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From: Maciej Marcin Piechotka <uzytkownik2@gmail.com>
To: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: btrfs vs data deduplication
Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2011 23:01:31 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1316379701.27066.10.camel@picard> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACVpCE7ZSjgT9+h2DfHAR_n=4LqHguOSVaNzE3YcnZ5Bb00_Kw@mail.gmail.com>

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On Sat, 2011-07-09 at 08:19 +0200, Paweł Brodacki wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I've stumbled upon this article:
> http://storagemojo.com/2011/06/27/de-dup-too-much-of-good-thing/
> 
> Reportedly Sandforce SF1200 SSD controller does internally block-level
> data de-duplication. This effectively removes the additional
> protection given by writing multiple metadata copies. This technique
> may be used, or can be used in the future by manufactureres of other
> drives too.
> 
> I would like to ask, if the metadata copies written to a btrfs system
> with enabled metadata mirroring are identical, or is there something
> that makes them unique on-disk, therefore preventing their
> de-duplication. I tried googling for the answer, but didn't net
> anything that would answer my question.
> 
> If the metadata copies are identical, I'd like to ask if it would be
> possible to change this without major disruption? I know that changes
> to on-disk format aren't a thing made lightly, but I'd be grateful for
> any comments.
> 
> The increase of the risk of file system corruption introduced by data
> de-duplication on Sandforce controllers was down-played in the
> vendor's reply included in the article, but still, what's the point of
> duplicating metadata on file system level, if storage below can remove
> that redundancy?
> 
> Regards,
> Paweł

Hello,

Sorry I add my 0.03$. It is possible to workaround it by using
encryption. If something other then ebc is used the identical elements
in unecrypted mode are stored as different on hdd.

The drawbacks:

 - Encryption overhead (you may want to use non-secure mode as you're
not interested in security)
 - There is avalanche effect (whole [encryption] block gets corrupted
even if one bit of block is corrupted).

Regards

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      parent reply	other threads:[~2011-09-18 21:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-07-09  6:19 btrfs vs data deduplication Paweł Brodacki
2011-09-18 20:15 ` Hubert Kario
2011-09-18 22:14   ` Chris Samuel
2011-09-18 21:01 ` Maciej Marcin Piechotka [this message]

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