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From: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: ChaCha20 vs. AES performance
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2016 07:51:52 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160920155152.eopgz7h2z6kpsfdy@kmo-pixel> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160920142320.ubkifckpfvzvuzom@thunk.org>

On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 10:23:20AM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 03:15:19AM -0800, Kent Overstreet wrote:
> > Not on the list or I would've replied directly, but on Haswell, ChaCha20 (in
> > software) is over 2x as fast as AES (in hardware), at realistic (for a
> > filesystem) block sizes:
> 
> On Skylake and Broadwell processors, AES is faster (the posting is
> from a ChaCha20 enthusiast):
> 
>      https://blog.cloudflare.com/it-takes-two-to-chacha-poly/

The performance delta in his graphs isn't near as big as what I've measured,
which makes me suspect OpenSSL's ChaCha20 implementation isn't nearly as fast as
the kernel's.

> My big worry though is that schemes that require that nonces/IV's must
> **never** be reused are fragile.  It's for the same reason that DSA
> makes my skin crawl.  If you ever screw up --- maybe after a crash, or
> a file system bug, you end up reusing a nonce, it's game over.
> 
> So if there are hardware solutions which are faster or fast enough
> that the crypto is no longer dominant cost, why not use a cipher
> scheme which is more robust?

Block ciphers have their own downsides though - XTS is really a big pile of
hacks and workarounds. On the whole, if you can get nonces right, a stream
cipher cryptosystem (and ChaCha20 especially) is on the whole drastically
simpler, and thus easier to understand and audit.

And if you can do nonces correctly, ChaCha20/Poly1305 is pretty much one of the
gold standards - it's secure against pretty much any vaguely realistic threat
model. XTS, not so much - it's just the best you can do given the constraints of
typical disk crypto. The gold standards of encryption today are the AEADs - and
AES/GCM fails badly with nonce reuse too, there aren't any AEADs yet that don't
fail badly with nonce reuse.

> P.S.  We're also both ignoring the cost of whatever changes are needed in
> the file system to guarantee that the nonce is never, ever reused...

I'm definitely not advocating for hacking stream ciphers into existing
filesystems - if you don't have the machinery you need to be 100% rigorous about
nonces, then definitely stick with XTS. But I already had most of what I needed
in bcachefs, and I can still break the on disk format if I need to (and
encryption is a breaking change), so for me ChaCha20/Poly1305 was a no brainer.

BTW though, if there do turn out to be platforms where AES is significantly
faster than ChaCha20 I can still add AES support pretty easily - I've already
got all the relevant switch statements, since encryption is handled as another
checksum type.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-09-20 15:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-09-20 11:15 ChaCha20 vs. AES performance Kent Overstreet
2016-09-20 14:23 ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-09-20 15:51   ` Kent Overstreet [this message]
2016-09-20 20:35     ` Alex Elsayed
2016-09-20 22:40     ` Mathieu Chouquet-Stringer

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