From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Matt Anderson Subject: Auditing the TPM Date: Thu, 03 Jan 2008 14:22:45 -0500 Message-ID: <477D3605.5080406@hp.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: Received: from mx3.redhat.com (mx3.redhat.com [172.16.48.32]) by int-mx1.corp.redhat.com (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id m03JNNiE003361 for ; Thu, 3 Jan 2008 14:23:23 -0500 Received: from g5t0008.atlanta.hp.com (g5t0008.atlanta.hp.com [15.192.0.45]) by mx3.redhat.com (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id m03JMqDX023850 for ; Thu, 3 Jan 2008 14:22:52 -0500 Received: from g5t0008.atlanta.hp.com (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by receive-from-antispam-filter (Postfix) with SMTP id 2D03A24849 for ; Thu, 3 Jan 2008 19:22:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mailstation.cce.hp.com (mailstation.zcce.gate.cpqcorp.net [16.104.192.124]) (using TLSv1 with cipher EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA (168/168 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by g5t0008.atlanta.hp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2429924003 for ; Thu, 3 Jan 2008 19:22:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from autechre.americas.cpqcorp.net (c-24-147-68-184.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [24.147.68.184]) by mailstation.cce.hp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A6C52C043 for ; Thu, 3 Jan 2008 13:24:42 -0600 (CST) List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com To: linux-audit@redhat.com List-Id: linux-audit@redhat.com I have been experimenting with the TPM and the TrouSerS package some and have so far come up with this list of possible events that could be interesting from a OS auditing perspective: * Taking Ownership of the TPM * Clearing Ownership * Dis/Enabling the TPM * Dis/Activating the TPM * Recording PCR values * Adjustments to PCR values * Remote attestation connections/commands and their results * Requests of the Public Endorsement Key (EK) * Adjustments to the access controls on the EK * Creating/Destroying the EK * Changes to the TPM locked status (set/reset) For some of these events it makes sense that the auditing would happen in the TPM kernel driver, other events will need to be audited up in user space to accurately capture all the important information. Has anyone in this community begun looking at what TPM events are interesting from an audit perspective? thanks -matt