From: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
To: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>, <linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] btrfs: Make btrfs handle security mount options internally to avoid losing security label.
Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2014 09:29:25 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <54329935.7080404@fb.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1411450808-14988-1-git-send-email-quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>
On 09/23/2014 01:40 AM, Qu Wenruo wrote:
> [BUG]
> Originally when mount btrfs with "-o subvol=" mount option, btrfs will
> lose all security lable.
> And if the btrfs fs is mounted somewhere else, due to the lost of
> security lable, SELinux will refuse to mount since the same super block
> is being mounted using different security lable.
>
> [REPRODUCER]
> With SELinux enabled:
> #mkfs -t btrfs /dev/sda5
> #mount -o context=system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /dev/sda5 /mnt/btrfs
> #btrfs subvolume create /mnt/btrfs/subvol
> #mount -o subvol=subvol,context=system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /dev/sda5
> /mnt/test
>
> kernel message:
> SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different security settings
> for (dev sda5, type btrfs)
>
> [REASON]
> This happens because btrfs will call vfs_kern_mount() and then
> mount_subtree() to handle subvolume name lookup.
> First mount will cut off all the security lables and when it comes to
> the second vfs_kern_mount(), it has no security label now.
>
> [FIX]
> This patch will makes btrfs behavior much more like nfs,
> which has the type flag FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA,
> making btrfs handles the security label internally.
> So security label will be set in the real mount time and won't lose
> label when use with "subvol=" mount option.
>
Please make this an xfstest, I'm going to change how subvols are mounted
in a bit and I'd like to make sure I don't break anything. Thanks,
Josef
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-10-06 13:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-09-23 5:40 [PATCH] btrfs: Make btrfs handle security mount options internally to avoid losing security label Qu Wenruo
2014-09-23 12:49 ` Chris Mason
2014-09-23 18:51 ` Eric Sandeen
2014-09-24 0:31 ` Qu Wenruo
2014-09-24 3:33 ` Eric Sandeen
2014-09-24 3:43 ` Qu Wenruo
2014-10-06 3:02 ` Qu Wenruo
2014-10-06 13:26 ` Chris Mason
2014-10-07 1:01 ` Qu Wenruo
2014-10-06 13:29 ` Josef Bacik [this message]
2014-10-06 13:38 ` Eryu Guan
2014-10-07 1:03 ` Qu Wenruo
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