From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7263EC4363A for ; Thu, 29 Oct 2020 16:57:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [216.205.24.124]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AFBC420759 for ; Thu, 29 Oct 2020 16:57:45 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org AFBC420759 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=xmission.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=tempfail smtp.mailfrom=linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-159-EJFdEAdQOkmklneG9604Lg-1; Thu, 29 Oct 2020 12:57:42 -0400 X-MC-Unique: EJFdEAdQOkmklneG9604Lg-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx07.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.22]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CFD701882FBC; Thu, 29 Oct 2020 16:57:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from colo-mx.corp.redhat.com (colo-mx01.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.20]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B3E131002C03; Thu, 29 Oct 2020 16:57:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com (lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.19.33]) by colo-mx.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9427E1826D38; Thu, 29 Oct 2020 16:57:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.3]) by lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id 09TGj9qb003412 for ; Thu, 29 Oct 2020 12:45:09 -0400 Received: by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) id 8B24310F271D; Thu, 29 Oct 2020 16:45:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mimecast01.extmail.prod.ext.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.55.17]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 84E9210F1C0D for ; Thu, 29 Oct 2020 16:45:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from us-smtp-1.mimecast.com (us-smtp-2.mimecast.com [207.211.31.81]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1FEA189FEEB for ; Thu, 29 Oct 2020 16:45:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com (out01.mta.xmission.com [166.70.13.231]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-331-oznUKoQ5NuWRAATO6HgCuw-1; Thu, 29 Oct 2020 12:44:57 -0400 X-MC-Unique: oznUKoQ5NuWRAATO6HgCuw-1 Received: from in01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.51]) by out01.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (Exim 4.93) (envelope-from ) id 1kYB2Q-009eVE-Gs; Thu, 29 Oct 2020 10:44:34 -0600 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95] helo=x220.xmission.com) by in01.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1kYB2N-0000rc-Un; Thu, 29 Oct 2020 10:44:34 -0600 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Tycho Andersen References: <20201029003252.2128653-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> <87pn51ghju.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20201029161231.GA108315@cisco> Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 11:44:33 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20201029161231.GA108315@cisco> (Tycho Andersen's message of "Thu, 29 Oct 2020 10:12:31 -0600") Message-ID: <87blglc77y.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-XM-SPF: eid=1kYB2N-0000rc-Un; ; ; mid=<87blglc77y.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>; ; ; hst=in01.mta.xmission.com; ; ; ip=68.227.160.95; ; ; frm=ebiederm@xmission.com; ; ; spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX18l/ky6v0TPp3RfG1uVSiI/idjNvZVspy0= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/34] fs: idmapped mounts X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in01.mta.xmission.com) X-Mimecast-Impersonation-Protect: Policy=CLT - Impersonation Protection Definition; Similar Internal Domain=false; Similar Monitored External Domain=false; Custom External Domain=false; Mimecast External Domain=false; Newly Observed Domain=false; Internal User Name=false; Custom Display Name List=false; Reply-to Address Mismatch=false; Targeted Threat Dictionary=false; Mimecast Threat Dictionary=false; Custom Threat Dictionary=false X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.78 on 10.11.54.3 X-loop: linux-audit@redhat.com X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 12:57:25 -0400 Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Mimi Zohar , Howells , Andreas Dilger , Christian Brauner , Miklos Szeredi , smbarber@chromium.org, Christoph Hellwig , linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Mrunal Patel , Arnd Bergmann , Jann Horn , selinux@vger.kernel.org, Josh Triplett , Forshee , Alexander Viro , Lennart Poettering , OGAWA Hirofumi , Geoffrey Thomas , James Bottomley , John Johansen , Theodore Tso , Dmitry Kasatkin , containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, Jonathan Corbet , Seth, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, David, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Alban Crequy , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Todd Kjos X-BeenThere: linux-audit@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: junk List-Id: Linux Audit Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.22 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Tycho Andersen writes: > Hi Eric, > > On Thu, Oct 29, 2020 at 10:47:49AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Christian Brauner writes: >> >> > Hey everyone, >> > >> > I vanished for a little while to focus on this work here so sorry for >> > not being available by mail for a while. >> > >> > Since quite a long time we have issues with sharing mounts between >> > multiple unprivileged containers with different id mappings, sharing a >> > rootfs between multiple containers with different id mappings, and also >> > sharing regular directories and filesystems between users with different >> > uids and gids. The latter use-cases have become even more important with >> > the availability and adoption of systemd-homed (cf. [1]) to implement >> > portable home directories. >> >> Can you walk us through the motivating use case? >> >> As of this year's LPC I had the distinct impression that the primary use >> case for such a feature was due to the RLIMIT_NPROC problem where two >> containers with the same users still wanted different uid mappings to >> the disk because the users were conflicting with each other because of >> the per user rlimits. >> >> Fixing rlimits is straight forward to implement, and easier to manage >> for implementations and administrators. > > Our use case is to have the same directory exposed to several > different containers which each have disjoint ID mappings. Why do the you have disjoint ID mappings for the users that are writing to disk with the same ID? >> Reading up on systemd-homed it appears to be a way to have encrypted >> home directories. Those home directories can either be encrypted at the >> fs or at the block level. Those home directories appear to have the >> goal of being luggable between systems. If the systems in question >> don't have common administration of uids and gids after lugging your >> encrypted home directory to another system chowning the files is >> required. >> >> Is that the use case you are looking at removing the need for >> systemd-homed to avoid chowning after lugging encrypted home directories >> from one system to another? Why would it be desirable to avoid the >> chown? > > Not just systemd-homed, but LXD has to do this, I asked why the same disk users are assigned different kuids and the only reason I have heard that LXD does this is the RLIMIT_NPROC problem. Perhaps there is another reason. In part this is why I am eager to hear peoples use case, and why I was trying very hard to make certain we get the requirements. I want the real requirements though and some thought, not just we did this and it hurts. Changning the uids on write is a very hard problem, and not just in implementating it but also in maintaining and understanding what is going on. Eric -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit