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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Cc: dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Md Sadre Alam <quic_mdalam@quicinc.com>,
	Israel Rukshin <israelr@nvidia.com>,
	Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/2] dm-inlinecrypt: add target for inline block device encryption
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 13:28:52 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241017202852.GB11717@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b8670e11-61d4-4831-8a21-2dda3c5db131@gmail.com>

On Thu, Oct 17, 2024 at 10:17:04PM +0200, Milan Broz wrote:
> On 10/17/24 9:44 PM, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 16, 2024 at 04:27:48PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > Add a new device-mapper target "dm-inlinecrypt" that is similar to
> > > dm-crypt but uses the blk-crypto API instead of the regular crypto API.
> > > This allows it to take advantage of inline encryption hardware such as
> > > that commonly built into UFS host controllers.
> > 
> > A slight difference in behavior vs. dm-crypt that I just became aware of:
> > dm-crypt allows XTS keys whose first half equals the second half, i.e.
> > cipher key == tweak key.  dm-inlinecrypt typically will not allow this.  Inline
> > encryption hardware typically rejects such keys, and blk-crypto-fallback rejects
> > them too because it uses CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS.
> > 
> > IMO, rejecting these weak keys is desirable, and the fact that dm-inlinecrypt
> > fixes this issue with dm-crypt will just need to be documented.
> 
> Hm, I thought this is already rejected in crypto API (at least in FIPS mode)...
> 
> It should be rejected exactly as you described even for dm-crypt,
> just the check should be (IMO) part of crypto API (set keys), not dm-crypt itself.
> 
> And here I think we should not be backward "compatible" as it is security issue,
> both XTS keys just must not be the same.
> 

In "FIPS mode" such keys are always rejected, but otherwise it is opt-in via the
flag CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS.  dm-crypt doesn't use that flag.

We could certainly try to fix that in dm-crypt, though I expect that some
dm-crypt users have started relying on such keys.  It is a common misconception
that XTS is secure when the two halves of the key are the same.

- Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-17 20:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-16 23:27 [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] dm-inlinecrypt: add target for inline block device encryption Eric Biggers
2024-10-16 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/2] block: export blk-crypto symbols required by dm-inlinecrypt Eric Biggers
2024-10-16 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/2] dm-inlinecrypt: add target for inline block device encryption Eric Biggers
2024-10-17 19:44   ` Eric Biggers
2024-10-17 20:17     ` Milan Broz
2024-10-17 20:28       ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2024-10-17 21:03         ` Milan Broz
2024-10-18  2:52   ` Adrian Vovk
2024-10-18 17:33     ` Eric Biggers
2025-07-11  5:30     ` Md Sadre Alam

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