From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Richard Guy Briggs Subject: Re: [PATCH V5 0/5] audit by executable name Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 21:17:04 -0400 Message-ID: <20141030011704.GR20866@madcap2.tricolour.ca> References: <13346524.UcV0TUOQcF@sifl> <20141029194840.GL20866@madcap2.tricolour.ca> <10404139.lj6aruQcWX@x2> <20141029215442.GQ20866@madcap2.tricolour.ca> <1414627149.18727.2.camel@localhost> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1414627149.18727.2.camel@localhost> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com To: Eric Paris Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com List-Id: linux-audit@redhat.com On 14/10/29, Eric Paris wrote: > On Wed, 2014-10-29 at 17:54 -0400, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > On 14/10/29, Steve Grubb wrote: > > > On Wednesday, October 29, 2014 03:48:40 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > > On 14/10/21, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > > > > Can anyone think of anything else that might be affected by this? > > > > > > > > > > > > No one uses this stuff, just change it. > > > > > > > > > > Yes, but I feel like I need to at least ask the question; how much > > > > > attention I pay to the answers is something else ... > > > > > > > > I'm still skeptical this won't blow up... Like the capabilities bitmap > > > > did. I suspect there isn't agreement on what constitutes a feature. > > > > > > Anything major that user space would have to know about to determine if its > > > supported. If you don't know, just ask if we need to add a bit to the bitmap. > > > Some examples, adding the object comparison engine, adding the loginuid- > > > immutable feature, if we added filtering on TTY that would also qualify (not > > > asking for that). Otherwise, user space get EINVAL on the netlink operation > > > which is not useful in explaining why the command was rejected. > > > > Well, I guess this falls under Linus' "thou shalt not break userspace", > > but it would certainly be tempting to change some of those to > > EOPNOTSUPP. > > You only break userspace if something breaks :) So which scratch monkey do we mount before sending it upstream? We saw how actually allowing CAP_AUDIT_WRITE from non-init PID namespaces backfired on us in stuff which didn't use audit before... - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat Remote, Ottawa, Canada Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635, Alt: +1.613.693.0684x3545