From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: plugin auditing approach question
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 13:36:18 -0400
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On Monday 23 June 2008 13:27:25 LC Bruzenak wrote:
> I would create a library call and matching executable audit proxy. I'd
> give CAP_AUDIT_WRITE to the proxy. Then, the library call would
> fork/exec the audit proxy child, create a socket pair, and give each
> side their half of the pair.

So then you have shifted access control issues to the proxy. Once you have a 
proxy, then other potentially misleading apps can write to it in order to 
hide or make it hard to analyze a suspicious event. So, you need a way of 
making sure that only certain apps can connect to the proxy...and bash should 
not be one of them. :)  Anyways, that is the core issue that I see.

-Steve