Re: [PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V4 02/10] audit: add container id

Steve Grubb
2018-08-24T16:01:11Z

On Tuesday, July 31, 2018 4:07:37 PM EDT Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a
> process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP record to document the event.
>
> This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of
> the form /proc/PID/audit_containerid where PID is the process ID of the
> newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or
> an additional task added to a container.
>
> The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
>
> The writer must have capability CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.
>
> This will produce a record such as this:
> type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set
> opid=2209 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root
> uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1
> subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash
> exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yes
>
> The "op" field indicates an initial set.

The op field seems to be entirely unnecessary. There is no unset event (nor
should there be) so op=set is implied by the record type. Otherwise the event
format looks fine.

-Steve

> The "pid" to "ses" fields are
> the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process
> being "contained". Old and new audit container identifier values are
> given in the "contid" fields, while res indicates its success.
>
> It is not permitted to unset the audit container identifier.
> A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier.
>
> See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
> See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
> See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
> See:
> https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
> ---
> fs/proc/base.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/audit.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
> kernel/auditsc.c | 68
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 131
> insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index b657294..1b3cda1 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -1260,6 +1260,41 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file *
> file, char __user * buf, .read = proc_sessionid_read,
> .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
> };
> +
> +static ssize_t proc_contid_write(struct file *file, const char __user
> *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> + u64 contid;
> + int rv;
> + struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
> +
> + if (!task)
> + return -ESRCH;
> + if (*ppos != 0) {
> + /* No partial writes. */
> + put_task_struct(task);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + rv = kstrtou64_from_user(buf, count, 10, &contid);
> + if (rv < 0) {
> + put_task_struct(task);
> + return rv;
> + }
> +
> + rv = audit_set_contid(task, contid);
> + put_task_struct(task);
> + if (rv < 0)
> + return rv;
> + return count;
> +}
> +
> +static const struct file_operations proc_contid_operations = {
> + .write = proc_contid_write,
> + .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
> +};
> +
> #endif
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
> @@ -2952,6 +2987,7 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m,
> struct pid_namespace *ns, #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
> REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
> REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
> + REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_contid_operations),
> #endif
> #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
> REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
> @@ -3337,6 +3373,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode
> *inode, int mask) #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
> REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
> REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
> + REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_contid_operations),
> #endif
> #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
> REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index 8964332..71a6fc6 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct
> audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_task_info {
> kuid_t loginuid;
> unsigned int sessionid;
> + u64 contid;
> struct audit_context *ctx;
> };
> extern struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit;
> @@ -334,6 +335,7 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
> extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
> struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
> extern int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid);
> +extern int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 contid);
>
> static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> {
> @@ -351,6 +353,14 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct
> task_struct *tsk) return AUDIT_SID_UNSET;
> }
>
> +static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + if (!tsk->audit)
> + return AUDIT_CID_UNSET;
> + else
> + return tsk->audit->contid;
> +}
> +
> extern void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
> extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t
> gid, umode_t mode); extern void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
> @@ -545,6 +555,10 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct
> task_struct *tsk) {
> return AUDIT_SID_UNSET;
> }
> +static inline kuid_t audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + return AUDIT_CID_UNSET;
> +}
> static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
> { }
> static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid,
> @@ -609,6 +623,16 @@ static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct
> task_struct *tsk) return uid_valid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
> }
>
> +static inline bool audit_contid_valid(u64 contid)
> +{
> + return contid != AUDIT_CID_UNSET;
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool audit_contid_set(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + return audit_contid_valid(audit_get_contid(tsk));
> +}
> +
> static inline void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char
> *buf) {
> audit_log_n_string(ab, buf, strlen(buf));
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 4e3eaba..3474f57 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_TTY_SET 1017 /* Set TTY auditing status */
> #define AUDIT_SET_FEATURE 1018 /* Turn an audit feature on or off */
> #define AUDIT_GET_FEATURE 1019 /* Get which features are enabled */
> +#define AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP 1020 /* Define the container id and information
> */
>
> #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100 /* Userspace messages mostly
> uninteresting to kernel */ #define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107 /* We filter this
> differently */
> @@ -468,6 +469,7 @@ struct audit_tty_status {
>
> #define AUDIT_UID_UNSET (unsigned int)-1
> #define AUDIT_SID_UNSET ((unsigned int)-1)
> +#define AUDIT_CID_UNSET ((u64)-1)
>
> /* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string
> * fields. It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 88779a7..6125cef 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -956,6 +956,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
> return -ENOMEM;
> info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
> info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
> + info->contid = audit_get_contid(current);
> tsk->audit = info;
>
> if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
> @@ -985,6 +986,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
> struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = {
> .loginuid = INVALID_UID,
> .sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET,
> + .contid = AUDIT_CID_UNSET,
> .ctx = NULL,
> };
>
> @@ -2112,6 +2114,72 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
> }
>
> /**
> + * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit_context contid
> + * @contid: contid value
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure.
> + *
> + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write().
> + */
> +int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)
> +{
> + u64 oldcontid;
> + int rc = 0;
> + struct audit_buffer *ab;
> + uid_t uid;
> + struct tty_struct *tty;
> + char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
> +
> + task_lock(task);
> + /* Can't set if audit disabled */
> + if (!task->audit) {
> + task_unlock(task);
> + return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> + }
> + oldcontid = audit_get_contid(task);
> + read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
> + /* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */
> + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid))
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + /* if we don't have caps, reject */
> + else if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
> + rc = -EPERM;
> + /* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */
> + else if (!list_empty(&task->children))
> + rc = -EBUSY;
> + else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task)))
> + rc = -EALREADY;
> + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
> + if (!rc)
> + task->audit->contid = contid;
> + task_unlock(task);
> +
> + if (!audit_enabled)
> + return rc;
> +
> + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP);
> + if (!ab)
> + return rc;
> +
> + uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
> + tty = audit_get_tty(current);
> + audit_log_format(ab, "op=set opid=%d old-contid=%llu contid=%llu pid=%d
> uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u", + task_tgid_nr(task), oldcontid,
contid,
> + task_tgid_nr(current), uid,
> + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
> + tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
> + audit_get_sessionid(current));
> + audit_put_tty(tty);
> + audit_log_task_context(ab);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
> + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
> + audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !rc);
> + audit_log_end(ab);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
> * @oflag: open flag
> * @mode: mode bits