From: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
To: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>,
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>,
Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>,
Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
"Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>,
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>,
Nipun Gupta <nipun.gupta@amd.com>,
Nikhil Agarwal <nikhil.agarwal@amd.com>,
Pieter Jansen van Vuuren <pieter.jansen-van-vuuren@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, driver-core@lists.linux.dev,
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linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 18/19] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:48:01 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261117124801.GD124972@unreal> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b4c2538f-8021-4abc-be2e-fcd1596f84ca@arm.com>
On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 05:13:59PM +0000, Robin Murphy wrote:
> On 10/11/2026 12:22 pm, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 09, 2026 at 01:53:02PM +0000, Robin Murphy wrote:
> > > On 09/11/2026 7:33 am, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> > > [...]
> > > > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
> > > > index b486b8bbd1fcd..8be2a246d4903 100644
> > > > --- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
> > > > +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
> > > > @@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static int iommu_get_def_domain_type(struct iommu_group *group,
> > > > static int iommu_get_default_domain_type(struct iommu_group *group,
> > > > int target_type)
> > > > {
> > > > - struct device *untrusted = NULL;
> > > > + struct device *restricted = NULL;
> > > > struct group_device *gdev;
> > > > int driver_type = 0;
> > > > @@ -1901,14 +1901,15 @@ static int iommu_get_default_domain_type(struct iommu_group *group,
> > > > driver_type = iommu_get_def_domain_type(group, gdev->dev,
> > > > driver_type);
> > > > - if (dev_is_pci(gdev->dev) && to_pci_dev(gdev->dev)->untrusted) {
> > > > + if (dev_is_pci(gdev->dev) &&
> > > > + pci_dev_default_is_restricted(to_pci_dev(gdev->dev))) {
> > >
> > > I think this should be the generic device_is_adversarial(gdev->dev) now - in
> > > fact probably all the dev_is_pci()/to_pci_dev() stanzas aren't conceptually
> > > PCI-specific, just an artefact of the current "untrusted" flag being so.
> >
> > I wanted to do the same, but iommu_get_default_domain_type() may be called
> > before the PCI device's trust level has been set. At that point, we are
> > still in "disabled" mode, whereas device_is_adversarial() checks for
> > "adversarial" mode.
> >
> > The below is from AI, I asked to present me the path for that:
> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > For a newly discovered PCI device with an available IOMMU and a new IOMMU group:
> > pci_scan_single_device()
> > pci_device_add()
> > device_add()
> > bus_notify(dev, BUS_NOTIFY_ADD_DEVICE)
> > blocking_notifier_call_chain()
> > notifier_call_chain()
> > iommu_bus_notifier()
> > iommu_probe_device(dev)
> > __iommu_probe_device(dev, NULL)
> > iommu_setup_default_domain(group, 0)
> > iommu_get_default_domain_type(group, 0)
> >
> > For a device whose initial policy is adversary, its state during that call is:
> > dev->trust_policy = DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY
> > dev->trust_level = DEVICE_TRUST_DISABLED
> > dev->trust_committed_level = DEVICE_TRUST_DISABLED
> > dev->driver = NULL
> >
> > device_is_adversarial(dev) = false
> >
> > The active level changes later, during binding:
> > really_probe()
> > device_trust_prepare()
> > __device_trust_prepare()
> > WRITE_ONCE(dev->trust_level, DEVICE_TRUST_ADVERSARY)
> > dev->bus->dma_configure()
> > call_driver_probe()
>
> OK, that seems less than ideal. Feels like it would be better if bus code
> set the initial device state prior to device_add, so then it only ever
> changes later as a result of an explicit attestation/acceptance process. If
> the initial IOMMU probe still has to poke into bus-specific code to avoid
> always making a worst-case assumption, doesn't that rather defeat the point
> of having a generic abstraction?
As Jason said, this is part of a very large series. Each series is an
adventure in itself. Even Greg's seemingly simple request to convert the
USB authorization knob to this new scheme has been extremely painful
because of AI reviews. They keep pointing out bugs and gaps that are
automatically attributed to me simply because I'm touching that part of
the code.
>
> Even with the slightly dubious argument that this series only intends to
> shuffle the existing PCI code around rather than fully introduce the generic
> abstraction that it claims to, if the PCI behaviour is still just based on
> propagating the internal "untrusted" flag plus the new global override, both
> of which *are* known at add_device time into the common trust state, then
> there seems little excuse for not doing that up-front so that the new API
> *can* just work as expected.
I would prefer to keep both PCI and USB out of this series on device trust
levels. Let's see what people say if I drop them in v3.
>
> > >
> > > > /*
> > > > - * No ARM32 using systems will set untrusted, it cannot
> > > > - * work.
> > > > + * No ARM32 using systems select a restricted trust
> > > > + * policy; it cannot work.
> > > > */
> > > > if (WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM_DMA_USE_IOMMU)))
> > > > return -1;
> > > > - untrusted = gdev->dev;
> > > > + restricted = gdev->dev;
> > > > }
> > > > }
> > > [...]
> > > > @@ -616,6 +608,28 @@ static inline struct pci_dev *to_pci_dev(const struct device *dev)
> > > > {
> > > > return container_of(dev, struct pci_dev, dev);
> > > > }
> > > > +
> > > > +static inline bool
> > > > +pci_dev_default_is_restricted(const struct pci_dev *pdev)
> > > > +{
> > > > + enum device_trust_policy policy = READ_ONCE(pdev->dev.trust_policy);
> > > > +
> > > > + return policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED ||
> > > > + policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY;
> > > > +}
> > >
> > > Unless I've wildly misunderstood, I'm not sure this is right - if the user
> > > has set DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED to explicitly override the bus-default
> > > behaviour, but that leads to the IOMMU layer special-casing all PCI devices
> > > as adversarial and thus force-*enabling* all their trust-model restrictions,
> > > isn't that pretty much the complete opposite of what was asked for?
> >
> > We have two levels: policy - that describes the default of all devices
> > for that bus. level - actual decision on how that device is going to be
> > operated.
> >
> > "Disabled" prevents driver probing until the device is authorized,
> > "Adversary" permits probing and requests the available protections
> > for operating an untrusted device.
> >
> > Both need conservative initial IOMMU setup: a disabled device may later
> > be authorized as adversary, and authorization does not rebuild its IOMMU
> > domain.
>
> Urgh, I can be absolutely certain I'm not the only one who is going to be
> confused this way... I see "disabled" and instinctively take it to mean
> disabling the device_trust *mechanism*, as the logical thing that people
> will reach for in terms of "I don't care what this new thing is, just get it
> out of my way and let my drivers work like they always used to; I want to
> disable the new thing."
I completely agree. I was under the impression that these names had already
been decided, since I picked up where Dan left off.
>
> From there it then also makes perfect self-consistent sense that
> "device_trust=full" would be the opposite end of the scale as in "Apply the
> explicit trust model 'fully', to all devices regardless of their bus-level
> default."
>
> Now I guess you could name it something like "device.default_trust_level" to
> attempt to make it clearer that it represents a value the value represents
> the "trust" *of* each individual device itself, but TBH it's still liable to
> look backwards to many users - similarly it's hard to guess that
> FOO_POLICY_DISABLED might mean something entirely different from "don't
> enforce the policy for FOO.", thus rather than try to contort the naming of
> everything, I'd still be much more inclined to just flip the meanings to be
> more intuitive from the outsider perspective.
>
> Say you upgrade your kernel and find your boot is broken because it now
> flibbles, but at least there is a "flibble" parameter whose values are
> "disabled", "wibble" and "frobble". Are you really going to spend time
> straight off reading up on what flibbling is to understand what wibbles and
> frobbles mean? Or is your instinct just going to be to try the seemingly
> obvious way of disabling flibbling, and then getting positively annoyed if
> that only makes it flibble harder?
What about: blocked, adversarial and unrestricted
instead of: disabled, adversarial and full
Thanks
>
> Robin.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 12:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-09 7:33 [PATCH v2 00/19] driver core: Authorize device trust before driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] Input: gameport - attach manual drivers through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 10:06 ` driver core: Authorize device trust before driver binding bluez.test.bot
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] wifi: mac80211_hwsim: lock device for manual " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] USB: Lock registered interfaces during " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] USB: Release interface claims refused during registration Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] PNP: Attach card devices through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] cdx: Propagate DMA configuration errors Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] driver core: Report deferred probes through sysfs drivers_probe Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] driver core: Add a compatibility API for manual driver attachment Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] Input: serio - use the compatibility driver attachment API Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] net: phy: Use " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 13:45 ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-10 7:39 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10 14:31 ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-10 14:58 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] driver core: Introduce a generic device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-13 11:30 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-16 12:11 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-16 12:27 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] driver core: Expose device trust authorization interfaces Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] driver core: Accept device trust policy on the kernel command line Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] driver core: Accept device trust policy by driver name Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] driver core: Expose committed device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] driver core: Cover trust authorization and binding with KUnit Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] driver core: Document trust admission and initrd authorization Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 13:53 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-10 12:22 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10 14:25 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10 14:34 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-16 17:13 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-17 0:05 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-17 12:48 ` Leon Romanovsky [this message]
2026-11-16 18:46 ` Kameron Carr
2026-11-16 19:04 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 19:24 ` Kameron Carr
2026-11-16 20:09 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] USB: Authorize devices and interfaces through " Leon Romanovsky
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