From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Paul Moore Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] audit: stop an old auditd being starved out by a new auditd Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2015 16:07:57 -0400 Message-ID: <6749672.utgyqf2Omq@sifl> References: <206b0f415832c9fde6befaa13a7b6efe916d1ba4.1442494593.git.rgb@redhat.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <206b0f415832c9fde6befaa13a7b6efe916d1ba4.1442494593.git.rgb@redhat.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Richard Guy Briggs Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, sgrubb@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, v.rathor@gmail.com, ctcard@hotmail.com List-Id: linux-audit@redhat.com On Friday, September 18, 2015 03:59:58 AM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > Nothing prevents a new auditd starting up and replacing a valid > audit_pid when an old auditd is still running, effectively starving out > the old auditd since audit_pid no longer points to the old valid auditd. > > If no message to auditd has been attempted since auditd died unnaturally > or got killed, audit_pid will still indicate it is alive. There isn't > an easy way to detect if an old auditd is still running on the existing > audit_pid other than attempting to send a message to see if it fails. > An -ECONNREFUSED almost certainly means it disappeared and can be > replaced. Other errors are not so straightforward and may indicate > transient problems that will resolve themselves and the old auditd will > recover. Yet others will likely need manual intervention for which a > new auditd will not solve the problem. > > Send a new message type (AUDIT_PING) to the old auditd containing a u32 > with the PID of the new auditd. If the audit ping succeeds (or doesn't > fail with certainty), fail to register the new auditd and return an > error (-EEXIST). > > This is expected to make the patch preventing an old auditd orphaning a > new auditd redundant. > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs > --- > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + > kernel/audit.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- > 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) XXX > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index 18cdfe2..3399ab2 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -810,6 +810,15 @@ static int audit_set_feature(struct sk_buff *skb) > return 0; > } > > +static int audit_ping(pid_t pid, u32 seq, u32 portid) > +{ > + struct sk_buff *skb = audit_make_reply(portid, seq, AUDIT_PING, 0, 0, > + &pid, sizeof(pid)); This is almost surely going to end up using the wrong netlink sequence number and portid since you are passing the new requestor's information below. I didn't chase down the netlink_unicast() guts to see if it replaces the portid, it might (it probably does), but that still leaves the sequence number. Also, this is more of a attempted hijack message and not a simple ping, right? If we want to create a simple ping message, leave the pid out of it; if we want to indicate to an existing auditd that another process is attempting to hijack the audit connection then we should probably create a proper audit record with a type other than AUDIT_PING. I tend to think there is more value in the hijack message than the ping message, but I can be convinced either way. > + if (!skb) > + return -ENOMEM; > + return netlink_unicast(audit_sock, skb, audit_nlk_portid, 0); > +} ... > @@ -871,13 +880,19 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, > if (s.mask & AUDIT_STATUS_PID) { > int new_pid = s.pid; > + pid_t requesting_pid = task_tgid_vnr(current); > + u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid; > > - if ((!new_pid) && (task_tgid_vnr(current) != audit_pid)) > + if ((!new_pid) && (requesting_pid != audit_pid)) > return -EACCES; > + if (audit_pid && new_pid && > + audit_ping(requesting_pid, nlmsg_hdr(skb)->..., portid) != > + -ECONNREFUSED) > + return -EEXIST; See my comments above about audit_ping(). > if (audit_enabled != AUDIT_OFF) > audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 1); > audit_pid = new_pid; > - audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid; > + audit_nlk_portid = portid; > audit_sock = skb->sk; > } > if (s.mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT) { -- paul moore security @ redhat