuration
> which is why it is gated by CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. The current thinking
> is that you would only change the audit container ID from one
> set/inherited value to another if you were nesting containers, in
> which case the nested container orchestrator would need to be granted
> CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL (which everyone to date seems to agree is a workable
> compromise).

But then don't you want some kind of ns_capable() instead (probably
not the obvious one, though...)? With capable(), you can't really nest
using the audit-id and user namespaces together.

Tycho