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From: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
To: hexlabsecurity@proton.me
Cc: "security@kernel.org" <security@kernel.org>,
	"hch@lst.de" <hch@lst.de>, "sagi@grimberg.me" <sagi@grimberg.me>,
	"kch@nvidia.com" <kch@nvidia.com>,
	"linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org" <linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org>,
	"linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org" <linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-block@vger.kernel.org" <linux-block@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [REPORT] nvmet-rdma: integer overflow in inline-data SGL bounds check -> pre-auth kernel-memory read + remote crash (candidate patch inline)
Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 10:09:14 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ahm6Ksr3rfGdnOsN@kbusch-mbp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <LM21QIR-1-qJb7PViyJKCnGBnUzizeiNJVWQ3wb7ZwGezodjgKg3f-iobqOyequ-sT1jFCKJImfqNO_BKU3KO80xFITnaI5GTV_GxLUNDDc=@proton.me>

On Fri, May 29, 2026 at 06:52:13AM +0000, hexlabsecurity@proton.me wrote:
> @@ -847,6 +848,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_rdma_map_sgl_inline(struct nvmet_rdma_rsp *rsp)
>  	struct nvme_sgl_desc *sgl = &rsp->req.cmd->common.dptr.sgl;
>  	u64 off = le64_to_cpu(sgl->addr);
>  	u32 len = le32_to_cpu(sgl->length);
> +	u64 bound;
> 
>  	if (!nvme_is_write(rsp->req.cmd)) {
>  		rsp->req.error_loc =
> @@ -854,7 +856,8 @@ static u16 nvmet_rdma_map_sgl_inline(struct nvmet_rdma_rsp *rsp)
>  		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
>  	}
> 
> -	if (off + len > rsp->queue->dev->inline_data_size) {
> +	if (check_add_overflow(off, (u64)len, &bound) ||
> +	    bound > rsp->queue->dev->inline_data_size) {

Since you don't use "bound" for anything other than the final check, I
think we make this simpler without it:

	if (off > rsp->queue->dev->inline_data_size ||
	    len > rsp->queue->dev->inline_data_size - off) {

Thanks for the report.

      reply	other threads:[~2026-05-29 16:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-29  6:52 [REPORT] nvmet-rdma: integer overflow in inline-data SGL bounds check -> pre-auth kernel-memory read + remote crash (candidate patch inline) hexlabsecurity
2026-05-29 16:09 ` Keith Busch [this message]

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