Re: [PATCH 0/6][v2] audit: implement multicast socket for journald

Eric Paris
2014-04-24T15:03:00Z

On Thu, 2014-04-24 at 10:59 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> I don't disagree. I would think the real solution to this would be to
> not allow sysadm_t to get to SystemHigh, where all of the logging data
> will be stored.

make journalctl a userspace object manager and do selinux checks on if
it can see individual records? so secadm_t running journalctl would see
them and sysadm running journalctl wouldn't see them?

Sounds elegant. Who is going to code it? *NOT IT!*

>
> On 04/24/2014 09:22 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
> > They would be equivalent if and only if journald had CAP_AUDIT_READ.
> >
> > I suggest you take CAP_AUDIT_READ away from journald on systems which
> > need the secadm/sysadmin split (which is a ridiculously stupid split
> > anyway, but who am I to complain?)
> >
> > On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 11:52 AM, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> wrote:
> >> Meaning looking at the journal would be equivalent to looking at
> >> /var/log/audit/audit.log.
> >>
> >>
> >> On 04/23/2014 11:37 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
> >>> On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 11:36 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> >>>> I guess the problem would be that the sysadm_t would be able to look at
> >>>> the journal which would now contain the audit content.
> >>> right. so include it in the sysadm_secadm bool
> >>>
> >>>> On 04/23/2014 10:42 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
> >>>>> On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 09:40 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> >>>>>> Here are the capabilities we currently give to sysadm_t with
> >>>>>> sysadm_secadm 1.0.0 Disabled
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { chown dac_override
> >>>>>> dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid setpcap linux_immutable
> >>>>>> net_bind_service net_broadcast net_admin net_raw ipc_lock ipc_owner
> >>>>>> sys_rawio sys_chroot sys_ptrace sys_pacct sys_admin sys_boot sys_nice
> >>>>>> sys_resource sys_time sys_tty_config mknod lease audit_write setfcap } ;
> >>>>>> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { setgid setuid sys_chroot }
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability2 { syslog block_suspend } ;
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> cap_audit_write might be a problem?
> >>>>> cap_audit_write is fine.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> syslogd_t (aka journal) is going to need the new permission
> >>>>> cap_audit_read. Also, as steve pointed out, someone may be likely to
> >>>>> want to be able to disable that permission easily.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> -Eric
> >>>>>
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