From: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>
To: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>, Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>,
"Theodore Y . Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
kernel-team@meta.com, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Omar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com>,
Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>
Subject: [PATCH v3 03/17] fscrypt: expose fscrypt_nokey_name
Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 13:12:05 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6205fb63ea974cb39be20137f6e4cc7f6ed2d47a.1691510179.git.sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1691510179.git.sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>
From: Omar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com>
btrfs stores its data structures, including filenames in directories, in
its own buffer implementation, struct extent_buffer, composed of
several non-contiguous pages. We could copy filenames into a
temporary buffer and use fscrypt_match_name() against that buffer, such
extensive memcpying would be expensive. Instead, exposing
fscrypt_nokey_name as in this change allows btrfs to recapitulate
fscrypt_match_name() using methods on struct extent_buffer instead of
dealing with a raw byte array.
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com>
Signed-off-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
---
fs/crypto/fname.c | 39 +--------------------------------------
include/linux/fscrypt.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c
index edb78cd1b0e7..fb6bc46302c1 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fname.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
@@ -26,43 +25,7 @@
#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_MIN_MSG_LEN 16
/*
- * struct fscrypt_nokey_name - identifier for directory entry when key is absent
- *
- * When userspace lists an encrypted directory without access to the key, the
- * filesystem must present a unique "no-key name" for each filename that allows
- * it to find the directory entry again if requested. Naively, that would just
- * mean using the ciphertext filenames. However, since the ciphertext filenames
- * can contain illegal characters ('\0' and '/'), they must be encoded in some
- * way. We use base64url. But that can cause names to exceed NAME_MAX (255
- * bytes), so we also need to use a strong hash to abbreviate long names.
- *
- * The filesystem may also need another kind of hash, the "dirhash", to quickly
- * find the directory entry. Since filesystems normally compute the dirhash
- * over the on-disk filename (i.e. the ciphertext), it's not computable from
- * no-key names that abbreviate the ciphertext using the strong hash to fit in
- * NAME_MAX. It's also not computable if it's a keyed hash taken over the
- * plaintext (but it may still be available in the on-disk directory entry);
- * casefolded directories use this type of dirhash. At least in these cases,
- * each no-key name must include the name's dirhash too.
- *
- * To meet all these requirements, we base64url-encode the following
- * variable-length structure. It contains the dirhash, or 0's if the filesystem
- * didn't provide one; up to 149 bytes of the ciphertext name; and for
- * ciphertexts longer than 149 bytes, also the SHA-256 of the remaining bytes.
- *
- * This ensures that each no-key name contains everything needed to find the
- * directory entry again, contains only legal characters, doesn't exceed
- * NAME_MAX, is unambiguous unless there's a SHA-256 collision, and that we only
- * take the performance hit of SHA-256 on very long filenames (which are rare).
- */
-struct fscrypt_nokey_name {
- u32 dirhash[2];
- u8 bytes[149];
- u8 sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
-}; /* 189 bytes => 252 bytes base64url-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255) */
-
-/*
- * Decoded size of max-size no-key name, i.e. a name that was abbreviated using
+ * Decoded size of max-size nokey name, i.e. a name that was abbreviated using
* the strong hash and thus includes the 'sha256' field. This isn't simply
* sizeof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name), as the padding at the end isn't included.
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
index b67054a2c965..fd8cb413e718 100644
--- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h
+++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <uapi/linux/fscrypt.h>
/*
@@ -54,6 +55,42 @@ struct fscrypt_name {
#define fname_name(p) ((p)->disk_name.name)
#define fname_len(p) ((p)->disk_name.len)
+/*
+ * struct fscrypt_nokey_name - identifier for directory entry when key is absent
+ *
+ * When userspace lists an encrypted directory without access to the key, the
+ * filesystem must present a unique "no-key name" for each filename that allows
+ * it to find the directory entry again if requested. Naively, that would just
+ * mean using the ciphertext filenames. However, since the ciphertext filenames
+ * can contain illegal characters ('\0' and '/'), they must be encoded in some
+ * way. We use base64url. But that can cause names to exceed NAME_MAX (255
+ * bytes), so we also need to use a strong hash to abbreviate long names.
+ *
+ * The filesystem may also need another kind of hash, the "dirhash", to quickly
+ * find the directory entry. Since filesystems normally compute the dirhash
+ * over the on-disk filename (i.e. the ciphertext), it's not computable from
+ * no-key names that abbreviate the ciphertext using the strong hash to fit in
+ * NAME_MAX. It's also not computable if it's a keyed hash taken over the
+ * plaintext (but it may still be available in the on-disk directory entry);
+ * casefolded directories use this type of dirhash. At least in these cases,
+ * each no-key name must include the name's dirhash too.
+ *
+ * To meet all these requirements, we base64url-encode the following
+ * variable-length structure. It contains the dirhash, or 0's if the filesystem
+ * didn't provide one; up to 149 bytes of the ciphertext name; and for
+ * ciphertexts longer than 149 bytes, also the SHA-256 of the remaining bytes.
+ *
+ * This ensures that each no-key name contains everything needed to find the
+ * directory entry again, contains only legal characters, doesn't exceed
+ * NAME_MAX, is unambiguous unless there's a SHA-256 collision, and that we only
+ * take the performance hit of SHA-256 on very long filenames (which are rare).
+ */
+struct fscrypt_nokey_name {
+ u32 dirhash[2];
+ u8 bytes[149];
+ u8 sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+}; /* 189 bytes => 252 bytes base64url-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255) */
+
/* Maximum value for the third parameter of fscrypt_operations.set_context(). */
#define FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE 40
--
2.41.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-08 18:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-08-08 17:12 [PATCH v3 00/17] btrfs: add encryption feature Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 01/17] btrfs: disable various operations on encrypted inodes Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 02/17] btrfs: disable verity " Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` Sweet Tea Dorminy [this message]
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 04/17] btrfs: start using fscrypt hooks Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 05/17] btrfs: add inode encryption contexts Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-09 20:20 ` Josef Bacik
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 06/17] btrfs: add new FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ENCRYPT flag Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 07/17] btrfs: adapt readdir for encrypted and nokey names Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 08/17] btrfs: handle " Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-09 20:32 ` Josef Bacik
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 09/17] btrfs: implement fscrypt ioctls Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 10/17] btrfs: add encryption to CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 11/17] btrfs: add get_devices hook for fscrypt Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 12/17] btrfs: turn on inlinecrypt mount option for encrypt Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 13/17] btrfs: turn on the encryption ioctls Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 14/17] btrfs: create and free extent fscrypt_infos Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 15/17] btrfs: start tracking extent encryption context info Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 16/17] btrfs: explicitly track file extent length and encryption Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v3 17/17] btrfs: save and load fscrypt extent contexts Sweet Tea Dorminy
2023-08-09 20:38 ` Josef Bacik
2023-08-09 20:39 ` [PATCH v3 00/17] btrfs: add encryption feature Josef Bacik
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