From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
"Jens Axboe" <axboe@kernel.dk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] xen: harden blkfront against malicious backends
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 12:16:09 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <324eab71-86ae-790a-d19c-97bb35b4f354@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210730103854.12681-1-jgross@suse.com>
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On 30.07.21 12:38, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0
> user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might
> reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so
> a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still
> mess up I/O data, but it shouldn't be able to e.g. crash a guest by
> other means or cause a privilege escalation in the guest).
>
> Unfortunately blkfront in the Linux kernel is fully trusting its
> backend. This series is fixing blkfront in this regard.
>
> It was discussed to handle this as a security problem, but the topic
> was discussed in public before, so it isn't a real secret.
>
> It should be mentioned that a similar series has been posted some years
> ago by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, but this series has not been applied
> due to a Xen header not having been available in the Xen git repo at
> that time. Additionally my series is fixing some more DoS cases.
>
> Changes in V3:
> - patch 3: insert missing unlock in error case (kernel test robot)
> - patch 3: use %#x as format for printing wrong operation value
> (Roger Pau Monné)
>
> Changes in V2:
> - put blkfront patches into own series
> - some minor comments addressed
>
> Juergen Gross (3):
> xen/blkfront: read response from backend only once
> xen/blkfront: don't take local copy of a request from the ring page
> xen/blkfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
>
> drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------
> 1 file changed, 84 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
>
Series pushed to xen/tip.git for-linus-5.15
Juergen
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-30 10:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-07-30 10:38 [PATCH v3 0/3] xen: harden blkfront against malicious backends Juergen Gross
2021-07-30 10:38 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] xen/blkfront: read response from backend only once Juergen Gross
2021-08-02 14:06 ` Oleksandr Andrushchenko
2021-08-02 19:26 ` Julien Grall
2021-08-03 7:00 ` Oleksandr Andrushchenko
2021-07-30 10:38 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] xen/blkfront: don't take local copy of a request from the ring page Juergen Gross
2021-09-10 10:14 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2021-09-10 10:36 ` Juergen Gross
2021-07-30 10:38 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] xen/blkfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly Juergen Gross
2021-08-30 10:16 ` Juergen Gross [this message]
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