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From: Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net>
To: Elman Shahbazov <shahbazovelman97@gmail.com>,
	 linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org
Cc: secalert@redhat.com, Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix Out-of-Bounds Read in AVRCP GetFolderItems parsing
Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2026 11:46:26 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c80cfccc288532015fa968b9fe06f612b5dc365f.camel@hadess.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CADE-WFdQ+35ePBX35mQt6o61dyz7tBkKByVe1BnKzXxpb-njAw@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, 2026-08-02 at 08:06 +0400, Elman Shahbazov wrote:
> Hello BlueZ maintainers and Red Hat Security team,
> 
> <snip>
> 4. Proof of Concept (PoC)
> I have attached poc_avrcp_obb.c which extracts the vulnerable logic
> and simulates
> the attack using a 14-byte malicious packet with an inflated namesize
> of 1000.

Do you have a proof of concept for the parse_media_folder() vuln?

I'm trying to integrate those into test cases.

> 
> To verify the vulnerability:
> 1. Compile with AddressSanitizer:
>    gcc -fsanitize=address -g -o poc_avrcp_oob poc_avrcp_obb.c
> 2. Run the binary:
>    ./poc_avrcp_oob
> 
> ASan will immediately detect the out-of-bounds access and abort:
> =================================================================
> ==113741==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address
> 0x...
> READ of size 254 at 0x... thread T0
>     #0 0x... in memcpy
>     #1 0x... in parse_media_element_vuln
>     #2 0x... in main
> SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow in
> parse_media_element_vuln
> 
> [ 5. Proposed Fix
> The attached patch ensures that the length extracted from the packet
> is strictly
> validated against the remaining bytes in the packet buffer (len)
> before being
> used in memcpy. It also adds boundary checks before accessing
> subsequent offsets.
> 
> Please review the attached .patch file. I am requesting a CVE
> assignment for
> this issue given its impact on system availability.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Elman Shahbazov
> Security Researcher

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-08-04  9:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-02  4:06 [PATCH] Fix Out-of-Bounds Read in AVRCP GetFolderItems parsing Elman Shahbazov
2026-08-02  6:20 ` bluez.test.bot
2026-08-04  9:46 ` Bastien Nocera [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-08-02  7:58 [PATCH] " Elman Shahbazov

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