* [syzbot] [bluetooth?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in hci_send_acl
@ 2023-08-21 16:26 syzbot
2023-08-31 18:07 ` syzbot
2024-01-14 14:37 ` syzbot
0 siblings, 2 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-08-21 16:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: johan.hedberg, linux-bluetooth, linux-kernel, luiz.dentz, marcel,
syzkaller-bugs
Hello,
syzbot found the following issue on:
HEAD commit: 7271b2a53042 Add linux-next specific files for 20230818
git tree: linux-next
console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13404b6ba80000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=1936af09cdef7dd6
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a0c80b06ae2cb8895bc4
compiler: gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=13506923a80000
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=147569efa80000
Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/d81109bc02c1/disk-7271b2a5.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/4b3bf8e2a4f7/vmlinux-7271b2a5.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/6404cd473c1e/bzImage-7271b2a5.xz
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+a0c80b06ae2cb8895bc4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_send_acl+0xdf4/0xf30 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3228
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888025635618 by task kworker/1:1/27
CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc6-next-20230818-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
Workqueue: events l2cap_info_timeout
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline]
print_report+0xc4/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:475
kasan_report+0xda/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:588
hci_send_acl+0xdf4/0xf30 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3228
l2cap_send_cmd+0x6dd/0x920 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:977
l2cap_send_conn_req+0x1e5/0x260 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1286
l2cap_start_connection+0x11e/0x420 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1514
l2cap_conn_start+0x7ae/0xa40 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1661
process_one_work+0x887/0x15d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2630
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2703 [inline]
worker_thread+0x8bb/0x1290 kernel/workqueue.c:2784
kthread+0x33a/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
</TASK>
Allocated by task 5046:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa2/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:383
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:600 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:721 [inline]
hci_chan_create+0xa6/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2691
l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1a/0xdf0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7841
l2cap_conn_add include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h:866 [inline]
l2cap_chan_connect+0x15b9/0x2140 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8053
bt_6lowpan_connect net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:894 [inline]
lowpan_control_write+0x3d6/0x730 net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:1129
full_proxy_write+0x124/0x190 fs/debugfs/file.c:236
vfs_write+0x2a4/0xe40 fs/read_write.c:582
ksys_write+0x12f/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Freed by task 50:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:522
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
____kasan_slab_free+0x15b/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:200
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:164 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1800 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x114/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:1826
slab_free mm/slub.c:3809 [inline]
__kmem_cache_free+0xb8/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3822
hci_chan_list_flush+0x81/0xf0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2731
hci_conn_cleanup net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:152 [inline]
hci_conn_del+0x1fc/0xd10 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1140
hci_abort_conn_sync+0xacb/0xe20 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5432
abort_conn_sync+0x18e/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2878
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x1a4/0x3c0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:306
process_one_work+0x887/0x15d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2630
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2703 [inline]
worker_thread+0x8bb/0x1290 kernel/workqueue.c:2784
kthread+0x33a/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbc/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:492
kvfree_call_rcu+0x70/0xbe0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3373
kernfs_unlink_open_file+0x3b6/0x4b0 fs/kernfs/file.c:633
kernfs_fop_release+0xec/0x1e0 fs/kernfs/file.c:805
__fput+0x3f7/0xa70 fs/file_table.c:384
__fput_sync+0x47/0x50 fs/file_table.c:465
__do_sys_close fs/open.c:1572 [inline]
__se_sys_close fs/open.c:1557 [inline]
__x64_sys_close+0x87/0xf0 fs/open.c:1557
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Second to last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbc/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:492
kvfree_call_rcu+0x70/0xbe0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3373
kernfs_unlink_open_file+0x3b6/0x4b0 fs/kernfs/file.c:633
kernfs_fop_release+0xec/0x1e0 fs/kernfs/file.c:805
__fput+0x3f7/0xa70 fs/file_table.c:384
__fput_sync+0x47/0x50 fs/file_table.c:465
__do_sys_close fs/open.c:1572 [inline]
__se_sys_close fs/open.c:1557 [inline]
__x64_sys_close+0x87/0xf0 fs/open.c:1557
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888025635600
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
freed 128-byte region [ffff888025635600, ffff888025635680)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000958d40 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x25635
flags: 0xfff00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff00000000800 ffff888012c418c0 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 4500, tgid 4500 (udevd), ts 28013160887, free_ts 27864795775
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x2cf/0x340 mm/page_alloc.c:1536
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1543 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x10d7/0x31b0 mm/page_alloc.c:3219
__alloc_pages+0x1d0/0x4a0 mm/page_alloc.c:4475
alloc_pages+0x1a9/0x270 mm/mempolicy.c:2298
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1870 [inline]
allocate_slab+0x251/0x380 mm/slub.c:2017
new_slab mm/slub.c:2070 [inline]
___slab_alloc+0x8be/0x1570 mm/slub.c:3223
__slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3322
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3375 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3468 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x137/0x350 mm/slub.c:3517
kmalloc_trace+0x25/0xe0 mm/slab_common.c:1095
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:600 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:721 [inline]
kernfs_get_open_node fs/kernfs/file.c:572 [inline]
kernfs_fop_open+0xad1/0xe00 fs/kernfs/file.c:740
do_dentry_open+0x88b/0x1730 fs/open.c:929
do_open fs/namei.c:3636 [inline]
path_openat+0x19af/0x29c0 fs/namei.c:3793
do_filp_open+0x1de/0x430 fs/namei.c:3820
do_sys_openat2+0x176/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1422
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1437 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1453 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1448 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1448
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
page last free stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1136 [inline]
free_unref_page_prepare+0x476/0xa40 mm/page_alloc.c:2348
free_unref_page+0x33/0x3b0 mm/page_alloc.c:2441
qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:166 [inline]
qlist_free_all+0x6a/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:185
kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x18b/0x1d0 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:292
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x65/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:305
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:188 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:762 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3486 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3493 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x172/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:3502
getname_flags.part.0+0x50/0x4d0 fs/namei.c:140
getname_flags include/linux/audit.h:319 [inline]
getname+0x90/0xe0 fs/namei.c:219
do_sys_openat2+0x100/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1416
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1437 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1453 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1448 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1448
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888025635500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc
ffff888025635580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888025635600: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888025635680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888025635700: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
If the bug is already fixed, let syzbot know by replying with:
#syz fix: exact-commit-title
If you want syzbot to run the reproducer, reply with:
#syz test: git://repo/address.git branch-or-commit-hash
If you attach or paste a git patch, syzbot will apply it before testing.
If you want to overwrite bug's subsystems, reply with:
#syz set subsystems: new-subsystem
(See the list of subsystem names on the web dashboard)
If the bug is a duplicate of another bug, reply with:
#syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report
If you want to undo deduplication, reply with:
#syz undup
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* Re: [syzbot] [bluetooth?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in hci_send_acl
2023-08-21 16:26 [syzbot] [bluetooth?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in hci_send_acl syzbot
@ 2023-08-31 18:07 ` syzbot
2024-01-14 14:37 ` syzbot
1 sibling, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-08-31 18:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: hdanton, johan.hedberg, linux-bluetooth, linux-kernel, luiz.dentz,
luiz.von.dentz, marcel, pav, syzkaller-bugs
syzbot has bisected this issue to:
commit 45c37c4e9c9aab5bb1cf5778d8e5ebd9f9ad820a
Author: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Date: Wed Aug 9 23:49:33 2023 +0000
Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF in hci_disconnect_all_sync
bisection log: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=1042c5ffa80000
start commit: 7271b2a53042 Add linux-next specific files for 20230818
git tree: linux-next
final oops: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=1242c5ffa80000
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1442c5ffa80000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=1936af09cdef7dd6
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a0c80b06ae2cb8895bc4
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=13506923a80000
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=147569efa80000
Reported-by: syzbot+a0c80b06ae2cb8895bc4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 45c37c4e9c9a ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF in hci_disconnect_all_sync")
For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* Re: [syzbot] [bluetooth?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in hci_send_acl
2023-08-21 16:26 [syzbot] [bluetooth?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in hci_send_acl syzbot
2023-08-31 18:07 ` syzbot
@ 2024-01-14 14:37 ` syzbot
1 sibling, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-01-14 14:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: davem, edumazet, hdanton, johan.hedberg, kuba, linux-bluetooth,
linux-kernel, luiz.dentz, luiz.von.dentz, marcel, netdev, pabeni,
pav, syzkaller-bugs, william.xuanziyang
syzbot suspects this issue was fixed by commit:
commit 181a42edddf51d5d9697ecdf365d72ebeab5afb0
Author: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
Date: Wed Oct 11 09:57:31 2023 +0000
Bluetooth: Make handle of hci_conn be unique
bisection log: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=127944c1e80000
start commit: 4b2b606075e5 ipv4/fib: send notify when delete source addr..
git tree: net
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=d594086f139d167
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a0c80b06ae2cb8895bc4
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=138aad9e680000
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=125e0b92680000
If the result looks correct, please mark the issue as fixed by replying with:
#syz fix: Bluetooth: Make handle of hci_conn be unique
For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH] Bluetooth: hci_conn: verify connection is to be aborted before doing it
@ 2023-08-25 19:01 Pauli Virtanen
2023-08-25 19:34 ` [syzbot] [bluetooth?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in hci_send_acl syzbot
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Pauli Virtanen @ 2023-08-25 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-bluetooth; +Cc: Pauli Virtanen, syzbot, syzkaller-bugs
There is a race condition where a connection handle is reused, after
hci_abort_conn but before abort_conn_sync is processed in hci_sync. In
this case, hci_abort_conn_sync ends up calling hci_connect_cfm with
success status and then delete the connection, which causes
use-after-free.
Fix by checking abort_reason before calling hci_abort_conn_sync.
Also fix some theoretical UAF / races, where something frees the conn
while hci_abort_conn_sync is working on it.
Fixes: a13f316e90fd ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Consolidate code for aborting connections")
Reported-by: syzbot+a0c80b06ae2cb8895bc4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/0000000000005ab984060371583e@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
---
Notes:
Not sure how you'd hit this condition in real controller, but syzbot
does end up calling hci_abort_conn_sync with reason == 0 which then
causes havoc.
This can be verified: with a patch that changes abort_conn_sync to
2874 conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(hdev, handle);
2875 if (!conn || WARN_ON(!conn->abort_reason))
2876 return 0;
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=Patch&x=16eff740680000
it hits that WARN_ON:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=10affb97a80000
#syz test git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bluetooth/bluetooth-next.git master
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index 9d5057cef30a..8622eddb946a 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -2886,12 +2886,25 @@ static int abort_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data)
{
struct hci_conn *conn;
u16 handle = PTR_UINT(data);
+ u8 reason;
+ int err;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(hdev, handle);
+ if (conn) {
+ reason = READ_ONCE(conn->abort_reason);
+ conn = reason ? hci_conn_get(conn) : NULL;
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
if (!conn)
return 0;
- return hci_abort_conn_sync(hdev, conn, conn->abort_reason);
+ err = hci_abort_conn_sync(hdev, conn, reason);
+ hci_conn_put(conn);
+ return err;
}
int hci_abort_conn(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 reason)
@@ -2903,6 +2916,8 @@ int hci_abort_conn(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 reason)
*/
if (conn->abort_reason)
return 0;
+ if (WARN_ON(!reason))
+ reason = HCI_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED;
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "handle 0x%2.2x reason 0x%2.2x", conn->handle, reason);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
index 9b93653c6197..a93096c5cbfd 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
@@ -5375,6 +5375,8 @@ int hci_abort_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn, u8 reason)
u16 handle = conn->handle;
struct hci_conn *c;
+ WARN_ON(!reason);
+
switch (conn->state) {
case BT_CONNECTED:
case BT_CONFIG:
--
2.41.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 2/2] Bluetooth: hci_conn: verify connection is to be aborted before doing it
@ 2023-09-30 12:53 Pauli Virtanen
2023-09-30 13:28 ` [syzbot] [bluetooth?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in hci_send_acl syzbot
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Pauli Virtanen @ 2023-09-30 12:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-bluetooth
Cc: Pauli Virtanen, syzkaller-bugs, syzbot+a0c80b06ae2cb8895bc4
There is a race condition where a connection handle is reused, after
hci_abort_conn but before abort_conn_sync is processed in hci_sync. In
this case, hci_abort_conn_sync ends up working on the wrong connection,
which can have abort_reason==0, in which case hci_connect_cfm is called
with success status and then connection is deleted, which causes various
use-after-free.
Fix by checking abort_reason is nonzero before calling
hci_abort_conn_sync. If it's zero, then the connection is probably a
different one than we expected and should not be aborted.
Also fix some theoretical UAF / races, where something frees the conn
while hci_abort_conn_sync is working on it.
Fixes: a13f316e90fd ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Consolidate code for aborting connections")
Reported-by: syzbot+a0c80b06ae2cb8895bc4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/0000000000005ab984060371583e@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
---
Notes:
v2: drop one probably not necessary WARN_ON
Not sure how you'd hit this condition in real controller, but syzbot
does end up calling hci_abort_conn_sync with reason == 0 which then
causes havoc.
This can be verified: with a patch that changes abort_conn_sync to
2874 conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(hdev, handle);
2875 if (!conn || WARN_ON(!conn->abort_reason))
2876 return 0;
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=Patch&x=16eff740680000
it hits that WARN_ON:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=10affb97a80000
#syz test git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bluetooth/bluetooth-next.git master
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index e62a5f368a51..22de82071e35 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -2901,12 +2901,25 @@ static int abort_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data)
{
struct hci_conn *conn;
u16 handle = PTR_UINT(data);
+ u8 reason;
+ int err;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(hdev, handle);
+ if (conn) {
+ reason = READ_ONCE(conn->abort_reason);
+ conn = reason ? hci_conn_get(conn) : NULL;
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
if (!conn)
return 0;
- return hci_abort_conn_sync(hdev, conn, conn->abort_reason);
+ err = hci_abort_conn_sync(hdev, conn, reason);
+ hci_conn_put(conn);
+ return err;
}
int hci_abort_conn(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 reason)
@@ -2918,6 +2931,8 @@ int hci_abort_conn(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 reason)
*/
if (conn->abort_reason)
return 0;
+ if (WARN_ON(!reason))
+ reason = HCI_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED;
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "handle 0x%2.2x reason 0x%2.2x", conn->handle, reason);
--
2.41.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2024-01-14 14:37 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2023-08-21 16:26 [syzbot] [bluetooth?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in hci_send_acl syzbot
2023-08-31 18:07 ` syzbot
2024-01-14 14:37 ` syzbot
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2023-08-25 19:01 [PATCH] Bluetooth: hci_conn: verify connection is to be aborted before doing it Pauli Virtanen
2023-08-25 19:34 ` [syzbot] [bluetooth?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in hci_send_acl syzbot
2023-09-30 12:53 [PATCH v2 2/2] Bluetooth: hci_conn: verify connection is to be aborted before doing it Pauli Virtanen
2023-09-30 13:28 ` [syzbot] [bluetooth?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in hci_send_acl syzbot
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