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Similar Internal Domain=false; Similar Monitored External Domain=false; Custom External Domain=false; Mimecast External Domain=false; Newly Observed Domain=false; Internal User Name=false; Custom Display Name List=false; Reply-to Address Mismatch=false; Targeted Threat Dictionary=false; Mimecast Threat Dictionary=false; Custom Threat Dictionary=false X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.85 on 10.11.54.10 X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 06 Apr 2022 02:58:48 +0000 X-BeenThere: linux-audit@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux Audit Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: kbuild-all@lists.01.org, Zeal Robot , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, dai.shixin@zte.com.cn, Yang Yang , linux-audit@redhat.com, ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru, huang.junhua@zte.com.cn, guo.xiaofeng@zte.com.cn, mattst88@gmail.com Errors-To: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com Sender: "Linux-audit" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.85 on 10.11.54.7 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Disposition: inline Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Mon, Apr 04, 2022 at 11:58:50AM -0400, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2022-04-02 08:06, CGEL wrote: > > On Fri, Apr 01, 2022 at 10:16:45AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > > On Fri, Apr 1, 2022 at 9:39 AM Steve Grubb wrote: > > > > On Thursday, March 31, 2022 9:57:05 PM EDT CGEL wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Mar 31, 2022 at 10:16:23AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 10:29 PM CGEL wrote: > > > > > > > On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 10:48:12AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > > > > > If audit is not generating SYSCALL records, even for invalid/ENOSYS > > > > > > > > syscalls, I would consider that a bug which should be fixed. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If we fix this bug, do you think audit invalid/ENOSYS syscalls better > > > > > > > be forcible or be a rule that can be configure? I think configure is > > > > > > > better. > > > > > > > > > > > > It isn't clear to me exactly what you are asking, but I would expect > > > > > > the existing audit syscall filtering mechanism to work regardless if > > > > > > the syscall is valid or not. > > > > > > > > > > Thanks, I try to make it more clear. We found that auditctl would only > > > > > set rule with syscall number (>=0 && <2047) ... > > > > > > That is exactly why I wrote the warning below in my response ... > > > > > I think the question is more clear now. > > > > 1) libaudit.c wants to forbid setting invalid syscall, but inconsistent > > Currently way(>=0 && <2047) is inconsistent, syscall with number 2000 and > > syscall with number 3000 are both invalid syscall. But 2000 can be set by > > auditctl, and 3000 cannot be set by auditctl. > > A better way to do this forbidden is to use __NR_syscalls(asm-generic/unistd.h). > > > > 2) if libaudit.c do the right forbidden, kernel better ignore invalid syscall > > See this patch. > > > > If we want audit invalid syscall as you said before. libaudit.c should not > > do the forbidden, auditctl should allow setting syscall rule with 'any' number. > > So do you think we should fix libaudit.c? > > I'm having a bit of trouble understanding what you've said above. > > The kernel ultimately must protect itself from malice and mistakes, so > it must verify all data sent to it. > > Userspace can help by knowing what that kernel policy is so it can avoid > violating that policy or provide useful feedback if it can't. Userspace > can be used to make things more efficient, but the kernel is the last > step for security. > > If userspace and the kernel are mismatched or out of sync, then the > kernel enforces policy to protect itself. > Much appreciate for your interpretation. Have you get any idea of how to solve the mismatched? From your viewpoint, I think it's better for kernel to not handle syscall of syscall number<0, because it's invaild of all arch, and has no value for attacker to probing for specific syscall numbers. > > > > > > Beware that there are some limitations > > > > > > to the audit syscall filter, which are unfortunately baked into the > > > > > > current design/implementation, which may affect this to some extent. > > > > > > -- > > > paul-moore.com > > - RGB > > -- > Richard Guy Briggs > Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems > Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada > IRC: rgb, SunRaycer > Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635 -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit