From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2017 20:07:57 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170303020757.GA9920@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <515427654218b7ce22441f635115e93cf74d6302.1488491988.git.rgb@redhat.com>
On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 08:10:29PM -0500, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid
> application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was
> supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities
> in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event
> really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly
> records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on
> set*id.
>
> See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
Hey Richard,
one possibly audit-worth case which (if I read correctly) this will
skip is where a setuid-root binary has filecaps which *limit* its privs.
Does that matter?
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
> ---
> security/commoncap.c | 5 +++--
> 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 14540bd..8f6bedf 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -594,16 +594,17 @@ skip:
> /*
> * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
> *
> - * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
> + * We do not bother to audit if 4 things are true:
> * 1) cap_effective has all caps
> * 2) we are root
> * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
> + * 4) we are running a set*id binary
> * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
> *
> * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
> * that is interesting information to audit.
> */
> - if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) {
> + if (!is_setid && !cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) {
> if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
> !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
> issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
> --
> 1.7.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-03 2:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-03 1:10 [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs
2017-03-03 2:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2017-03-03 2:50 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-03-07 17:22 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-03-07 18:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-03-07 21:10 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-03-07 21:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-03-09 14:34 ` Steve Grubb
2017-03-29 10:29 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-04-11 19:36 ` Paul Moore
2017-04-12 6:43 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-04-12 14:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-04-12 18:49 ` Steve Grubb
2017-04-13 8:50 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-04-13 19:36 ` Steve Grubb
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