From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Casey Schaufler Subject: Re: [Fwd: [PATCH][RFC] SMACK : add logging support V1] Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2009 22:24:21 -0700 Message-ID: <49CDB485.5010809@schaufler-ca.com> References: <49B3AB1A.8040201@numericable.fr> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: Received: from mx2.redhat.com (mx2.redhat.com [10.255.15.25]) by int-mx2.corp.redhat.com (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id n2S5QTjc012791 for ; Sat, 28 Mar 2009 01:26:29 -0400 Received: from smtp107.prem.mail.sp1.yahoo.com (smtp107.prem.mail.sp1.yahoo.com [98.136.44.62]) by mx2.redhat.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with SMTP id n2S5QOZk004003 for ; Sat, 28 Mar 2009 01:26:24 -0400 In-Reply-To: <49B3AB1A.8040201@numericable.fr> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com To: etienne Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com List-Id: linux-audit@redhat.com etienne wrote: > Hi, > > could you have a look at this patch from the audit point of view? > > thanks, > Etienne > > > > > Hello, > > the following patch, against current 2.6.29-rc7, add logging of smack decisions. > This is of course very useful to understand what your current smack policy does. > It borrows a lot from selinux; > > It introduces a '/smack/logging' switch : > 0: no logging > 1: log denied (default) > 2: log accepted > 3: log denied&accepted > > > example of logs produced : > > type=1400 audit(1236429348.858:5655879): SMACK[smack_task_kill]: denied pid=6521 comm="bash" subject:'toto' object:'_' requested:w pid=5757 comm="knetworkmanager" > type=1400 audit(1236429361.477:5655882): SMACK[smk_curacc_shm]: denied pid=6533 comm="ipcrm" subject:'toto' object:'_' requested:rw key=491521 > type=1400 audit(1236429392.389:5655885): SMACK[smack_sb_mount]: denied pid=6536 comm="mount" subject:'toto' object:'_' requested:w path="/debug" dev=sda5 ino=16161 > type=1400 audit(1236429485.009:5655890): SMACK[smack_ptrace_may_access]: denied pid=6539 comm="strace" subject:'toto' object:'_' requested:rw pid=5634 comm="python" > type=1400 audit(1236429527.693:5655893): SMACK[smack_inode_getattr]: denied pid=6544 comm="ls" subject:'toto' object:'etienne' requested:r path="/home/etienne/linux" dev=sda8 ino=2342913 > type=1400 audit(1236429741.006:6006665): SMACK[smack_socket_sendmsg]: granted pid=6580 comm="ping" subject:'toto' object:'@' requested:w daddr=192.168.0.10 > type=1400 audit(1236429741.006:6006666): SMACK[smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb]: granted pid=6580 comm="ping" subject:'@' object:'toto' requested:w saddr=192.168.0.10 daddr=192.168.0.10 netif=lo > > > > Signed-off-by: > Acked-by: Casey Schaufler > --- > Documentation/Smack.txt | 12 + > security/smack/Kconfig | 2 +- > security/smack/Makefile | 2 +- > security/smack/smack_logging.c | 460 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/smack/smack_logging.h | 97 +++++++++ > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 356 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- > security/smack/smackfs.c | 52 +++++ > 7 files changed, 892 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-) > --- > diff --git a/Documentation/Smack.txt b/Documentation/Smack.txt > index 989c2fc..81a6921 100644 > --- a/Documentation/Smack.txt > +++ b/Documentation/Smack.txt > @@ -491,3 +491,15 @@ Smack supports some mount options: > > These mount options apply to all file system types. > > +Smack logging support > + > +Smack supports logging of security accesses. It will log by default all denied > +requests. The interface to change this behavior is /smack/logging, where you > +can write the logging level you desire : > +0: no logging > +1: log denied (default) > +2: log accepted > +3: log denied&accepted > + > +Note that due to the rate-limit of audit messages, logging accepted request will > +drop a lot of messages. > diff --git a/security/smack/Kconfig b/security/smack/Kconfig > index 603b087..d83e708 100644 > --- a/security/smack/Kconfig > +++ b/security/smack/Kconfig > @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ > config SECURITY_SMACK > bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Support" > - depends on NETLABEL && SECURITY_NETWORK > + depends on NETLABEL && SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT > default n > help > This selects the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel. > diff --git a/security/smack/Makefile b/security/smack/Makefile > index 67a63aa..b562fba 100644 > --- a/security/smack/Makefile > +++ b/security/smack/Makefile > @@ -4,4 +4,4 @@ > > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) := smack.o > > -smack-y := smack_lsm.o smack_access.o smackfs.o > +smack-y := smack_lsm.o smack_access.o smackfs.o smack_logging.o > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_logging.c b/security/smack/smack_logging.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..1ff81c0 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/smack/smack_logging.c > @@ -0,0 +1,460 @@ > +/* > + * Smack logging > + * > + * heavily inspired by security/selinux/avc.c > + * > + * All credits to : Stephen Smalley, > + * James Morris > + * Author : Etienne Basset, > + * > + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify > + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, > + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. > + */ > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include "smack.h" > +#include "smack_logging.h" > + > +/* what do we log > + * can be overwrite at run-time by /smack/logging > + */ > +struct smack_log_policy log_policy = { > + .log_accepted = 0, > + .log_denied = 1 > +}; > + > + > + > +/** > + * ipv4_skb_to_auditdata : fill smack_auditdata from skb > + * @skb : the skb > + * @ad : the audit data to fill > + * @proto : the layer 4 protocol > + * > + * return 0 on success > + */ > +int ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, > + struct smack_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) > +{ > + int ret = 0; > + struct iphdr *ih; > + > + ih = ip_hdr(skb); > + if (ih == NULL) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; > + ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; > + > + if (proto) > + *proto = ih->protocol; > + /* non initial fragment */ > + if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) > + return 0; > + > + switch (ih->protocol) { > + case IPPROTO_TCP: { > + struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); > + if (th == NULL) > + break; > + > + ad->u.net.sport = th->source; > + ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; > + break; > + } > + case IPPROTO_UDP: { > + struct udphdr *uh = udp_hdr(skb); > + if (uh == NULL) > + break; > + > + ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; > + ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; > + break; > + } > + case IPPROTO_DCCP: { > + struct dccp_hdr *dh = dccp_hdr(skb); > + if (dh == NULL) > + break; > + > + ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; > + ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; > + break; > + } > + case IPPROTO_SCTP: { > + struct sctphdr *sh = sctp_hdr(skb); > + if (sh == NULL) > + break; > + ad->u.net.sport = sh->source; > + ad->u.net.dport = sh->dest; > + break; > + } > + default: > + ret = -EINVAL; > + } > + return ret; > +} > +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) > +/** > + * ipv6_skb_to_auditdata : fill smack_auditdata from skb > + * @skb : the skb > + * @ad : the audit data to fill > + * @proto : the layer 4 protocol > + * > + * return 0 on success > + */ > +int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, > + struct smack_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) > +{ > + int offset, ret = 0; > + struct ipv6hdr *ip6; > + u8 nexthdr; > + > + ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb); > + if (ip6 == NULL) > + return -EINVAL; > + ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr); > + ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr); > + ret = 0; > + /* IPv6 can have several extension header before the Transport header > + * skip them */ > + offset = skb_network_offset(skb); > + offset += sizeof(*ip6); > + nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; > + offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr); > + if (offset < 0) > + return 0; > + if (proto) > + *proto = nexthdr; > + switch (nexthdr) { > + case IPPROTO_TCP: { > + struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; > + > + th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); > + if (th == NULL) > + break; > + > + ad->u.net.sport = th->source; > + ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; > + break; > + } > + case IPPROTO_UDP: { > + struct udphdr _udph, *uh; > + > + uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); > + if (uh == NULL) > + break; > + > + ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; > + ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; > + break; > + } > + case IPPROTO_DCCP: { > + struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; > + > + dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); > + if (dh == NULL) > + break; > + > + ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; > + ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; > + break; > + } > + case IPPROTO_SCTP: { > + struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh; > + > + sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph); > + if (sh == NULL) > + break; > + ad->u.net.sport = sh->source; > + ad->u.net.dport = sh->dest; > + break; > + } > + default: > + ret = -EINVAL; > + } > + return ret; > +} > +#endif > + > + > +static inline void avc_print_ipv6_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, > + struct in6_addr *addr, __be16 port, > + char *name1, char *name2) > +{ > + if (!ipv6_addr_any(addr)) > + audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI6", name1, addr); > + if (port) > + audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port)); > +} > + > +static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr, > + __be16 port, char *name1, char *name2) > +{ > + if (addr) > + audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI4", name1, &addr); > + if (port) > + audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port)); > +} > +/** > + * smack_str_from_perm : helper to transalate an int to a > + * readable string > + * @string : the string to fill > + * @access : the int > + * > + */ > +static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access) > +{ > + int i = 0; > + if (access & MAY_READ) > + string[i++] = 'r'; > + if (access & MAY_WRITE) > + string[i++] = 'w'; > + if (access & MAY_EXEC) > + string[i++] = 'x'; > + if (access & MAY_APPEND) > + string[i++] = 'a'; > + string[i] = '\0'; > +} > + > + > +/** > + * smack_log - Audit the granting or denial of permissions. > + * @subject_label : smack label of the requester > + * @object_label : smack label of the object being accessed > + * @request: requested permissions > + * @result: result from smk_access > + * @a: auxiliary audit data > + * > + * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance > + * with the policy. > + */ > +void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, > + int result, struct smack_audit_data *a) > +{ > + struct task_struct *tsk = current; > + struct inode *inode = NULL; > + struct audit_buffer *ab; > + char request_buffer[5]; > + u32 denied; > + u32 audited = 0; > + > + /* check if we have to log the current event */ > + if (result != 0) { > + denied = 1; > + if (log_policy.log_denied) > + audited = 1; > + } else { > + denied = 0; > + if (log_policy.log_accepted) > + audited = 1; > + } > + if (audited == 0) > + return; > + > + /* we use GFP_ATOMIC so we won't sleep */ > + ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_AVC); > + if (!ab) > + return; > + audit_log_format(ab, "SMACK[%s]: %s ", a->function, denied ? "denied" : "granted"); > + > + if (a && a->tsk) > + tsk = a->tsk; > + if (tsk && tsk->pid) { > + audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid); > + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm); > + } > + smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request); > + audit_log_format(ab, " subject:'%s' object:'%s' requested:%s ", > + subject_label, object_label, request_buffer); > + > + if (a==NULL) > + goto audit_log_end; > + > + switch (a->type) { > + case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC: > + audit_log_format(ab, "key=%d ", a->u.ipc_id); > + break; > + case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP: > + audit_log_format(ab, "capability=%d ", a->u.cap); > + break; > + case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS: > + if (a->u.fs.path.dentry) { > + struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.path.dentry; > + if (a->u.fs.path.mnt) { > + audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &a->u.fs.path); > + } else { > + audit_log_format(ab, "name="); > + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name); > + } > + inode = dentry->d_inode; > + } else if (a->u.fs.inode) { > + struct dentry *dentry; > + inode = a->u.fs.inode; > + dentry = d_find_alias(inode); > + if (dentry) { > + audit_log_format(ab, "name="); > + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name); > + dput(dentry); > + } > + } > + if (inode) > + audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu", > + inode->i_sb->s_id, > + inode->i_ino); > + break; > + case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_TASK: > + tsk = a->u.tsk; > + if (tsk && tsk->pid) { > + audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid); > + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm); > + } > + break; > + case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET: > + if (a->u.net.sk) { > + struct sock *sk = a->u.net.sk; > + struct unix_sock *u; > + int len = 0; > + char *p = NULL; > + > + switch (sk->sk_family) { > + case AF_INET: { > + struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); > + > + avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->rcv_saddr, > + inet->sport, > + "laddr", "lport"); > + avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->daddr, > + inet->dport, > + "faddr", "fport"); > + break; > + } > + case AF_INET6: { > + struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); > + struct ipv6_pinfo *inet6 = inet6_sk(sk); > + > + avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->rcv_saddr, > + inet->sport, > + "laddr", "lport"); > + avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->daddr, > + inet->dport, > + "faddr", "fport"); > + break; > + } > + case AF_UNIX: > + u = unix_sk(sk); > + if (u->dentry) { > + struct path path = { > + .dentry = u->dentry, > + .mnt = u->mnt > + }; > + audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", > + &path); > + break; > + } > + if (!u->addr) > + break; > + len = u->addr->len-sizeof(short); > + p = &u->addr->name->sun_path[0]; > + audit_log_format(ab, " path="); > + if (*p) > + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p); > + else > + audit_log_n_hex(ab, p, len); > + break; > + } > + } > + > + switch (a->u.net.family) { > + case AF_INET: > + avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.saddr, > + a->u.net.sport, > + "saddr", ":"); > + avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.daddr, > + a->u.net.dport, > + "daddr", ":"); > + break; > + case AF_INET6: > + avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.saddr, > + a->u.net.sport, > + "saddr", ":"); > + avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.daddr, > + a->u.net.dport, > + "daddr", ":"); > + break; > + } > + if (a->u.net.netif > 0) { > + struct net_device *dev; > + > + /* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */ > + dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, > + a->u.net.netif); > + if (dev) { > + audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s", > + dev->name); > + dev_put(dev); > + } > + } > + break; > +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS > + case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_KEY: > + audit_log_format(ab, " key serial=%u", a->u.key); > + if (a->u.key_desc) > + audit_log_format(ab, " key desc=%s", a->u.key_desc); > + break; > +#endif > + } /* switch (a->type) */ > + > +audit_log_end: > + audit_log_end(ab); > +} > + > +/** > + * smk_curracc_log : check access of current on olabel > + * @olabel : label being accessed > + * @access : access requested > + * @a : pointer to data > + * > + * return the same perm return by smk_curacc > + */ > +int smk_curacc_log(char *olabel, int access, struct smack_audit_data *a) > +{ > + int rc; > + rc = smk_curacc(olabel, access); > + smack_log(current_security(), olabel, access, rc, a); > + return rc; > +} > + > +/** > + * smk_access_log : check access of slabel on olabel > + * @slabel : subjet label > + * @olabel : label being accessed > + * @access : access requested > + * @a : pointer to data > + * > + * return the same perm return by smk_access > + */ > +int smk_access_log(char *slabel, char *olabel, int access, > + struct smack_audit_data *a) > +{ > + int rc; > + rc = smk_access(slabel, olabel, access); > + smack_log(slabel, olabel, access, rc, a); > + return rc; > +} > + > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_logging.h b/security/smack/smack_logging.h > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..1a01574 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/smack/smack_logging.h > @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ > +/* > + * Smack logging function > + * Heavily borrowed from selinux/avc.h > + * > + * Author : Etienne BASSET > + * > + * All credits to : Stephen Smalley, > + * All BUGS to : Etienne BASSET > + */ > +#ifndef _SMACK_LOGGING_ > +#define _SMACK_LOGGING_ > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > + > + > +struct smack_log_policy { > + int log_accepted; > + int log_denied; > +}; > +extern struct smack_log_policy log_policy; > + > + > +/* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */ > +struct smack_audit_data { > + char type; > +#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS 1 > +#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET 2 > +#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP 3 > +#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC 4 > +#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_TASK 5 > +#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_KEY 6 > + struct task_struct *tsk; > + union { > + struct { > + struct path path; > + struct inode *inode; > + } fs; > + struct { > + int netif; > + struct sock *sk; > + u16 family; > + __be16 dport; > + __be16 sport; > + union { > + struct { > + __be32 daddr; > + __be32 saddr; > + } v4; > + struct { > + struct in6_addr daddr; > + struct in6_addr saddr; > + } v6; > + } fam; > + } net; > + int cap; > + int ipc_id; > + struct task_struct *tsk; > +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS > + key_serial_t key; > + char *key_desc; > +#endif > + } u; > + const char *function; > +}; > + > +#define v4info fam.v4 > +#define v6info fam.v6 > + > +int ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, > + struct smack_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto); > + > +int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, > + struct smack_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto); > + > +/* Initialize an AVC audit data structure. */ > +#define SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d, _t) \ > + { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct smack_audit_data)); (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; (_d)->function = __func__; } > + > +void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, > + int request, > + int result, struct smack_audit_data *auditdata); > + > +int smk_access_log(char *subjectlabel, char *olabel, int access, > + struct smack_audit_data *a); > +int smk_curacc_log(char *olabel, int access, struct smack_audit_data *a); > + > +#endif > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 0278bc0..6e7af4e 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ > #include > > #include "smack.h" > +#include "smack_logging.h" > > #define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security)) > > @@ -99,14 +100,20 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack) > static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) > { > int rc; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > > rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode); > if (rc != 0) > return rc; > > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.tsk = ctp; > + /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */ > rc = smk_access(current_security(), task_security(ctp), MAY_READWRITE); > if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) > - return 0; > + rc = 0; > + > + smack_log(current_security(), task_security(ctp), MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad); > return rc; > } > > @@ -121,14 +128,20 @@ static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) > static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) > { > int rc; > - > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp); > if (rc != 0) > return rc; > > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.tsk = ptp; > + > + /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */ > rc = smk_access(task_security(ptp), current_security(), MAY_READWRITE); > if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) > - return 0; > + rc = 0; > + > + smack_log(task_security(ptp), current_security(), MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad); > return rc; > } > > @@ -324,8 +337,14 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) > static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) > { > struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > + int rc; > + > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > > - return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad); > + return rc; > } > > /** > @@ -343,8 +362,12 @@ static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, > char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) > { > struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_security; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > > - return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE); > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = path->dentry; > + ad.u.fs.path.mnt = path->mnt; > + return smk_curacc_log(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -358,10 +381,14 @@ static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, > static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) > { > struct superblock_smack *sbp; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > > sbp = mnt->mnt_sb->s_security; > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint; > + ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt; > > - return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc_log(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > /* > @@ -438,15 +465,20 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, > struct dentry *new_dentry) > { > - int rc; > char *isp; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > + int rc; > + > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry; > > isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode); > - rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > > if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) { > isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode); > - rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry; > + rc = smk_curacc_log(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > return rc; > @@ -463,18 +495,24 @@ static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, > static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) > { > struct inode *ip = dentry->d_inode; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > int rc; > > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > + > /* > * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking > */ > - rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE); > - if (rc == 0) > + rc = smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > + if (rc == 0) { > /* > * You also need write access to the containing directory > */ > - rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE); > - > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = NULL; > + ad.u.fs.inode = dir; > + rc = smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > + } > return rc; > } > > @@ -488,17 +526,24 @@ static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) > */ > static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) > { > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > int rc; > > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > + > /* > * You need write access to the thing you're removing > */ > - rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); > - if (rc == 0) > + rc = smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > + if (rc == 0) { > /* > * You also need write access to the containing directory > */ > - rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = NULL; > + ad.u.fs.inode = dir; > + rc = smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > + } > > return rc; > } > @@ -522,15 +567,19 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, > { > int rc; > char *isp; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > + > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry; > > isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode); > - rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); > > if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) { > isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode); > - rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry; > + rc = smk_curacc_log(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); > } > - > return rc; > } > > @@ -546,14 +595,16 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, > */ > static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > { > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > /* > * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there. > */ > if (mask == 0) > return 0; > - > - return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask); > -} > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.inode = inode; > + return smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad); > + } > > /** > * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes > @@ -564,13 +615,15 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > */ > static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) > { > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > /* > * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit. > */ > if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) > return 0; > - > - return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > + return smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -582,7 +635,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) > */ > static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) > { > - return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ); > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > + > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > + ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt; > + return smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -600,6 +658,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) > static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > const void *value, size_t size, int flags) > { > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > int rc = 0; > > if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || > @@ -610,8 +669,10 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > } else > rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); > > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > if (rc == 0) > - rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > > return rc; > } > @@ -666,7 +727,11 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > */ > static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) > { > - return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ); > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > + > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > + return smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad); > } > > /* > @@ -680,6 +745,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) > */ > static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) > { > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > int rc = 0; > > if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || > @@ -690,8 +756,10 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) > } else > rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); > > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > if (rc == 0) > - rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > > return rc; > } > @@ -851,12 +919,16 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > unsigned long arg) > { > int rc = 0; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > + > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path; > > if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) > - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > > if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) > - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad); > > return rc; > } > @@ -870,7 +942,11 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > */ > static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) > { > - return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE); > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > + > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = file->f_path.dentry; > + return smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -884,8 +960,12 @@ static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) > static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > unsigned long arg) > { > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > int rc; > > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path; > + > switch (cmd) { > case F_DUPFD: > case F_GETFD: > @@ -893,7 +973,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > case F_GETLK: > case F_GETOWN: > case F_GETSIG: > - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad); > break; > case F_SETFD: > case F_SETFL: > @@ -901,10 +981,10 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > case F_SETLKW: > case F_SETOWN: > case F_SETSIG: > - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > break; > default: > - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READWRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); > } > > return rc; > @@ -939,14 +1019,20 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, > { > struct file *file; > int rc; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > > /* > * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file > */ > file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); > + /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */ > rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->cred->security, MAY_WRITE); > if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) > return 0; > + > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.tsk = tsk; > + smack_log(file->f_security, tsk->cred->security, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad); > return rc; > } > > @@ -959,7 +1045,10 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, > static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) > { > int may = 0; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path; > /* > * This code relies on bitmasks. > */ > @@ -968,7 +1057,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) > if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) > may |= MAY_WRITE; > > - return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may); > + return smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, may, &ad); > } > > /* > @@ -1048,6 +1137,22 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, > } > > /** > + * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access > + * @p: the task object > + * @access : the access requested > + * > + * Return 0 if access is permitted > + */ > +static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access) > +{ > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > + > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.tsk = p; > + return smk_curacc_log(task_security(p), access, &ad); > +} > + > +/** > * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid > * @p: the task object > * @pgid: unused > @@ -1056,7 +1161,7 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, > */ > static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) > { > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -1067,7 +1172,7 @@ static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) > */ > static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ); > + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ); > } > > /** > @@ -1078,7 +1183,7 @@ static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) > */ > static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ); > + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ); > } > > /** > @@ -1106,7 +1211,7 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) > > rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice); > if (rc == 0) > - rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE); > return rc; > } > > @@ -1123,7 +1228,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) > > rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); > if (rc == 0) > - rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE); > return rc; > } > > @@ -1135,7 +1240,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) > */ > static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ); > + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ); > } > > /** > @@ -1153,7 +1258,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, > > rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp); > if (rc == 0) > - rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE); > return rc; > } > > @@ -1165,7 +1270,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, > */ > static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ); > + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ); > } > > /** > @@ -1176,7 +1281,7 @@ static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) > */ > static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -1194,18 +1299,23 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) > static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > int sig, u32 secid) > { > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > + > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.tsk = p; > /* > * Sending a signal requires that the sender > * can write the receiver. > */ > if (secid == 0) > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc_log(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > /* > * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO > * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing > * we can't take privilege into account. > */ > - return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_access_log(smack_from_secid(secid), task_security(p), > + MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -1216,12 +1326,13 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > */ > static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > { > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > int rc; > > + /* we don't log here, we can be overriden */ > rc = smk_access(current_security(), task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > if (rc == 0) > - return 0; > - > + goto out_log; > /* > * Allow the operation to succeed if either task > * has privilege to perform operations that might > @@ -1235,7 +1346,11 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > */ > if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) > return 0; > - > + /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */ > + out_log: > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.tsk = p; > + smack_log(current_security(), task_security(p), MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad); > return rc; > } > > @@ -1567,22 +1682,30 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap, > { > struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; > char *hostsp; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > + struct sockaddr_in *sin; > int rc; > > + > if (sock->sk == NULL || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET) > return 0; > > if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) > return -EINVAL; > - > - hostsp = smack_host_label((struct sockaddr_in *)sap); > + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sap; > + hostsp = smack_host_label(sin); > if (hostsp == NULL) { > if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET) > return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET); > return 0; > } > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); > + ad.u.net.family = sock->sk->sk_family; > + ad.u.net.v4info.daddr = sin->sin_addr.s_addr; > + ad.u.net.dport = sin->sin_port; > + > + rc = smk_access_log(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > > - rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE); > if (rc != 0) > return rc; > > @@ -1673,6 +1796,23 @@ static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) > } > > /** > + * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm > + * @shp : the object > + * @access : access requested > + * > + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise > + */ > +static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access) > +{ > + char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp); > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > + > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); > + ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id; > + return smk_curacc_log(ssp, access, &ad); > +} > + > +/** > * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm > * @shp: the object > * @shmflg: access requested > @@ -1681,11 +1821,10 @@ static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) > */ > static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) > { > - char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp); > int may; > > may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg); > - return smk_curacc(ssp, may); > + return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1697,7 +1836,6 @@ static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) > */ > static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) > { > - char *ssp; > int may; > > switch (cmd) { > @@ -1720,9 +1858,7 @@ static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) > default: > return -EINVAL; > } > - > - ssp = smack_of_shm(shp); > - return smk_curacc(ssp, may); > + return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1736,11 +1872,10 @@ static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) > static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, > int shmflg) > { > - char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp); > int may; > > may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg); > - return smk_curacc(ssp, may); > + return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1782,6 +1917,23 @@ static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma) > } > > /** > + * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem > + * @sma : the object > + * @access : access requested > + * > + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise > + */ > +static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access) > +{ > + char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma); > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > + > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); > + ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id; > + return smk_curacc_log(ssp, access, &ad); > +} > + > +/** > * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem > * @sma: the object > * @semflg: access requested > @@ -1790,11 +1942,10 @@ static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma) > */ > static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) > { > - char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma); > int may; > > may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg); > - return smk_curacc(ssp, may); > + return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1806,7 +1957,6 @@ static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) > */ > static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) > { > - char *ssp; > int may; > > switch (cmd) { > @@ -1835,8 +1985,7 @@ static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) > return -EINVAL; > } > > - ssp = smack_of_sem(sma); > - return smk_curacc(ssp, may); > + return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1853,9 +2002,7 @@ static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) > static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops, > unsigned nsops, int alter) > { > - char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma); > - > - return smk_curacc(ssp, MAY_READWRITE); > + return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -1897,6 +2044,23 @@ static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq) > } > > /** > + * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq > + * @msq : the msq > + * @access : access requested > + * > + * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise > + */ > +static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access) > +{ > + char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq); > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > + > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); > + ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id; > + return smk_curacc_log(msp, access, &ad); > +} > + > +/** > * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue > * @msq: the object > * @msqflg: access requested > @@ -1905,11 +2069,10 @@ static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq) > */ > static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) > { > - char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq); > int may; > > may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg); > - return smk_curacc(msp, may); > + return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1921,7 +2084,6 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) > */ > static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) > { > - char *msp; > int may; > > switch (cmd) { > @@ -1943,8 +2105,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) > return -EINVAL; > } > > - msp = smack_of_msq(msq); > - return smk_curacc(msp, may); > + return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1958,11 +2119,10 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) > static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, > int msqflg) > { > - char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq); > - int rc; > + int may; > > - rc = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg); > - return smk_curacc(msp, rc); > + may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg); > + return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1978,9 +2138,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, > static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, > struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) > { > - char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq); > - > - return smk_curacc(msp, MAY_READWRITE); > + return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -1993,10 +2151,13 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, > static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag) > { > char *isp = ipp->security; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > int may; > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); > + ad.u.ipc_id = ipp->id; > > may = smack_flags_to_may(flag); > - return smk_curacc(isp, may); > + return smk_curacc_log(isp, may, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -2255,8 +2416,12 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, > { > struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock); > struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other); > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > > - return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_READWRITE); > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); > + ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; > + return smk_access_log(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), > + MAY_READWRITE, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -2271,8 +2436,12 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) > { > struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock); > struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other); > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > > - return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_WRITE); > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); > + ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; > + return smk_access_log(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), > + MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -2292,6 +2461,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, > struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; > char *hostsp; > int rc; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > > /* > * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL > @@ -2305,8 +2475,12 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, > return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET); > return 0; > } > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); > + ad.u.net.family = sip->sin_family; > + ad.u.net.dport = sip->sin_port; > + ad.u.net.v4info.daddr = sip->sin_addr.s_addr; > > - rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_access_log(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > if (rc != 0) > return rc; > > @@ -2314,7 +2488,6 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, > return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET); > > return 0; > - > } > > > @@ -2405,6 +2578,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) > struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; > char smack[SMK_LABELLEN]; > char *csp; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > int rc; > > if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6) > @@ -2424,13 +2598,17 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) > > netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); > > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); > + ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; > + ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif; > + ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad, NULL); > /* > * Receiving a packet requires that the other end > * be able to write here. Read access is not required. > * This is the simplist possible security model > * for networking. > */ > - rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_access_log(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > if (rc != 0) > netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0); > return rc; > @@ -2638,6 +2816,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, > const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm) > { > struct key *keyp; > + struct smack_audit_data ad; > > keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); > if (keyp == NULL) > @@ -2653,8 +2832,11 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, > */ > if (cred->security == NULL) > return -EACCES; > + SMACK_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KEY); > + ad.u.key = keyp->serial; > + ad.u.key_desc = keyp->description; > > - return smk_access(cred->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE); > + return smk_access_log(cred->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); > } > #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ > > diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c > index 8e42800..923223f 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c > +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c > @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include "smack.h" > +#include "smack_logging.h" > > /* > * smackfs pseudo filesystem. > @@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ enum smk_inos { > SMK_AMBIENT = 7, /* internet ambient label */ > SMK_NETLBLADDR = 8, /* single label hosts */ > SMK_ONLYCAP = 9, /* the only "capable" label */ > + SMK_LOGGING = 10, /* logging */ > }; > > /* > @@ -1112,6 +1114,54 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = { > .write = smk_write_onlycap, > }; > > + > +static ssize_t smk_read_logging(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, > + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) > +{ > + char temp[32]; > + ssize_t rc; > + > + if (*ppos != 0) > + return 0; > + > + sprintf(temp, "%d\n", > + log_policy.log_denied + log_policy.log_accepted*2); > + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp)); > + return rc; > +} > + > +static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) > +{ > + char temp[32]; > + int i; > + > + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) > + return -EPERM; > + > + if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + temp[count] = '\0'; > + > + if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1) > + return -EINVAL; > + if (i < 0 || i > 3) > + return -EINVAL; > + log_policy.log_denied = i & 1; > + log_policy.log_accepted = (i & 2) >> 1 ; > + return count; > +} > + > + > + > +static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = { > + .read = smk_read_logging, > + .write = smk_write_logging, > +}; > /** > * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock > * @sb: the empty superblock > @@ -1142,6 +1192,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) > {"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > [SMK_ONLYCAP] = > {"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + [SMK_LOGGING] = > + {"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > /* last one */ {""} > }; > > > > >