[PATCH v5 4/8] fscrypt: move dirhash key setup away from IO key setup

[Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>]

The function named fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key() has as its main focus the
setting up of the fscrypt_info's ci_enc_key member, the prepared key
with which filenames or file contents are encrypted or decrypted.
However, it currently also sets up the dirhash key, used by some
directories, based on a parameter. There are no dependencies on
setting up the dirhash key beyond having the master key locked, and it's
clearer having fscrypt_setup_file_key() be only about setting up the
prepared key for IO.

Thus, move dirhash key setup to fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(), which
calls out to each function setting up parts of the fscrypt_info, and
stop passing the need_dirhash_key parameter around.

Signed-off-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>
---
 fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
index 06deac6f4487..430e2455ea2d 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
@@ -343,8 +343,7 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 }
 
 static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
-				     struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
-				     bool need_dirhash_key)
+				     struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
 {
 	int err;
 
@@ -386,25 +385,15 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 		err = fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(ci, derived_key);
 		memzero_explicit(derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
 	}
-	if (err)
-		return err;
 
-	/* Derive a secret dirhash key for directories that need it. */
-	if (need_dirhash_key) {
-		err = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(ci, mk);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
+	return err;
 }
 
 /*
  * Find or create the appropriate prepared key for an info.
  */
 static int fscrypt_setup_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
-				  struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
-				  bool need_dirhash_key)
+				  struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
 {
 	int err;
 
@@ -426,7 +415,7 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 		err = fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key(ci, mk->mk_secret.raw);
 		break;
 	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2:
-		err = fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(ci, mk, need_dirhash_key);
+		err = fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(ci, mk);
 		break;
 	default:
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
@@ -620,10 +609,26 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode,
 	if (res)
 		goto out;
 
-	res = fscrypt_setup_file_key(crypt_info, mk, need_dirhash_key);
+	res = fscrypt_setup_file_key(crypt_info, mk);
 	if (res)
 		goto out;
 
+	/*
+	 * Derive a secret dirhash key for directories that need it. It
+	 * should be impossible to set flags such that a v1 policy sets
+	 * need_dirhash_key, but check it anyway.
+	 */
+	if (need_dirhash_key) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(policy->version == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1)) {
+			res = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		res = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(crypt_info, mk);
+		if (res)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * For existing inodes, multiple tasks may race to set ->i_crypt_info.
 	 * So use cmpxchg_release().  This pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in
-- 
2.40.1