From: Duncan <1i5t5.duncan@cox.net>
To: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: btrfs-image hash collision option, super slow
Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2017 03:28:43 +0000 (UTC) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <pan$df360$39f930a0$8666bf35$41b193fc@cox.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 4bc2caf5-6f4c-4012-2bab-4daaa766d202@siedziba.pl
Piotr Pawłow posted on Sun, 12 Nov 2017 15:05:44 +0100 as excerpted:
>> The other part I'm not groking is that some filenames fail with:
>>
>> WARNING: cannot find a hash collision for 'Tool', generating garbage,
>> it won't match indexes
>
> Unfortunately there are no CRC32 collisions for any file name having 4
> or less characters when you have to keep the same file name length, and
> there may be no collisions for longer file names when you limit the
> result to ASCII only.
Hmm... Sounds reasonable, tho I hadn't thought/read of it before. But
now that I am...
What's the statistical collision spread as the number of characters
increases?
More worrying than not having /any/ collisions might be having only one,
or for that matter, some known small number less than say 1024, and
certainly less than 64 or so, since for the only one collision
possibility, once you know it wasn't the one you have, you know which one
it actually was, and chances are, with a bit of information about the
target in question, such as a suspected crime or the department at a
competing company the filesystem was from, 64 or even something like 1024
possibilities are trivial to look up in some rainbow table somewhere and
see which possibilities look interesting. Get a few of those and pretty
soon you can start putting a story together.
So it might make sense to (at least have an option to, maybe -sss) force
garbage for anything under say 6 chars or whatever, depending on how fast
the number of collisions rise, to avoid the information leak due to too
few collisions issue, particularly given that once we assume people
consider it worth going to the trouble in the first place, they likely
/are/ going to be concerned about such low number of collisions
information leakage.
--
Duncan - List replies preferred. No HTML msgs.
"Every nonfree program has a lord, a master --
and if you use the program, he is your master." Richard Stallman
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-13 3:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-12 0:18 btrfs-image hash collision option, super slow Chris Murphy
2017-11-12 0:42 ` Hugo Mills
2017-11-12 0:54 ` Chris Murphy
2017-11-12 14:05 ` Piotr Pawłow
2017-11-13 3:28 ` Duncan [this message]
2017-11-13 3:42 ` Chris Murphy
2017-11-13 8:02 ` Piotr Pawłow
2017-11-13 18:18 ` Chris Murphy
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