From: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
To: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>, Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>,
linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: guaneryu@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] btrfs: Make btrfs handle security mount options internally to avoid losing security label.
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 22:33:10 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <54223B76.1040908@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <542210E5.7060509@cn.fujitsu.com>
On 9/23/14 7:31 PM, Qu Wenruo wrote:
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: Re: [PATCH] btrfs: Make btrfs handle security mount options internally to avoid losing security label.
> From: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
> To: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>, Qu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>, <linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org>
> Date: 2014年09月24日 02:51
>> On 9/23/14 7:49 AM, Chris Mason wrote:
>>> On 09/23/2014 01:40 AM, Qu Wenruo wrote:
>>>> [BUG]
>>>> Originally when mount btrfs with "-o subvol=" mount option, btrfs will
>>>> lose all security lable.
>>>> And if the btrfs fs is mounted somewhere else, due to the lost of
>>>> security lable, SELinux will refuse to mount since the same super block
>>>> is being mounted using different security lable.
>>>>
>>>> [REPRODUCER]
>>>> With SELinux enabled:
>>>> #mkfs -t btrfs /dev/sda5
>>>> #mount -o context=system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /dev/sda5 /mnt/btrfs
>>>> #btrfs subvolume create /mnt/btrfs/subvol
>>>> #mount -o subvol=subvol,context=system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /dev/sda5
>>>> /mnt/test
>>>>
>>>> kernel message:
>>>> SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different security settings
>>>> for (dev sda5, type btrfs)
>>>>
>>>> [REASON]
>>>> This happens because btrfs will call vfs_kern_mount() and then
>>>> mount_subtree() to handle subvolume name lookup.
>>>> First mount will cut off all the security lables and when it comes to
>>>> the second vfs_kern_mount(), it has no security label now.
>>>>
>>>> [FIX]
>>>> This patch will makes btrfs behavior much more like nfs,
>>>> which has the type flag FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA,
>>>> making btrfs handles the security label internally.
>>>> So security label will be set in the real mount time and won't lose
>>>> label when use with "subvol=" mount option.
>>> Thanks for working on this. Eric Sandeen (cc'd) was trying out
>>> something similar recently, so I want to make sure this doesn't conflict
>>> with his ideas.
>> My ideas didn't get very far. ;)
>>
>> What I was after was a way for multiple subvolumes to have unique contexts.
>> It looks like this might do the trick, as long as they are mounted on a unique
>> mount point.
>>
>> Would this allow "subvolume create" to take a context, so that everything
>> under /mnt/btrfs/subvol/ has a unique subvol-wide context?
>>
>> thanks,
>> -Eric
> Did you mean the following situation?
> /dev/sdb default subvol(FS_TREE) mounted on /mnt/default with context A
> /dev/sdb subvol=subvol mounted on /mnt/subvol with context B
>
> If that's your goal, I am afraid that my patch can't achieve it and even worse, will even forbid it. :(
>
> SELinux doesn't allow same superblock mounted with different context, and the patch follows it.
> If SELinux is modified to allow same superblock different context, then my patch also needs to be modified.
oh, ok, I see.
I don't think that my "wish" should disallow your patch.
For the problem I was looking at, I think the only way forward would require
some significant selinux modification, and treating a subvol root essentially
like a superblock.
So ... don't let me slow you down, at least for now. ;)
-Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-09-24 3:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-09-23 5:40 [PATCH] btrfs: Make btrfs handle security mount options internally to avoid losing security label Qu Wenruo
2014-09-23 12:49 ` Chris Mason
2014-09-23 18:51 ` Eric Sandeen
2014-09-24 0:31 ` Qu Wenruo
2014-09-24 3:33 ` Eric Sandeen [this message]
2014-09-24 3:43 ` Qu Wenruo
2014-10-06 3:02 ` Qu Wenruo
2014-10-06 13:26 ` Chris Mason
2014-10-07 1:01 ` Qu Wenruo
2014-10-06 13:29 ` Josef Bacik
2014-10-06 13:38 ` Eryu Guan
2014-10-07 1:03 ` Qu Wenruo
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=54223B76.1040908@redhat.com \
--to=sandeen@redhat.com \
--cc=clm@fb.com \
--cc=guaneryu@gmail.com \
--cc=linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).