[PATCH-v7 0/2] Bluetooth: Add MITM protection to LE-SMP

[PATCH-v7 0/2] Bluetooth: Add MITM protection to LE-SMP

[Brian Gix]

These patches are identical to Version 6 of the same patchset, except
that they have been rebased onto the latest code, including the new
work queue patches.

-- 
Brian Gix
bgix@codeaurora.org
Employee of Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc.
Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum 

[PATCH-v7 1/2] Bluetooth: Add MITM mechanism to LE-SMP

[Brian Gix]

To achive Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) level security with Low Energy,
we have to enable User Passkey Comparison.  This commit modifies the
hard-coded JUST-WORKS pairing mechanism to support query via the MGMT
interface of Passkey comparison and User Confirmation.

Signed-off-by: Brian Gix <bgix@codeaurora.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |    1 +
 include/net/bluetooth/smp.h      |    5 +
 net/bluetooth/smp.c              |  227 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 3 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index e34cd71..39bcd50 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ struct hci_conn {
 	struct hci_dev	*hdev;
 	void		*l2cap_data;
 	void		*sco_data;
+	void		*smp_conn;
 
 	struct hci_conn	*link;
 
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
index 15b97d5..5cbcd05 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ struct smp_cmd_security_req {
 #define SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE		7
 #define SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE		16
 
+#define SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID	1
+#define SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING	2
+
 struct smp_chan {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn;
 	u8		preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
@@ -124,6 +127,7 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
 	u8		tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
 	u8		smp_key_size;
+	unsigned long	smp_flags;
 	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm;
 	struct work_struct confirm;
 	struct work_struct random;
@@ -134,6 +138,7 @@ struct smp_chan {
 int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level);
 int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force);
+int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey);
 
 void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn);
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 0b96737..42ca847 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
@@ -188,24 +189,45 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 					msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
 }
 
+static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq)
+{
+	if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM)
+		return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+	else
+		return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+}
+
+static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
+{
+	switch (sec_level) {
+	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
+		return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
+		return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	default:
+		return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+	}
+}
+
 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 				struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
 				struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp,
 				__u8 authreq)
 {
-	u8 dist_keys;
+	u8 dist_keys = 0;
 
-	dist_keys = 0;
 	if (test_bit(HCI_PAIRABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->flags)) {
 		dist_keys = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
 		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	} else {
+		authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
 	}
 
 	if (rsp == NULL) {
 		req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
 		req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
 		req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
-		req->init_key_dist = dist_keys;
+		req->init_key_dist = 0;
 		req->resp_key_dist = dist_keys;
 		req->auth_req = authreq;
 		return;
@@ -214,7 +236,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
 	rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
 	rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
-	rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & dist_keys;
+	rsp->init_key_dist = 0;
 	rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & dist_keys;
 	rsp->auth_req = authreq;
 }
@@ -244,6 +266,93 @@ static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason, u8 send)
 	smp_chan_destroy(conn);
 }
 
+#define JUST_WORKS	0x00
+#define JUST_CFM	0x01
+#define REQ_PASSKEY	0x02
+#define CFM_PASSKEY	0x03
+#define REQ_OOB		0x04
+#define OVERLAP		0xFF
+
+static const u8	gen_method[5][5] = {
+	{JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY},
+	{JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY},
+	{CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY},
+	{JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    JUST_WORKS,  JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM},
+	{CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP}
+};
+
+static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
+						u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	u8 method;
+	u32 passkey = 0;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/* Initialize key to JUST WORKS */
+	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+
+	BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
+
+	/* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */
+	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_WORKS */
+	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM) ||
+			local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
+			remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) {
+		auth &= ~SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* MITM is now officially requested, but not required */
+	/* Determine what we need (if anything) from the agent */
+	method = gen_method[local_io][remote_io];
+
+	if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
+		auth &= ~SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+
+	/* Don't bother confirming unbonded JUST_WORKS */
+	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && method == JUST_CFM) {
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+		return 0;
+	} else if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+		return 0;
+	} else if (method == OVERLAP) {
+		if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
+			method = CFM_PASSKEY;
+		else
+			method = REQ_PASSKEY;
+	}
+
+	if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
+		u8 key[16];
+		/* Generate a passkey for display. It is not valid until
+		 * confirmed.
+		 */
+		memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+		get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
+		passkey %= 1000000;
+		put_unaligned_le32(passkey, key);
+		swap128(key, smp->tk);
+		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
+	}
+
+	hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev);
+
+	if (method == REQ_PASSKEY)
+		ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, conn->dst);
+	else
+		ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, conn->dst,
+						cpu_to_le32(passkey), 0);
+
+	hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, confirm);
@@ -276,6 +385,8 @@ static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work)
 		goto error;
 	}
 
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
+
 	swap128(res, cp.confirm_val);
 	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 
@@ -381,6 +492,7 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 
 	smp->conn = conn;
 	conn->smp_chan = smp;
+	conn->hcon->smp_conn = conn;
 
 	hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
 
@@ -398,18 +510,67 @@ void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 
 	kfree(smp);
 	conn->smp_chan = NULL;
+	conn->hcon->smp_conn = NULL;
 	hci_conn_put(conn->hcon);
 }
 
+int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->smp_conn;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	u32 value;
+	u8 key[16];
+	u8 reason = 0;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	BT_DBG("");
+
+	if (!conn)
+		return -ENOTCONN;
+
+	smp = conn->smp_chan;
+
+	switch (mgmt_op) {
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
+		value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
+		memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
+		put_unaligned_le32(value, key);
+		swap128(key, smp->tk);
+		/* Fall Through */
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		/* Fall Through */
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
+		reason = SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (reason)
+		smp_failure(conn, reason, 1);
+	else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags))
+		queue_work(hcon->hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
 	u8 key_size;
+	u8 auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
 	int ret;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
+	if (conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
+		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
 	if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->pend))
 		smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
 
@@ -419,19 +580,16 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
 
-	if (req->oob_flag)
-		return SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL;
+	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
+	if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)
+		auth = req->auth_req;
 
-	/* We didn't start the pairing, so no requirements */
-	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, SMP_AUTH_NONE);
+	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
 
 	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
 	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
 		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 
-	/* Just works */
-	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
-
 	ret = smp_rand(smp->prnd);
 	if (ret)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@@ -441,6 +599,11 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
 
+	/* Request setup of TK */
+	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -449,11 +612,14 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
-	u8 key_size;
+	u8 key_size, auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
 	int ret;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
+	if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
+		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
 
 	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
@@ -462,12 +628,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
 		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 
-	if (rsp->oob_flag)
-		return SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL;
-
-	/* Just works */
-	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
-
 	ret = smp_rand(smp->prnd);
 	if (ret)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@@ -475,6 +635,22 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
 	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
 
+	if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) &&
+			(rsp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+		auth = SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+
+	auth |= (req->auth_req | rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+
+	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability);
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
+
+	/* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
+	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags))
+		return 0;
+
 	queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -496,8 +672,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		swap128(smp->prnd, random);
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(random),
 								random);
-	} else {
+	} else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags)) {
 		queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
+	} else {
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -550,7 +728,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
-	hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+	hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
 
 	if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn))
 		return 0;
@@ -577,6 +755,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 {
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	__u8 authreq;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
 
@@ -597,18 +776,22 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 		return 0;
 
 	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+	if (!smp)
+		return 1;
+
+	authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
 
 	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
 		struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
 
-		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, SMP_AUTH_NONE);
+		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
 		smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
 		memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
 
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 	} else {
 		struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
-		cp.auth_req = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+		cp.auth_req = authreq;
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 	}
 
-- 
1.7.8

-- 
Brian Gix
bgix@codeaurora.org
Employee of Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc.
Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum 

Re: [PATCH-v7 1/2] Bluetooth: Add MITM mechanism to LE-SMP

[Marcel Holtmann]

Hi Brian,

> To achive Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) level security with Low Energy,
> we have to enable User Passkey Comparison.  This commit modifies the
> hard-coded JUST-WORKS pairing mechanism to support query via the MGMT
> interface of Passkey comparison and User Confirmation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brian Gix <bgix@codeaurora.org>
> ---
>  include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |    1 +
>  include/net/bluetooth/smp.h      |    5 +
>  net/bluetooth/smp.c              |  227 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  3 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
> index e34cd71..39bcd50 100644
> --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
> +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
> @@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ struct hci_conn {
>  	struct hci_dev	*hdev;
>  	void		*l2cap_data;
>  	void		*sco_data;
> +	void		*smp_conn;
>  
>  	struct hci_conn	*link;
>  
> diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
> index 15b97d5..5cbcd05 100644
> --- a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
> +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
> @@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ struct smp_cmd_security_req {
>  #define SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE		7
>  #define SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE		16
>  
> +#define SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID	1
> +#define SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING	2
> +
>  struct smp_chan {
>  	struct l2cap_conn *conn;
>  	u8		preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
> @@ -124,6 +127,7 @@ struct smp_chan {
>  	u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
>  	u8		tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
>  	u8		smp_key_size;
> +	unsigned long	smp_flags;
>  	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm;
>  	struct work_struct confirm;
>  	struct work_struct random;
> @@ -134,6 +138,7 @@ struct smp_chan {
>  int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level);
>  int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force);
> +int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey);
>  
>  void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn);
>  
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> index 0b96737..42ca847 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
>  #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
>  #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
>  #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
> +#include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
>  #include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
>  #include <linux/crypto.h>
>  #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
> @@ -188,24 +189,45 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
>  					msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
>  }
>  
> +static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq)
> +{
> +	if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM)
> +		return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
> +	else
> +		return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
> +}
> +
> +static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
> +{
> +	switch (sec_level) {
> +	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
> +		return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
> +	case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
> +		return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
> +	default:
> +		return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
> +	}
> +}
> +
>  static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
>  				struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
>  				struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp,
>  				__u8 authreq)
>  {
> -	u8 dist_keys;
> +	u8 dist_keys = 0;
>  
> -	dist_keys = 0;
>  	if (test_bit(HCI_PAIRABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->flags)) {
>  		dist_keys = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
>  		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
> +	} else {
> +		authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
>  	}
>  
>  	if (rsp == NULL) {
>  		req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
>  		req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
>  		req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
> -		req->init_key_dist = dist_keys;
> +		req->init_key_dist = 0;
>  		req->resp_key_dist = dist_keys;
>  		req->auth_req = authreq;
>  		return;
> @@ -214,7 +236,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
>  	rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
>  	rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
>  	rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
> -	rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & dist_keys;
> +	rsp->init_key_dist = 0;
>  	rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & dist_keys;
>  	rsp->auth_req = authreq;
>  }
> @@ -244,6 +266,93 @@ static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason, u8 send)
>  	smp_chan_destroy(conn);
>  }
>  
> +#define JUST_WORKS	0x00
> +#define JUST_CFM	0x01
> +#define REQ_PASSKEY	0x02
> +#define CFM_PASSKEY	0x03
> +#define REQ_OOB		0x04
> +#define OVERLAP		0xFF
> +
> +static const u8	gen_method[5][5] = {

some style nitpicks here. Please remove the tab in between. It does not
really help to make this more visual.

> +	{JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY},
> +	{JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY},
> +	{CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY},
> +	{JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    JUST_WORKS,  JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM},
> +	{CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP}

And here please do { JUST_WORKS and close with REQ_PASSKEY } and just
make sure that all } align. Also for the last one do }, even it is not
strictly speaking necessary.

> +};
> +
> +static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
> +						u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
> +{
> +	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
> +	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
> +	u8 method;
> +	u32 passkey = 0;
> +	int ret = 0;
> +
> +	/* Initialize key to JUST WORKS */
> +	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
> +	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
> +
> +	BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
> +
> +	/* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */
> +	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_WORKS */
> +	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM) ||
> +			local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
> +			remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) {
> +		auth &= ~SMP_AUTH_MITM;
> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* MITM is now officially requested, but not required */
> +	/* Determine what we need (if anything) from the agent */
> +	method = gen_method[local_io][remote_io];
> +
> +	if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
> +		auth &= ~SMP_AUTH_MITM;
> +
> +	/* Don't bother confirming unbonded JUST_WORKS */
> +	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && method == JUST_CFM) {
> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
> +		return 0;

Since we do return 0 here, whey not just do another if we an empty line
in between instead of else if. I think it helps a bit with making clear
what to code does. I would also not mind some extra small comments on
top of every if statement.

> +	} else if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
> +		return 0;
> +	} else if (method == OVERLAP) {
> +		if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
> +			method = CFM_PASSKEY;
> +		else
> +			method = REQ_PASSKEY;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
> +		u8 key[16];
> +		/* Generate a passkey for display. It is not valid until
> +		 * confirmed.
> +		 */
> +		memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
> +		get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
> +		passkey %= 1000000;
> +		put_unaligned_le32(passkey, key);
> +		swap128(key, smp->tk);
> +		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
> +	}
> +
> +	hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev);
> +
> +	if (method == REQ_PASSKEY)
> +		ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, conn->dst);
> +	else
> +		ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, conn->dst,
> +						cpu_to_le32(passkey), 0);
> +
> +	hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev);
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
>  static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work)
>  {
>  	struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, confirm);
> @@ -276,6 +385,8 @@ static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work)
>  		goto error;
>  	}
>  
> +	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
> +
>  	swap128(res, cp.confirm_val);
>  	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
>  
> @@ -381,6 +492,7 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
>  
>  	smp->conn = conn;
>  	conn->smp_chan = smp;
> +	conn->hcon->smp_conn = conn;
>  
>  	hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
>  
> @@ -398,18 +510,67 @@ void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
>  
>  	kfree(smp);
>  	conn->smp_chan = NULL;
> +	conn->hcon->smp_conn = NULL;
>  	hci_conn_put(conn->hcon);
>  }
>  
> +int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
> +{
> +	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->smp_conn;
> +	struct smp_chan *smp;
> +	u32 value;
> +	u8 key[16];
> +	u8 reason = 0;
> +	int ret = 0;
> +
> +	BT_DBG("");
> +
> +	if (!conn)
> +		return -ENOTCONN;
> +
> +	smp = conn->smp_chan;
> +
> +	switch (mgmt_op) {
> +	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
> +		value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
> +		memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
> +		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
> +		put_unaligned_le32(value, key);
> +		swap128(key, smp->tk);
> +		/* Fall Through */
> +	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +		/* Fall Through */
> +	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
> +	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
> +		reason = SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED;
> +		break;
> +	}

So I do not like the labels after default at all. I prefer that we have
default at really the last one and just duplicate the one line.

> +
> +	if (reason)
> +		smp_failure(conn, reason, 1);
> +	else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags))
> +		queue_work(hcon->hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);

And then looking here, why do we bother with assigning reason while in
reality right now it is constant anyway. Could we just not feed that
into the switch statement and just return in that case?

Maybe some future patches use this, but then you need to give me head up
here. Right now this looks too complicated for what it is actually
doing.

> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
>  static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
>  	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
>  	struct smp_chan *smp;
>  	u8 key_size;
> +	u8 auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
>  	int ret;
>  
>  	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
>  
> +	if (conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
> +		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
> +
>  	if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->pend))
>  		smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
>  
> @@ -419,19 +580,16 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
>  	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
>  
> -	if (req->oob_flag)
> -		return SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL;
> +	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
> +	if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)
> +		auth = req->auth_req;
>  
> -	/* We didn't start the pairing, so no requirements */
> -	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, SMP_AUTH_NONE);
> +	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
>  
>  	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
>  	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
>  		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
>  
> -	/* Just works */
> -	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
> -
>  	ret = smp_rand(smp->prnd);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
> @@ -441,6 +599,11 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  
>  	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
>  
> +	/* Request setup of TK */
> +	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
> +
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -449,11 +612,14 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
>  	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
>  	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
> -	u8 key_size;
> +	u8 key_size, auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
>  	int ret;
>  
>  	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
>  
> +	if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
> +		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
> +
>  	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
>  
>  	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
> @@ -462,12 +628,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
>  		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
>  
> -	if (rsp->oob_flag)
> -		return SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL;
> -
> -	/* Just works */
> -	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
> -
>  	ret = smp_rand(smp->prnd);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
> @@ -475,6 +635,22 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
>  	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
>  
> +	if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) &&
> +			(rsp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
> +		auth = SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
> +
> +	auth |= (req->auth_req | rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_MITM;
> +
> +	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
> +
> +	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
> +
> +	/* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
> +	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags))
> +		return 0;
> +
>  	queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
>  
>  	return 0;
> @@ -496,8 +672,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  		swap128(smp->prnd, random);
>  		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(random),
>  								random);
> -	} else {
> +	} else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags)) {
>  		queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
> +	} else {
> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
>  	}
>  
>  	return 0;
> @@ -550,7 +728,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  
>  	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
>  
> -	hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
> +	hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
>  
>  	if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn))
>  		return 0;
> @@ -577,6 +755,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
>  {
>  	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
>  	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
> +	__u8 authreq;
>  
>  	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
>  
> @@ -597,18 +776,22 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
> +	if (!smp)
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
>  
>  	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
>  		struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
>  
> -		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, SMP_AUTH_NONE);
> +		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
>  		smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
>  		memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
>  
>  		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
>  	} else {
>  		struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
> -		cp.auth_req = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
> +		cp.auth_req = authreq;
>  		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
>  	}
>  

Someone might need to have a second look over this, but from what I can
tell, the rest looks all fine to me.

Regards

Marcel

Re: [PATCH-v7 1/2] Bluetooth: Add MITM mechanism to LE-SMP

[Andrei Emeltchenko]

Hi Brian,

On Tue, Dec 20, 2011 at 05:04:41PM -0800, Brian Gix wrote:
> To achive Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) level security with Low Energy,
> we have to enable User Passkey Comparison.  This commit modifies the
> hard-coded JUST-WORKS pairing mechanism to support query via the MGMT
> interface of Passkey comparison and User Confirmation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brian Gix <bgix@codeaurora.org>
> ---
>  include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |    1 +
>  include/net/bluetooth/smp.h      |    5 +
>  net/bluetooth/smp.c              |  227 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  3 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

...

> +static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
> +						u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
> +{
> +	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
> +	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
> +	u8 method;
> +	u32 passkey = 0;
> +	int ret = 0;
> +
> +	/* Initialize key to JUST WORKS */
> +	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
> +	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
> +
> +	BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
> +
> +	/* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */
> +	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_WORKS */
> +	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM) ||
> +			local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
> +			remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) {
> +		auth &= ~SMP_AUTH_MITM;
> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* MITM is now officially requested, but not required */
> +	/* Determine what we need (if anything) from the agent */
> +	method = gen_method[local_io][remote_io];
> +
> +	if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
> +		auth &= ~SMP_AUTH_MITM;
> +
> +	/* Don't bother confirming unbonded JUST_WORKS */
> +	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && method == JUST_CFM) {
> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
> +		return 0;
> +	} else if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
> +		return 0;
> +	} else if (method == OVERLAP) {
> +		if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
> +			method = CFM_PASSKEY;
> +		else
> +			method = REQ_PASSKEY;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
> +		u8 key[16];
> +		/* Generate a passkey for display. It is not valid until
> +		 * confirmed.
> +		 */
> +		memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
> +		get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
> +		passkey %= 1000000;
> +		put_unaligned_le32(passkey, key);
> +		swap128(key, smp->tk);
> +		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
> +	}

Would it make sense to use switch(method) instead of [if/else/else if] ?

Best regards 
Andrei Emeltchenko 

Re: [PATCH-v7 1/2] Bluetooth: Add MITM mechanism to LE-SMP

[Brian Gix]

Hi Andrei,

On 12/21/2011 2:28 AM, Andrei Emeltchenko wrote:
> Hi Brian,
>
> On Tue, Dec 20, 2011 at 05:04:41PM -0800, Brian Gix wrote:
>> To achive Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) level security with Low Energy,
>> we have to enable User Passkey Comparison.  This commit modifies the
>> hard-coded JUST-WORKS pairing mechanism to support query via the MGMT
>> interface of Passkey comparison and User Confirmation.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Brian Gix<bgix@codeaurora.org>
>> ---
>>   include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |    1 +
>>   include/net/bluetooth/smp.h      |    5 +
>>   net/bluetooth/smp.c              |  227 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>>   3 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>
> ...
>
>> +static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
>> +						u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
>> +{
>> +	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
>> +	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
>> +	u8 method;
>> +	u32 passkey = 0;
>> +	int ret = 0;
>> +
>> +	/* Initialize key to JUST WORKS */
>> +	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
>> +	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,&smp->smp_flags);
>> +
>> +	BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
>> +
>> +	/* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */
>> +	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_WORKS */
>> +	if (!(auth&  SMP_AUTH_MITM) ||
>> +			local_io>  SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
>> +			remote_io>  SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) {
>> +		auth&= ~SMP_AUTH_MITM;
>> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,&smp->smp_flags);
>> +		return 0;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	/* MITM is now officially requested, but not required */
>> +	/* Determine what we need (if anything) from the agent */
>> +	method = gen_method[local_io][remote_io];
>> +
>> +	if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
>> +		auth&= ~SMP_AUTH_MITM;
>> +
>> +	/* Don't bother confirming unbonded JUST_WORKS */
>> +	if (!(auth&  SMP_AUTH_BONDING)&&  method == JUST_CFM) {
>> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,&smp->smp_flags);
>> +		return 0;
>> +	} else if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
>> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,&smp->smp_flags);
>> +		return 0;
>> +	} else if (method == OVERLAP) {
>> +		if (hcon->link_mode&  HCI_LM_MASTER)
>> +			method = CFM_PASSKEY;
>> +		else
>> +			method = REQ_PASSKEY;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
>> +		u8 key[16];
>> +		/* Generate a passkey for display. It is not valid until
>> +		 * confirmed.
>> +		 */
>> +		memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
>> +		get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
>> +		passkey %= 1000000;
>> +		put_unaligned_le32(passkey, key);
>> +		swap128(key, smp->tk);
>> +		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
>> +	}
>
> Would it make sense to use switch(method) instead of [if/else/else if] ?

I can use a simpler "method" switch at the end, to determine which mgmt 
call to make to get the passkey or confirmation. However, the "truth 
table" is a bit too complex for a switch, with the method being tweaked 
based on rules coming from the Core Spec, and then later clarified in 
erratum 4249.  I also wanted to avoid putting the random passkey 
generation inside of the  hci_dev_lock block.


-- 
Brian Gix
bgix@codeaurora.org
Employee of Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc.
Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum

Re: [PATCH-v7 1/2] Bluetooth: Add MITM mechanism to LE-SMP

[Marcel Holtmann]

Hi Brian,

> > On Tue, Dec 20, 2011 at 05:04:41PM -0800, Brian Gix wrote:
> >> To achive Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) level security with Low Energy,
> >> we have to enable User Passkey Comparison.  This commit modifies the
> >> hard-coded JUST-WORKS pairing mechanism to support query via the MGMT
> >> interface of Passkey comparison and User Confirmation.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Brian Gix<bgix@codeaurora.org>
> >> ---
> >>   include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |    1 +
> >>   include/net/bluetooth/smp.h      |    5 +
> >>   net/bluetooth/smp.c              |  227 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> >>   3 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
> >
> > ...
> >
> >> +static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
> >> +						u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
> >> +{
> >> +	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
> >> +	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
> >> +	u8 method;
> >> +	u32 passkey = 0;
> >> +	int ret = 0;
> >> +
> >> +	/* Initialize key to JUST WORKS */
> >> +	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
> >> +	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,&smp->smp_flags);
> >> +
> >> +	BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
> >> +
> >> +	/* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */
> >> +	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_WORKS */
> >> +	if (!(auth&  SMP_AUTH_MITM) ||
> >> +			local_io>  SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
> >> +			remote_io>  SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) {
> >> +		auth&= ~SMP_AUTH_MITM;
> >> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,&smp->smp_flags);
> >> +		return 0;
> >> +	}
> >> +
> >> +	/* MITM is now officially requested, but not required */
> >> +	/* Determine what we need (if anything) from the agent */
> >> +	method = gen_method[local_io][remote_io];
> >> +
> >> +	if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
> >> +		auth&= ~SMP_AUTH_MITM;
> >> +
> >> +	/* Don't bother confirming unbonded JUST_WORKS */
> >> +	if (!(auth&  SMP_AUTH_BONDING)&&  method == JUST_CFM) {
> >> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,&smp->smp_flags);
> >> +		return 0;
> >> +	} else if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
> >> +		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,&smp->smp_flags);
> >> +		return 0;
> >> +	} else if (method == OVERLAP) {
> >> +		if (hcon->link_mode&  HCI_LM_MASTER)
> >> +			method = CFM_PASSKEY;
> >> +		else
> >> +			method = REQ_PASSKEY;
> >> +	}
> >> +
> >> +	if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
> >> +		u8 key[16];
> >> +		/* Generate a passkey for display. It is not valid until
> >> +		 * confirmed.
> >> +		 */
> >> +		memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
> >> +		get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
> >> +		passkey %= 1000000;
> >> +		put_unaligned_le32(passkey, key);
> >> +		swap128(key, smp->tk);
> >> +		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
> >> +	}
> >
> > Would it make sense to use switch(method) instead of [if/else/else if] ?
> 
> I can use a simpler "method" switch at the end, to determine which mgmt 
> call to make to get the passkey or confirmation. However, the "truth 
> table" is a bit too complex for a switch, with the method being tweaked 
> based on rules coming from the Core Spec, and then later clarified in 
> erratum 4249.  I also wanted to avoid putting the random passkey 
> generation inside of the  hci_dev_lock block.

I am fine with if statements as long as you just return and do not
bother with else if.

Regards

Marcel

[PATCH-v7 2/2] Bluetooth: Add SMP to User Passkey and Confirm

[Brian Gix]

Low Energy pairing is performed through the SMP (Security Manager Protocol)
mechanism rather than HCI.

Signed-off-by: Brian Gix <bgix@codeaurora.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
index 7a23f21..4e05e24 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
 
 #define MGMT_VERSION	0
 #define MGMT_REVISION	1
@@ -1606,8 +1607,15 @@ static int user_pairing_resp(struct sock *sk, u16 index, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
 		}
 
 		/* Continue with pairing via SMP */
+		err = smp_user_confirm_reply(conn, mgmt_op, passkey);
+
+		if (!err)
+			err = cmd_status(sk, index, mgmt_op,
+							MGMT_STATUS_SUCCESS);
+		else
+			err = cmd_status(sk, index, mgmt_op,
+							MGMT_STATUS_FAILED);
 
-		err = cmd_status(sk, index, mgmt_op, MGMT_STATUS_SUCCESS);
 		goto done;
 	}
 
-- 
1.7.8

-- 
Brian Gix
bgix@codeaurora.org
Employee of Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc.
Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum 

Re: [PATCH-v7 2/2] Bluetooth: Add SMP to User Passkey and Confirm

[Marcel Holtmann]

Hi Brain,

> Low Energy pairing is performed through the SMP (Security Manager Protocol)
> mechanism rather than HCI.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brian Gix <bgix@codeaurora.org>
> ---
>  net/bluetooth/mgmt.c |   10 +++++++++-
>  1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Regards

Marcel