Re: [PATCH] selinux: remove AVC init audit log message

[Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>]

On Friday, July 28, 2017 3:23:31 AM EDT Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> In the process of normalizing audit log messages, it was noticed that the
> AVC initialization code registered an audit log KERNEL record that didn't
> fit the standard format.  In the process of attempting to normalize it it
> was determined that this record was not even necessary.  Remove it.

Actually, I'd probably go the other direction. I'd make it useful. How about a 
AUDIT_MAC_INIT record that records, name of MAC framework, status (enabled/
disabled), and enforcing mode (enforcing/permissive). This way if there is an 
investigation that needs to know the initial system state, we have that 
information preserved. There might be one or two other tidbits people might 
want to know like policy version or number of overrides (booleans) deviating 
from policy baseline. But I'd say that's nice to have and not mandatory.

I'm pretty sure that was the intent of the event and its probably to satisfy 
one of the FMT_MSA.3 common criteria requirements about initial subject/object 
security attribute association.

-Steve

> Ref: http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=149614868525826&w=2
> See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/48
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/avc.c |    2 --
>  1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
> index e60c79d..4b42931 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/avc.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
> @@ -197,8 +197,6 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
>  	avc_xperms_data_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_data",
>  					sizeof(struct extended_perms_data),
>  					0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> -
> -	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC
> INITIALIZED\n"); }
> 
>  int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)