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From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-audit@redhat.com, James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 05:19:08 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170828091908.GL24692@madcap2.tricolour.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJbgoeBpaHt=2u+KkSsewwVdjZmtxMMuFOv927XkW0uig@mail.gmail.com>

On 2017-08-24 12:06, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 24, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> > Quoting Richard Guy Briggs (rgb@redhat.com):
> >> On 2017-08-24 11:03, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >> > Quoting Richard Guy Briggs (rgb@redhat.com):
> >> > > Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of the
> >> > > negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse.
> >> > >
> >> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
> >> > > ---
> >> > >  security/commoncap.c |   16 ++++++++++------
> >> > >  1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> >> > >
> >> > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> >> > > index b7fbf77..6f05ec0 100644
> >> > > --- a/security/commoncap.c
> >> > > +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> >> > > @@ -513,6 +513,12 @@ void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap, bool *effec
> >> > >           *effective = true;
> >> > >  }
> >> > >
> >> >
> >> > It's subjective and so might be just me, but I think I'd find it easier
> >> > to read if it was cap_gained(source, target, field) and cap_grew(cred, source, target)
> >>
> >> In more than one place, I wanted to put the parameter that I was trying
> >> to read aloud closest to the function name to make reading it flow
> >> better, leaving the parameters less critical to comprehension towards
> >> the end.
> >
> > And I see that in the final patch it looks nicer the way you have it.
> >
> >> > This looks correct though, so either way
> >> >
> >> > Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> >>
> >> Thanks.  Did you want to put this through, or send it through Paul's
> >> audit tree?
> >
> > If Paul's around I'm happy to have it go through his tree.
> 
> Is this series based against -next with the changes that touch commoncap.c?

This series is against pcmoore's audit/next tree (I know I'm missing two
commits but they pose no conflict.).

Which -next tree are you talking about?  I might guess
linux-security/next or linux-next/master (I have at least a dozen "next"
in my git repo config.)

I did eventually find your patches in sfr's tree and in your for-next/kspp branch.

I'll have a look at the commoncap.c changes including the elimination of cap_effective.

> Also, did you validate this with the existing LTP tests and selftests?
> 
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/commit/?h=for-next/secureexec&id=ee67ae7ef6ff499137292ac8a9dfe86096796283

No.  I will look into doing that.  Thanks for the suggestion.

I see that bprm->cap_effective has vanished, so that will affect at least one hunk.

> Kees Cook

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-08-28  9:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-08-23 10:12 [PATCH V3 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 01/10] capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 15:42   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25  5:55   ` James Morris
2017-08-25 10:49     ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:03   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-24 16:19     ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:37       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-24 19:06         ` Kees Cook
2017-08-24 21:17           ` Paul Moore
2017-08-28  9:19           ` Richard Guy Briggs [this message]
2017-08-28 11:08             ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-01 10:18               ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-02  5:37                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-09-04  6:57                   ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-05  6:45                     ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-25  5:56   ` James Morris
2017-08-25 15:08   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-08-25 18:47     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:10   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25  5:56   ` James Morris
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:14   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25  5:58   ` James Morris
2017-08-28 12:03     ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-31 14:49       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 05/10] capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:17   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25  5:59   ` James Morris
2017-08-25 15:06   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-08-25 18:51     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25 19:45       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-08-25 20:06         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-28  1:32           ` James Morris
2017-08-28  9:12           ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-28 20:12             ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:18   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25  6:01   ` James Morris
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 07/10] capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:20   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25  5:47   ` James Morris
2017-08-25 15:11   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-08-25 18:53     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 08/10] capabilities: invert logic for clarity Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:23   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25  5:47   ` James Morris
2017-08-23 10:13 ` [PATCH V3 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:29   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-24 16:44     ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:47       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25  5:48   ` James Morris
2017-08-23 10:13 ` [PATCH V3 10/10] capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:35   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25  5:50   ` James Morris

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